"The RSPCA advert breached breached CAP Code clauses 3.1, 3.2 (Substantiation) and 7.1 (Truthfulness)."
That was the conclusion of an investigation of the 'Back off Badgers' campaign run by the RSPCA this spring.Taken to task by the FUW (Farmers Union of Wales) and an individual (un named) farmer, their complaint against the RSPCA was today upheld. The campaign run by the charity, (together with the Badger Trust) alerted their followers to the government's consultation paper on how, when and if it should cull badgers in response to outbreaks of bTb.
We covered their high profile campaign, in our post here and the Telegraph reported;
http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2006/03/rspca-under-investigation.html
The FUW case to the ASA rested on the RSPCA's assertion that cattle were to blame for the spread of bTb. And the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) today supported their complaint, describing the charity's campaign as being untrue and unsubstantiated. The outcome of this decision could have caused immense damage to a government consultation process on disease control. That the responsibility for this very serious zoonotic disease is wholly Defra's seems to slipped everyone's mind - especially the RSPCA's - but let that pass.
The Farmers’ Union of Wales (FUW) president Gareth Vaughan said this morning : "
Defra received 47,472 responses to the consultation and the vast majority were campaign responses prompted by, and supportive of, the RSPCA stance. The RSPCA itself claimed: "Our campaign to try to stop the proposed cull of badgers has received a fantastic response. Thousands of you wrote to the government in opposition of the cull……more than 10,000 people showed their support for the campaign by sending a text message to the government in opposition of the cull. A booklet of your text messages was presented to the government, along with the RSPCA's official response to the government consultation on the proposed cull."
Mr Vaughan said: "It seems clear that the vast majority of responses will have been made by people who were severely misguided by the RSPCA’s advertising campaign and those opposing a cull should now be disregarded. The repercussions of the RSPCA’s untruthful and unsubstantiated advertisements are truly huge. Today’s ASA ruling should serve as a warning to all pressure groups that they cannot twist the truth to subvert a public consultation process for their own blinkered ends."
In light of the ASA ruling, the FUW has written to Defra asking it to review the outcome of the consultation.
FUW policy officer Nick Fenwick, who lodged the complaint with the ASA, said: "The RSPCA has in recent years pursued an increasingly extremist agenda, and the fact that it published such misinformation in an attempt to influence an important government consultation demonstrates the depths it will stoop to follow that agenda."
In its evidence to the ASA, the FUW supplied the ASA with an overwhelming body of evidence from leading scientists, politicians and veterinarians, supporting the fact that the RSPCA was wrong to claim unequivocally that most TB is spread by cattle.
The FUW said "Our evidence even included sources quoted by the RSPCA itself, which highlights its inability to deal objectively with the scientific facts. In fact, we believe that most of the research points to badgers being the major cause of TB in cattle."
Click here to access the ASA website and click here for the FUW.
The conclusion of the Advertising Standards Agency's investigation is below:
"We noted the ad aimed to highlight that a cull of badgers would not stop the spread of bTB and considered that readers were likely to understand it in the context of the RSPCA's position as a well-known advocate of animal welfare. We also noted the RSPCA's assertion that the ad was intended to inform readers that the issue was not straightforward. We considered, however, that the claim was a straightforward and unqualified statement which, in the context of the ad, was used to support the RSPCA's position. We considered that the claim did not reasonably provide readers with an indication of the caution and uncertainty among scientists and government advisers surrounding the relative importance of the two factors in bTB transmission. We also considered that the RSPCA's reputation and public profile was likely to enhance readers' acceptance of the claim. Although we acknowledged that the opinion of scientists and government advisers indicated that cattle-to-cattle transmission was an important factor and may have been the main cause, we considered that it was not generally agreed by expert opinion or supported by the available evidence. We concluded that the RSPCA had not substantiated the claim or shown that it was generally agreed by informed opinion."
The ad breached CAP Code clauses 3.1, 3.2 (Substantiation) and 7.1 (Truthfulness).
Full judgement: ASA website
The RSPCA enjoys "charitable" status, and as such is regulated by the Charity Commission.
One wonders what their view will be of the antics of one its most high profile members, found guilty of committing breaches of "substantiation" and "truthfulness". As we have said before, such organisations are not a solution, or even part of the solution to bTb, they are the problem.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
90 pages of.........Fluff.
The editor and her team of 14 Very Important Persons profess 'pride' in their glossy booklet, which Defra has produced to promote 'Disease Control, Animal welfare, Consumer protection and Public health'. Not doing too well on bTb are they? Unless a succession of glossy booklets and stakeholder partnerships count as 'Disease control'.Foreword;
"I am proud to present you with the first Government Veterinary Journal bovine TB special edition." can be viewed here
Editor Linda Smith then enthuses that her readers will 'learn from it', pointing out that 'contributions have been made by some of the UK's leading authorities on bovine tuberculosis".
Aside from making the damn thing sound like a MacDonald's Special, what, may one ask, has the editor, or anyone else involved in this whole charade got to be proud of?
After almost eradicating bTb in the 1980's, the 2005 figures for bTb are back where GB was in the 1950's at the start of the Tb eradication programme. Define progress?
Skimming the 90 page A4 tome's content shows little new, even less to be enthusiatic about - even its "recycled paper, containing 80 per cent consumer waste, and 20 per cent totally chlorine free virgin pulp," could probably have been better used - eeerr elsewhere.
The introduction by the CVO Debbie Reynolds contains many weasel words - stakeholders, partners and the commitment of Government to developing policies. Then she spoils it all by regurgitating the first year's Krebs results - yup, the ones John Bourne was spitting feathers about and alleging he was being misquoted in our post here.
Dr. Reynolds also mentions pre movement testing, about which she is enthusiastic and the tabular valuation which she says "is designed to be fairer to both cattle owners and taxpayers" . That is a matter of opinion, but is now somewhat outdated by the EU bombshell of last week, which we covered here.
She concludes: "The range of policy mechanisms available for controlling Tb depends largely on achieving a better understanding of the disease, how it is spread, and the effectiveness and practicality of interventions and the outcomes of our research programme and other evidence will help us with this."Understanding the disease? It's really quite simple. Badgers carry bTb - in some cases an overwhelming load from which they eventually die - and cattle are curious.
To identify another creature, cattle sniff and smell (see above)
And if that 'other creature' is carrying mycobacterium bovis in its lungs, urine or pus ridden bite wounds, as infected badgers do - 300 units in just 1ml of urine - then a sniff of just 70 units of the bacteria is enough to flag up a reaction in the skin test. And that means another dead sentinel cow.
We are back to the appalling level of bTb reactors slaughtered of 1959 - in fact last year we exceeded it - and the lady wants more research? Almost 50 years wasted, 30,000 cattle dead annually, our trading status in tatters and the spill over from infected badgers affecting cats, dogs, pigs and camelids - and the lady wants more research? Sheeesh.
The Parliamentary Questions archived on this site were the millenium equivalent of the Evans postulates - the gold standard in epidemiology. What do we know about this disease? How is spread? For how long and under what circumstances can the bacterium survive? What is the infectious load carried by an infected badger, and how long can it survive carrying it? How little does it take to infect a cow? What are the transmission opportunities? And all the other 532 questions answered patiently - or not - by baby Ben Bradshaw, with the Minister finally admitting that "Government recognises that eradication of bovine Tb is unlikely to be achieved in the next 10 years using current control methods" Well he got that right and he continues "A desirable outcome would be achieve Officially Tb free status, as defined in EU Directive 64/432/EEC".
But from Ricardo de la Rua Domenech's charts in this dead tree booklet (OK, recycled dead tree ) that ain't going to happen any time soon. Only Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Italy and Spain have a worse record of disease clearance. The UK (GB) trend over the period 1999- 2004 is unique in the Community, described as 'Increasing steadily'. Something else for the contributers and editors of this book to be proud of?
Other contributers from the circle of Tb beneficiaries, offer their thoughts on the Intradermal skin test (good world wide tool - yup we knew that) the value of NVL reactors ; not 'false positives' but animals picked up early in the disease transmission cycle (yup- it was useful, but Lelystad tuberclin has stuffed that) and wildlife interface in other countries. Been there as well.
But there is nothing in this booklet about the disease in badgers. Nothing to show the extraordinary suffering, starvation and suppurating abcesses that these creatures are enduring - and spreading to cattle and onwards and upwards into other species. And absolutely nothing about which Ms. Linda Smith and her team should be in the least bit 'proud'.
Those with a strong constitution may view the evidence of abandoning the problem of bTb in badgers at: http://www.warmwell.com/tbbadger.html (Warning: This picture should offend)
Another glossy booklet and a new committee is not a solution to the problem of bTb, which after twenty years of prevarication is now "endemic" in the UK's badgers and producing an "epidemic" in the sentinel cattle. (thankyou Ben) This gaggle of bTb beneficiaries - including Ms. Smith and her editorial team - are the problem. They should hang their heads in shame.
Sunday, September 24, 2006
More on the EU Animal compensation cut...
After our posting below, which sketched out Commission proposals to change the rates of animal disease compensation payable to reporting farmers in member states, more from that document has surfaced - although we expect it to be of little use to UK farmers. Defra - formerly MAFF in a new jacket - have a history of making things more complicated for, or of less value to their so-called 'partners' - or any other member of the European club for that matter.
The Commission proposals limit animal disease compensation paid by all member states to 75% of market value (80% in LFAs, Less Favoured Areas) and then only to businesses able to substantiate a 30 percent loss. And any compensation would be limited to 'small or medium sized' enterprises.
But hidden in the depths of the paperwork is an option to offset 'consequential losses'.
These occur when farms are put under a 'restriction notice by Defra, and can be as expensive and onerous as the death of the individual candidate animal(s). The farm cannot trade at all, except for direct slaughter, or, in rare circumstances and with Defra's permission, to another holding of the same status. That means a standstill on all breeding stock sales, store stock and calf sales. Only finished beef animals and cull cattle can move, and then direct to abattoir or via dedicated collection centres.
As we have pointed out before, the accumulation of extra stock numbers may cause problems with pressure on feed and housing, and with tuberculosis restriction, the testing of all cattle every 60 days for years at a time, is time consuming and stressful both to men and beasts.
But within the EU package - and we are not defending it in any way ( see on our sister site;
http://www.eureferendum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2725 ) is a section on such 'consequential losses'. Although member states would be limited to paying only threequarters of market value on an individual animal, and then only in a breakdown which involved a 30 per cent loss to the business concerned, a further 75 percent of cash could be available for 'consequential losses' of the disease.
Defra however, is indicating 'shock horror', and that it has no intention of taking advantage of this option, stating: "Current UK policy is that we do not pay for consequential losses".
More here: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=4601
The whole point of this debacle, with the greatest respect to Defra and its numerous spokesmen (and women of course) is that Defra have very little choice in the matter anyway. That competance has been signed away to the unelected and nebulous 'Commission', who in our humble opinion have got this particular rule change totally, recklessly and dangerously - wrong.
The Commission proposals limit animal disease compensation paid by all member states to 75% of market value (80% in LFAs, Less Favoured Areas) and then only to businesses able to substantiate a 30 percent loss. And any compensation would be limited to 'small or medium sized' enterprises.
But hidden in the depths of the paperwork is an option to offset 'consequential losses'.
These occur when farms are put under a 'restriction notice by Defra, and can be as expensive and onerous as the death of the individual candidate animal(s). The farm cannot trade at all, except for direct slaughter, or, in rare circumstances and with Defra's permission, to another holding of the same status. That means a standstill on all breeding stock sales, store stock and calf sales. Only finished beef animals and cull cattle can move, and then direct to abattoir or via dedicated collection centres.
As we have pointed out before, the accumulation of extra stock numbers may cause problems with pressure on feed and housing, and with tuberculosis restriction, the testing of all cattle every 60 days for years at a time, is time consuming and stressful both to men and beasts.
But within the EU package - and we are not defending it in any way ( see on our sister site;
http://www.eureferendum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2725 ) is a section on such 'consequential losses'. Although member states would be limited to paying only threequarters of market value on an individual animal, and then only in a breakdown which involved a 30 per cent loss to the business concerned, a further 75 percent of cash could be available for 'consequential losses' of the disease.
Defra however, is indicating 'shock horror', and that it has no intention of taking advantage of this option, stating: "Current UK policy is that we do not pay for consequential losses".
More here: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=4601
The whole point of this debacle, with the greatest respect to Defra and its numerous spokesmen (and women of course) is that Defra have very little choice in the matter anyway. That competance has been signed away to the unelected and nebulous 'Commission', who in our humble opinion have got this particular rule change totally, recklessly and dangerously - wrong.
Saturday, September 16, 2006
Copy Cats...
In our posting :
http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2005/04/anything-you-can-do.html , we described some of the measures undertaken by the Irish, against cattle / cattle spread of Tb during what was known as the 'Downie' era in an effort to circumvent the tb problem - without encroaching into the disease in badgers. Exactly mirroring the contortions, prevarications and general arrogance of our own dear Defra - twenty years later. And with the same result of course.
A snippet of information to build on that has come in from a farmer who has a better memory for these things than we do, about the effect of this water-treading on the veterinary profession as well. In the postings discussing Lelystadt tuberculin, Defra's smokescreen was 'veterinary practise' about which the CVO issued a report. But if the SVS and LVI vets conducted cattle tb tests on several hundred cattle, in the way in which they were supposed to - and able to - on ten, then all these clerical 'technical errors' (primarily concerned with who writes eartag numbers down, and who measures with calipers the skin thickness on day one etc.,) would double the time taken to conduct the test.
And this, we are told, happened in Ireland during the late 1980's. In a broadside aimed at its practising vets, the Irish Ministry of Agriculture at the time issued instructions not dissimilar from our own Debbie Reynold's 'retraining' manual. The result being of course, that a Tb test would take twice as long, and up with which the Irish vets would not put. Well, not for the same money anyway. They went on strike. And for a period of time, variously described to us as 18 months to two years, no cattle were tested at all.
Defra seems to have a nasty habit of repeating vacuous efforts of the past, while ignoring anything of note (PCR) which may drive targeted detection of bTb nearer. But I wonder what our own veterinary profession's reaction will be, when after its 'refresher course' in Tb testing, it realises that it is expected to do twice the (clerical) work - for effectively half the money?
Any bets on it being the same as the Irish vets of the 1980's?
http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2005/04/anything-you-can-do.html , we described some of the measures undertaken by the Irish, against cattle / cattle spread of Tb during what was known as the 'Downie' era in an effort to circumvent the tb problem - without encroaching into the disease in badgers. Exactly mirroring the contortions, prevarications and general arrogance of our own dear Defra - twenty years later. And with the same result of course.
A snippet of information to build on that has come in from a farmer who has a better memory for these things than we do, about the effect of this water-treading on the veterinary profession as well. In the postings discussing Lelystadt tuberculin, Defra's smokescreen was 'veterinary practise' about which the CVO issued a report. But if the SVS and LVI vets conducted cattle tb tests on several hundred cattle, in the way in which they were supposed to - and able to - on ten, then all these clerical 'technical errors' (primarily concerned with who writes eartag numbers down, and who measures with calipers the skin thickness on day one etc.,) would double the time taken to conduct the test.
And this, we are told, happened in Ireland during the late 1980's. In a broadside aimed at its practising vets, the Irish Ministry of Agriculture at the time issued instructions not dissimilar from our own Debbie Reynold's 'retraining' manual. The result being of course, that a Tb test would take twice as long, and up with which the Irish vets would not put. Well, not for the same money anyway. They went on strike. And for a period of time, variously described to us as 18 months to two years, no cattle were tested at all.
Defra seems to have a nasty habit of repeating vacuous efforts of the past, while ignoring anything of note (PCR) which may drive targeted detection of bTb nearer. But I wonder what our own veterinary profession's reaction will be, when after its 'refresher course' in Tb testing, it realises that it is expected to do twice the (clerical) work - for effectively half the money?
Any bets on it being the same as the Irish vets of the 1980's?
Thursday, September 14, 2006
Compensation - all change again?
Compensation for animal diseases is set to change dramatically as of January 1st 2007 - and as far as we can see, there is little the UK government can do about it, even if it wanted to.
Out to tender from Sept. 8th, but with a closing date of September 17th, is the following 'consultation paper', which has been forwarded by the moderators of www.warmwell.com
Proposed EC changes to slaughter compensation
Defra has informed participants at their recent FMD, CSF and Avian Influenza Stakeholder meetings that the EC is proposing changes to the state aids regulations for agriculture. We urge you to read and discuss with others these proposed changes as they would appear to have serious consequences for livestock keepers and could constitute an unacceptable disincentive to reporting of suspicious signs.
Note that the consultation deadline is 17 September 2006, and that the changes are currently due to come into force on 1 January 2007 . This matter deserves wide public dissemination.
Please do send your comments directly to the EC at the address below (email: Agri-State-Aids@ec.europa.eu), and we invite you to comment and discuss these issues on our CA Forum and include your submission to the EC if you wish. We also invite comments on the role of Member States.
According to Defra: “State aid is Commission competence. This means that the Commission has been given the power by Member States to decide which forms of aid are to be allowed and under which conditions. There are therefore no negotiations or vote on these issues – the Commission will decide having listened to the views of the Member States and those with an interest.”
Extracts from a Defra email to stakeholders dated 8 September 2006: “We have just been made aware that they are holding a public consultation period which ends on the 17 September. Comments can be sent to the following address/fax/email. European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture, Unit H.2, Office Loi 130 05/126, B-1049 Brussels, Fax (32-2) 296 76 72, E-mail: Agri-State-Aids@ec.europa.eu
These changes are currently due to come into force on 1 January 2006 [correction: 1 January 2007] and would have the following implications:
* Limit aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);
* Limit compensation payments for animals slaughtered to 75% of their market value (80% in less favoured areas (LFAs)
* Limit compensation for animals slaughtered to outbreaks of disease which result in a 30% production loss on the holding concerned.
Article 10 contains the relevant information on 'Aid in respect of animal and plant diseases and pest infestations'.”
The briefing document sent by Defra is available on the CA Forum at :
http://www.fmd-and-csf-action.org/forums/csf/post200609049339214573
Extracts from this document: "As the Community Animal Health Policy is currently under review we are questioning whether it is appropriate to introduce quickly a temporary new policy at this moment in time. State aid is Commission competence. This means that the Commission has been given the power by Member States to decide which forms of aid are to be allowed and under which conditions. There are therefore no negotiations or vote on these issues – the Commission will decide having listened to the views of the Member States and those with an interest. The Commission is likely to launch a public consultation on the Block Exemption Regulation shortly. There will then be a further consultation of the Member States in the autumn. We have previously circulated the links to the relevant documents, but they are attached again for ease. The Block Exemption Regulation can be found on the Commission website at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/
exemption/commprop_en.pdf
The Article 10 on page 14 is the relevant section. The proposed revised guidelines are also attached, the animal diseases section begins at paragraph 121 on page 30.” The document with the proposed revised guidelines that Defra sent to stakeholders has only 24 pages, so we ask Defra to please post this information with the correct page and paragraph reference on the Defra website.
From: Mary Marshall, Member, Defra’s FMD, CSF and Avian Influenza stakeholder groups
The extent to which the UK has lost control - or rather its elected representatives have given or bartered it away - is quite clear, when this 'consultation' is taken in the context of previous EU legislation already in statute.
We understand that new guidelines, described as "the strengthened partnership with national parliaments", were announced by the Commission on May 10th, and endorsed by EU at the June summit. From September 11th. 2006, all the Commission's new legislative proposals and consultation papers will be sent by e-mail, to national parliaments for 'comment'.
But this 'partnership' is in name only, in that national parliaments and their elected MPs, have the right to receive the Commission proposals directly, but not the formal right to oppose them.
Margot Wallstrom, Vice-President of the European Commission is quoted as saying" A greater voice for Parliaments is a greater voice for Europe's citizens". Which is all well and good, but does not mean that the commission is under any obligation whatsoever to follow up on any 'opinions and comments' which it receives. As the Commisssion says " The procedure does not change existing legislative procedures forseen by the Treaties".
For more on the background to how our decision making process has been culled, see our sister site; http://www.eureferendum.blogspot.com/#115827296907923081
So dear old Defra in a spin over this, we understand. They seem unable or unaware of just how to operate the EU's instructions on animal compensation due to be introduced on January 1st 2007, and are presently trying to interpret how the key elements which will affect UK farmers. In particular how they define:
* Limit aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
* Limit compensation payments for animals slaughtered to 75% of the market value (80% in less favoured areas (LFAs)
* Limit compensation for animals slaughtered to outbreaks of disease which result in a 30% production loss on the holding concerned.
And they have just one week in which to - say anything at all to the Commission, having presumably agreed to this procedure at the June summit. How this will pan out with Tb compensation is anybody's guess. Defra haven't a clue, so why should we?
So from a professional 'valuation' procedure, we have been shafted onto a 'one size fits none' tabular chart - with little chance of obtaining insurance to prop up pedigree values. And now our lords and masters in Brussels are preparing to ratchet 'values' down again. From what we can see in some instances, to perhaps nothing at all. And all in a year..........
This is not helpful in the due process of disease control. For that, full co operation with the owners of affected livestock is crucial. If they feel that they cannot 'afford' to report a suspect animal, then they will not. Long term, that has huge implications for any disease control programme - particularly zoonoses like tuberculosis. Perhaps we should have entitled this posting 'Cheques and Balances'. More in Farmers Guardian today.
Out to tender from Sept. 8th, but with a closing date of September 17th, is the following 'consultation paper', which has been forwarded by the moderators of www.warmwell.com
Proposed EC changes to slaughter compensation
Defra has informed participants at their recent FMD, CSF and Avian Influenza Stakeholder meetings that the EC is proposing changes to the state aids regulations for agriculture. We urge you to read and discuss with others these proposed changes as they would appear to have serious consequences for livestock keepers and could constitute an unacceptable disincentive to reporting of suspicious signs.
Note that the consultation deadline is 17 September 2006, and that the changes are currently due to come into force on 1 January 2007 . This matter deserves wide public dissemination.
Please do send your comments directly to the EC at the address below (email: Agri-State-Aids@ec.europa.eu), and we invite you to comment and discuss these issues on our CA Forum and include your submission to the EC if you wish. We also invite comments on the role of Member States.
According to Defra: “State aid is Commission competence. This means that the Commission has been given the power by Member States to decide which forms of aid are to be allowed and under which conditions. There are therefore no negotiations or vote on these issues – the Commission will decide having listened to the views of the Member States and those with an interest.”
Extracts from a Defra email to stakeholders dated 8 September 2006: “We have just been made aware that they are holding a public consultation period which ends on the 17 September. Comments can be sent to the following address/fax/email. European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture, Unit H.2, Office Loi 130 05/126, B-1049 Brussels, Fax (32-2) 296 76 72, E-mail: Agri-State-Aids@ec.europa.eu
These changes are currently due to come into force on 1 January 2006 [correction: 1 January 2007] and would have the following implications:
* Limit aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);
* Limit compensation payments for animals slaughtered to 75% of their market value (80% in less favoured areas (LFAs)
* Limit compensation for animals slaughtered to outbreaks of disease which result in a 30% production loss on the holding concerned.
Article 10 contains the relevant information on 'Aid in respect of animal and plant diseases and pest infestations'.”
The briefing document sent by Defra is available on the CA Forum at :
http://www.fmd-and-csf-action.org/forums/csf/post200609049339214573
Extracts from this document: "As the Community Animal Health Policy is currently under review we are questioning whether it is appropriate to introduce quickly a temporary new policy at this moment in time. State aid is Commission competence. This means that the Commission has been given the power by Member States to decide which forms of aid are to be allowed and under which conditions. There are therefore no negotiations or vote on these issues – the Commission will decide having listened to the views of the Member States and those with an interest. The Commission is likely to launch a public consultation on the Block Exemption Regulation shortly. There will then be a further consultation of the Member States in the autumn. We have previously circulated the links to the relevant documents, but they are attached again for ease. The Block Exemption Regulation can be found on the Commission website at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/
exemption/commprop_en.pdf
The Article 10 on page 14 is the relevant section. The proposed revised guidelines are also attached, the animal diseases section begins at paragraph 121 on page 30.” The document with the proposed revised guidelines that Defra sent to stakeholders has only 24 pages, so we ask Defra to please post this information with the correct page and paragraph reference on the Defra website.
From: Mary Marshall, Member, Defra’s FMD, CSF and Avian Influenza stakeholder groups
The extent to which the UK has lost control - or rather its elected representatives have given or bartered it away - is quite clear, when this 'consultation' is taken in the context of previous EU legislation already in statute.
We understand that new guidelines, described as "the strengthened partnership with national parliaments", were announced by the Commission on May 10th, and endorsed by EU at the June summit. From September 11th. 2006, all the Commission's new legislative proposals and consultation papers will be sent by e-mail, to national parliaments for 'comment'.
But this 'partnership' is in name only, in that national parliaments and their elected MPs, have the right to receive the Commission proposals directly, but not the formal right to oppose them.
Margot Wallstrom, Vice-President of the European Commission is quoted as saying" A greater voice for Parliaments is a greater voice for Europe's citizens". Which is all well and good, but does not mean that the commission is under any obligation whatsoever to follow up on any 'opinions and comments' which it receives. As the Commisssion says " The procedure does not change existing legislative procedures forseen by the Treaties".
For more on the background to how our decision making process has been culled, see our sister site; http://www.eureferendum.blogspot.com/#115827296907923081
So dear old Defra in a spin over this, we understand. They seem unable or unaware of just how to operate the EU's instructions on animal compensation due to be introduced on January 1st 2007, and are presently trying to interpret how the key elements which will affect UK farmers. In particular how they define:
* Limit aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
* Limit compensation payments for animals slaughtered to 75% of the market value (80% in less favoured areas (LFAs)
* Limit compensation for animals slaughtered to outbreaks of disease which result in a 30% production loss on the holding concerned.
And they have just one week in which to - say anything at all to the Commission, having presumably agreed to this procedure at the June summit. How this will pan out with Tb compensation is anybody's guess. Defra haven't a clue, so why should we?
So from a professional 'valuation' procedure, we have been shafted onto a 'one size fits none' tabular chart - with little chance of obtaining insurance to prop up pedigree values. And now our lords and masters in Brussels are preparing to ratchet 'values' down again. From what we can see in some instances, to perhaps nothing at all. And all in a year..........
This is not helpful in the due process of disease control. For that, full co operation with the owners of affected livestock is crucial. If they feel that they cannot 'afford' to report a suspect animal, then they will not. Long term, that has huge implications for any disease control programme - particularly zoonoses like tuberculosis. Perhaps we should have entitled this posting 'Cheques and Balances'. More in Farmers Guardian today.
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
'Cream' is the new 'Fern'.
In a squabble which echoes the case of Devon farmer Sheilagh Kremers and her Dexter calf Fern, a Cornish beef farmer from Looe, is challenging defra over his 'Cream'.
This time the animal is a twelve year old beef cow, whose Tb test was positive. Owner Mr. Arthur however is refusing to let her go for slaughter, claiming the test was not carried out properly. He has banned Defra from his land, meaning that the cow cannot be valued (at approx. £680) collected and slaughtered. However, SVS has in this case, refused to retest the 12 year old cross bred beef cow and stand behind the veterinary surgeon who conducted the test.
Quoted in the Western Morning News, Mr. Arthur said: "I am demanding that she is given a retest to give her the benefit of the doubt. I don't believe she is carrying the disease and I'm willing to carry this through."
But a spokesman for Defra replied: "We are aware of a case in Cornwall where a farmer has disputed the way in which a TB test was carried out on his premises.The State Veterinary Service has spoken to the local veterinary inspector who performed the test and are content that it was performed satisfactorily. A request for a retest has been refused as there is no reason to suppose that there was any fault or problem with the first test.The purpose of TB testing is, of course, to prevent the spread of the disease in cattle and this is why it is imperative that an animal which has tested positive is slaughtered."
When an animal is found to be reactor to the intradermal skin test, the vet who has conducted the test immediately serves a 'standstill' notice on the farm. No animals can be traded at all, except for direct slaughter until the whole herd tests clear at least once. And this is now the position of Mr. Arthur. He can sell nothing at all until 'Cream' is slaughtered, and, depending on the post mortem results, all his cattle have had at least one clear test. If the reactor cow (Cream) has lesions, or samples from her prove 'culture positive' then he will need two tests at 60 day intervals to get his herd clear again. Assuming there are no more reactors lurking he is looking at a standstill of at least two months from when 'Cream' leaves the farm, and possibly four. And the longer she stays, the longer this beef farmer will be unable to trade any of his stock. And the longer he will have no income.
Unlike Mrs. Kremer's Dexter calf, which was part of a much loved ' hobby' herd, Mr. Arthur is a beef farmer with over a hundred cattle. He needs to sell cattle for his living, and with a standstill on his herd, this he cannot do. His protest to Defra is therefore very different, and from all directions both trade and other income, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affiars have him over a proverbial barrel.
the Western morning News article quotes 'farmers' (they didn't ask us) as suggesting that the intrdermal skin test is "not 100 percent accurate". In fact on the back of the Kremer's case, Defra sent a few clerks out with both SVS and LVI vets to see if 'I's were being dotted and 'Ts' crossed. And shock, horror they were not. Nothing to do with the actual physical jabbing you understand, but 'vets were not filling out eartag numbers', and 'vets were not putting 5 digit Lelystadt batch numbers into 3 box batch codes, so that they could be read'.
As far as your contributers are concerned, they have utmost faith in the skin test, particularly as a herd test, as in the case of Mr. Arthur. And also its veterinary practitioners. Used around the globe, either with or without a comparable avian jab, this test is the primary tool for diagnosis of exposure to tb bacterium. Not full blown disease, but exposure to the bacteria. And as we have said many times, and as PQ's confirmed, in the absence of a wildlife reservoir, it is the only tool that is necessary.
If of course a country is daft enough to let Tb establish and flourish within a wildlife reservoir, then nothing is going to eradicate it. Not intradermal skin tests, gamma interferon, PCR or the man in the moon.
In this case, Defra cannot afford another 'Fern', and Mr. Arthur cannot afford a prolonged standstill of his business. 'Cream' has to go.
This time the animal is a twelve year old beef cow, whose Tb test was positive. Owner Mr. Arthur however is refusing to let her go for slaughter, claiming the test was not carried out properly. He has banned Defra from his land, meaning that the cow cannot be valued (at approx. £680) collected and slaughtered. However, SVS has in this case, refused to retest the 12 year old cross bred beef cow and stand behind the veterinary surgeon who conducted the test.
Quoted in the Western Morning News, Mr. Arthur said: "I am demanding that she is given a retest to give her the benefit of the doubt. I don't believe she is carrying the disease and I'm willing to carry this through."
But a spokesman for Defra replied: "We are aware of a case in Cornwall where a farmer has disputed the way in which a TB test was carried out on his premises.The State Veterinary Service has spoken to the local veterinary inspector who performed the test and are content that it was performed satisfactorily. A request for a retest has been refused as there is no reason to suppose that there was any fault or problem with the first test.The purpose of TB testing is, of course, to prevent the spread of the disease in cattle and this is why it is imperative that an animal which has tested positive is slaughtered."
When an animal is found to be reactor to the intradermal skin test, the vet who has conducted the test immediately serves a 'standstill' notice on the farm. No animals can be traded at all, except for direct slaughter until the whole herd tests clear at least once. And this is now the position of Mr. Arthur. He can sell nothing at all until 'Cream' is slaughtered, and, depending on the post mortem results, all his cattle have had at least one clear test. If the reactor cow (Cream) has lesions, or samples from her prove 'culture positive' then he will need two tests at 60 day intervals to get his herd clear again. Assuming there are no more reactors lurking he is looking at a standstill of at least two months from when 'Cream' leaves the farm, and possibly four. And the longer she stays, the longer this beef farmer will be unable to trade any of his stock. And the longer he will have no income.
Unlike Mrs. Kremer's Dexter calf, which was part of a much loved ' hobby' herd, Mr. Arthur is a beef farmer with over a hundred cattle. He needs to sell cattle for his living, and with a standstill on his herd, this he cannot do. His protest to Defra is therefore very different, and from all directions both trade and other income, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affiars have him over a proverbial barrel.
the Western morning News article quotes 'farmers' (they didn't ask us) as suggesting that the intrdermal skin test is "not 100 percent accurate". In fact on the back of the Kremer's case, Defra sent a few clerks out with both SVS and LVI vets to see if 'I's were being dotted and 'Ts' crossed. And shock, horror they were not. Nothing to do with the actual physical jabbing you understand, but 'vets were not filling out eartag numbers', and 'vets were not putting 5 digit Lelystadt batch numbers into 3 box batch codes, so that they could be read'.
As far as your contributers are concerned, they have utmost faith in the skin test, particularly as a herd test, as in the case of Mr. Arthur. And also its veterinary practitioners. Used around the globe, either with or without a comparable avian jab, this test is the primary tool for diagnosis of exposure to tb bacterium. Not full blown disease, but exposure to the bacteria. And as we have said many times, and as PQ's confirmed, in the absence of a wildlife reservoir, it is the only tool that is necessary.
If of course a country is daft enough to let Tb establish and flourish within a wildlife reservoir, then nothing is going to eradicate it. Not intradermal skin tests, gamma interferon, PCR or the man in the moon.
In this case, Defra cannot afford another 'Fern', and Mr. Arthur cannot afford a prolonged standstill of his business. 'Cream' has to go.
Saturday, September 09, 2006
"My trial is good science......"
.....and the critics are wrong. In this weeks’ farming press, John Bourne hits back at his critics - or if you prefer, throws his teddies out of the ISG pram. In an interview with Alistair Driver, for Farmers Guardian, he blamed pressure from politicians in general and the Minister in particular, for causing ‘confusion’ over his trial - or to be more precise, his first and only years’ results published so far.
Calling the Minister’s "Consultation on Badger Culling", a complete waste of time, Professor Bourne said that things had been "rushed through to meet a timetable but we couldn’t do it in the timescale we were working to". As a result, the document made "many inaccurate statements. For example two of the proposals for taking badgers out were shown in our trials to make the situation worse".
Professor Bourne said that the 20 – 60% culling efficiency figure presented in the Defra consultation document was "wrong, absolutely and categorically wrong". (What was it then, less than 20%? Sheeesh) He continued, having hurled a few more toys, " It was only based on an assessment after the first cull, but that was never made clear".
Errr. Yes. But having heard all the world and his dog speak on this subject, did we really miss the strident voice of the diminutive John Bourne announcing that this set of tortured data, presented in autumn 2005 - SEVEN years after the trial started - only made up his first year’s results, should not be relied upon, and was inaccurate in its conclusions anyway? No. I thought not. Neither did he stamp his foot at those politicians / un-civil servants allegedly pressurising him, as he has done so many times in the past with us lesser mortals. ‘Sound science’ can not be subject to the sort of meddling – unless of course its result is an excuse for more prevarication by its paymaster. That Bourne is a paper shield for Defra’s continuing intransigence is unequivocal. That the good Professor has yet to realise this, is more worrying.
Professor Bourne categorically denied that he was against badger culling saying: " What I am against is culling that is not effective, and makes the situation worse". Aren't we all.
Full report: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=24&storycode=4292
Alongside Professor Bourne’s spirited defence of his trial, is the sorry tale of one farmer, unfortunate enough to be in the middle of it. Describing how, after a ‘hit and run’ visit by the Krebs team in June 2000, this North Cornish dairy farm, housing a closed herd of pedigree cattle became a mecca for badgers and endured a Tb breakdown lasting almost 5 years, farmer Pat Bird is less than sympathetic to Professor Bourne’s indignation.
As the tests on this farm, and its neighbours, continued with 60 day depressing regularity and the mound of dead cattle grew, Bourne’s ‘Reactive’ culling team, charged with clearing out badgers in response to a breakdown, failed to turn up at all. No wonder the Reactive figures were shown to ‘increase tb’. Well they would, wouldn’t they if the Krebs lot didn't come? As her farm became laced with badger trials, Mrs. Bird describes Bourne’s trial as a ‘death sentence’ for her cattle, and suggests it could be renamed ‘Badger Dispersal Trial’.
Full article: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?storycode=4294
And farmers are not the only people with first hand knowledge of the ‘rigorous and robust’ work, done by the Krebs team, now so vigourously and indignantly defended by Professor Bourne. We covered in the post http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2006/03/robust-basis-of-krebs.html comments from Paul Caruana, a Senior Manager of the trial's Wildlife teams who said " The whole basis of Krebs was to remove badgers off the ground. For the first four years, that effort was farcical, due to restrictions placed upon us. The trial had too many flaws in it to be trusted to produce meaningful evidence. How much weight do we give the latest ISG report, detailing their ‘robust’ findings to the minister? If it were down to me and my staff, very little".
With vets, his Wildlife teams and now participating farmers saying how weak this ‘trial' was, Professor Bourne must be feeling a tad lonely out there.
Calling the Minister’s "Consultation on Badger Culling", a complete waste of time, Professor Bourne said that things had been "rushed through to meet a timetable but we couldn’t do it in the timescale we were working to". As a result, the document made "many inaccurate statements. For example two of the proposals for taking badgers out were shown in our trials to make the situation worse".
Professor Bourne said that the 20 – 60% culling efficiency figure presented in the Defra consultation document was "wrong, absolutely and categorically wrong". (What was it then, less than 20%? Sheeesh) He continued, having hurled a few more toys, " It was only based on an assessment after the first cull, but that was never made clear".
Errr. Yes. But having heard all the world and his dog speak on this subject, did we really miss the strident voice of the diminutive John Bourne announcing that this set of tortured data, presented in autumn 2005 - SEVEN years after the trial started - only made up his first year’s results, should not be relied upon, and was inaccurate in its conclusions anyway? No. I thought not. Neither did he stamp his foot at those politicians / un-civil servants allegedly pressurising him, as he has done so many times in the past with us lesser mortals. ‘Sound science’ can not be subject to the sort of meddling – unless of course its result is an excuse for more prevarication by its paymaster. That Bourne is a paper shield for Defra’s continuing intransigence is unequivocal. That the good Professor has yet to realise this, is more worrying.
Professor Bourne categorically denied that he was against badger culling saying: " What I am against is culling that is not effective, and makes the situation worse". Aren't we all.
Full report: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=24&storycode=4292
Alongside Professor Bourne’s spirited defence of his trial, is the sorry tale of one farmer, unfortunate enough to be in the middle of it. Describing how, after a ‘hit and run’ visit by the Krebs team in June 2000, this North Cornish dairy farm, housing a closed herd of pedigree cattle became a mecca for badgers and endured a Tb breakdown lasting almost 5 years, farmer Pat Bird is less than sympathetic to Professor Bourne’s indignation.
As the tests on this farm, and its neighbours, continued with 60 day depressing regularity and the mound of dead cattle grew, Bourne’s ‘Reactive’ culling team, charged with clearing out badgers in response to a breakdown, failed to turn up at all. No wonder the Reactive figures were shown to ‘increase tb’. Well they would, wouldn’t they if the Krebs lot didn't come? As her farm became laced with badger trials, Mrs. Bird describes Bourne’s trial as a ‘death sentence’ for her cattle, and suggests it could be renamed ‘Badger Dispersal Trial’.
Full article: http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?storycode=4294
And farmers are not the only people with first hand knowledge of the ‘rigorous and robust’ work, done by the Krebs team, now so vigourously and indignantly defended by Professor Bourne. We covered in the post http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2006/03/robust-basis-of-krebs.html comments from Paul Caruana, a Senior Manager of the trial's Wildlife teams who said " The whole basis of Krebs was to remove badgers off the ground. For the first four years, that effort was farcical, due to restrictions placed upon us. The trial had too many flaws in it to be trusted to produce meaningful evidence. How much weight do we give the latest ISG report, detailing their ‘robust’ findings to the minister? If it were down to me and my staff, very little".
With vets, his Wildlife teams and now participating farmers saying how weak this ‘trial' was, Professor Bourne must be feeling a tad lonely out there.
Friday, September 08, 2006
Latest stats
Defra have published their latest statistics for Tb incidence, available for a short time at: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/stats/latest.htm
This link will only connect to Jan - July as long as these figures remain. When Jan - Aug are posted, the link will show the updated statistics.
Briefly, the upward trend continues, or the downward trend has not been maintained - depending on your point of view.
Our analysis so far:
The Jan - March figure which caused all the fuss, showed a drop of almost 30 percent in New Herd Incidents (NHI), but herds under restriction was steady at only 1 percent down on 2005, and this as a percentage of herds registered, was slightly up at 3.65 percent. Cattle slaughtered were down 35 percent and slaughterhouse cases (as reported) was up 75 percent.
Jan - April : a drop of 27 percent in NHI but herds under restriction down just 3.5 percent, which as a percentage of herds registered on Vetnet was down very slightly. Cattle slaughtered still showed a 36 percent drop on 2005, and slaughterhouse cases we were unable to tabulate the change (typo)
Jan - May, the pattern was the same: A drop of 20 percent in NHI (so rising again) herds under restriction down just 1.7 percent, and this as a percentage of herds on Vet net up. Now at 4.33 percent. Cattle slaughtered still showing a 32 percent fall, and slaughterhouse reports up 50 percent.
Jan - June. A 'drop' of 18.7 percent in NHI, but herds under restriction down just 1.9 percent. This figure as a percentage of herds registered, slightly up, and cattle slaughtered still a third lower than 2005, with reports from slaughterhouses up 35 percent.
And the current figures continue this pattern:
Jan - July. The 'drop' in NHI has now reduced to 14 percent lower than 2005, and Defra are no longer flagging it up. Herds under Tb restriction remain slightly below last year at just 0.4 lower, and this as a percentage of registered herds is now 4.82 compared with 4.73 in 2005. Cattle slaughtered are still a third less than last year - 32 percent lower, while cases reported by MHS from slaughterhouses is up 36 percent.
For the record ( and members Her Majesty's Opposition, should they care to look before offering their opinions to the press in a burst of opportunist, lightweight spin (see post below)}:
391,822 more cattle were tested during this period, and 4,500 more herds than in 2005 - an increase of almost 17 percent.
Nothing we have seen from these figures, can we interpret as a substantial drop in bTb. The one 'constant' is the drop in numbers of cattle slaughtered, which are consistantly one third lower than last year, in every period from March. So we stick with the opinion that the Dutch Lelystadt tuberculin, while not a substandard product, is different from the UK produced antigen. And the more we scan the CVO's statement on it, the more we see that all the dots are in fact joined. The statement comments on the numbers of VL animals between the two products thus:
"The comparison of the tuberculin data, indicates to date that a proportion of VL animals [ ] differs significantly between Weybridge and Dutch PPD batches, with the Weybridge results having a smaller % of VLs.
The authors say that there are two ways of interpreting this, but conclude that the following is most likely:
"The sensitivety of the combined Dutch PPDs is less, because of failing to pick up NVLs (animals which could be in the early stages of disease) which may or may not be confirmed with culture, to the same extent as Weybridge PPDs. This would result in underdetection of cases, resulting in a transient decline in cases reported, despite there being no true decline in cases."
Precisely. The incidence of bTb is not dropping significantly, but the incidence of its detection, especially in the early pre visible lesion stages, is.
This link will only connect to Jan - July as long as these figures remain. When Jan - Aug are posted, the link will show the updated statistics.
Briefly, the upward trend continues, or the downward trend has not been maintained - depending on your point of view.
Our analysis so far:
The Jan - March figure which caused all the fuss, showed a drop of almost 30 percent in New Herd Incidents (NHI), but herds under restriction was steady at only 1 percent down on 2005, and this as a percentage of herds registered, was slightly up at 3.65 percent. Cattle slaughtered were down 35 percent and slaughterhouse cases (as reported) was up 75 percent.
Jan - April : a drop of 27 percent in NHI but herds under restriction down just 3.5 percent, which as a percentage of herds registered on Vetnet was down very slightly. Cattle slaughtered still showed a 36 percent drop on 2005, and slaughterhouse cases we were unable to tabulate the change (typo)
Jan - May, the pattern was the same: A drop of 20 percent in NHI (so rising again) herds under restriction down just 1.7 percent, and this as a percentage of herds on Vet net up. Now at 4.33 percent. Cattle slaughtered still showing a 32 percent fall, and slaughterhouse reports up 50 percent.
Jan - June. A 'drop' of 18.7 percent in NHI, but herds under restriction down just 1.9 percent. This figure as a percentage of herds registered, slightly up, and cattle slaughtered still a third lower than 2005, with reports from slaughterhouses up 35 percent.
And the current figures continue this pattern:
Jan - July. The 'drop' in NHI has now reduced to 14 percent lower than 2005, and Defra are no longer flagging it up. Herds under Tb restriction remain slightly below last year at just 0.4 lower, and this as a percentage of registered herds is now 4.82 compared with 4.73 in 2005. Cattle slaughtered are still a third less than last year - 32 percent lower, while cases reported by MHS from slaughterhouses is up 36 percent.
For the record ( and members Her Majesty's Opposition, should they care to look before offering their opinions to the press in a burst of opportunist, lightweight spin (see post below)}:
391,822 more cattle were tested during this period, and 4,500 more herds than in 2005 - an increase of almost 17 percent.
Nothing we have seen from these figures, can we interpret as a substantial drop in bTb. The one 'constant' is the drop in numbers of cattle slaughtered, which are consistantly one third lower than last year, in every period from March. So we stick with the opinion that the Dutch Lelystadt tuberculin, while not a substandard product, is different from the UK produced antigen. And the more we scan the CVO's statement on it, the more we see that all the dots are in fact joined. The statement comments on the numbers of VL animals between the two products thus:
"The comparison of the tuberculin data, indicates to date that a proportion of VL animals [ ] differs significantly between Weybridge and Dutch PPD batches, with the Weybridge results having a smaller % of VLs.
The authors say that there are two ways of interpreting this, but conclude that the following is most likely:
"The sensitivety of the combined Dutch PPDs is less, because of failing to pick up NVLs (animals which could be in the early stages of disease) which may or may not be confirmed with culture, to the same extent as Weybridge PPDs. This would result in underdetection of cases, resulting in a transient decline in cases reported, despite there being no true decline in cases."
Precisely. The incidence of bTb is not dropping significantly, but the incidence of its detection, especially in the early pre visible lesion stages, is.
Thursday, September 07, 2006
I wish.............
.... that before politicians opened their mouths, they would put their respective brain cell into gear. This week, Shadow Minister for the Conservative party, Peter Ainsworth MP joined a sorry crew of misinformed meddlers, by suggesting that Defra had skewed its own Tb stats, by deliberately delaying tests and test results.
The story was reported in Westcountry newspaper, Western Morning News thus:
WERE TB TESTING TIMES DELIBERATELY SLOWED?
"Did the Government deliberately slow down bovine TB testing in the South West to manicure the figures and make it look as though the problem was going away? That was the question posed to farmers by Shadow Defra Secretary of State Peter Ainsworth when he toured Devon and Somerset last week.
With the unexplained dramatic fall in the number of cattle returned as positive reactors to the TB test, he asked farmers how they thought it had happened. Had slowing down the number of tests and increasing the length of time it took for results to be made known simply been a cynical ploy to reduce statistics and thus head off a cull of diseased badgers, he asked.
Animal Health Minister Ben Bradshaw had ruled out a cull this year on the back of the latest statistics - thus retaining support from the animal rights lobby."Is it a fiddle of the statistics?" asked Mr Ainsworth, whose East Surrey constituency is not affected by diseased badgers.
Farmers agreed that in the Westcountry the testing campaign had certainly been getting slower - and receiving the results back was now very slow indeed, they said."TB had been virtually eradicated from farming, but because of what is happening with wildlife it's back with a vengeance," said Rob Mortimer, who hosted one of Mr Ainsworth's visits. "Something must be done quickly, as it is now accepted that it's being transmitted through wildlife."
Defra's comment on Mr. Ainsworth's inane jibe, with which we agree, was to point out that in fact 16% more cattle were tested in the current year nationally, than in 2005. But the figures are there for anyone with half a brain to look at. The main drop in Tb incidents (or detection of incidents, depending on one's point of view) was for Jan - March, peaking at almost 30% less than 2005, so if the Right Honourable Member for East Surrey is correct, less cattle should have been tested during that period. About 30% less? He's wrong. Lightweight, inane, out of his depth, ill prepared and an embarassment. And wrong.
In 2005 Jan - March in the West region, (from where he was 'campaigning') there were 7,121 herd tests involving 862,020 cattle.
Compare this to Jan - March 2006, when the Shadow Minister impliedthat "deliberate slowing down of tests had manicured the figures", vets carried out 7,230 herd tests involving 913,419 cattle. So in that period, which saw the biggest drop in incidence, SVS actually tested 51,419 more cattle and 119 more herds than in 2005. Hardly a drop in cattle tested then? Or herds?
Nationally in 2005 Jan - March there were 15,390 herd tests and 1,649,543 cattle tested and in 2006, as Defra's spokesman correctly pointed out, 17,385 herd tests and 1,807,805 cattle tested. Not a drop in testing then, 'manicured' or otherwise.
And Her Majesty's Opposition get paid for purveying this sort of rubbish? Playing to the gallery may sound good, but this industry deserves better than cheap soundbites, dreamed up 2 minutes before the press arrive.
The story was reported in Westcountry newspaper, Western Morning News thus:
WERE TB TESTING TIMES DELIBERATELY SLOWED?
"Did the Government deliberately slow down bovine TB testing in the South West to manicure the figures and make it look as though the problem was going away? That was the question posed to farmers by Shadow Defra Secretary of State Peter Ainsworth when he toured Devon and Somerset last week.
With the unexplained dramatic fall in the number of cattle returned as positive reactors to the TB test, he asked farmers how they thought it had happened. Had slowing down the number of tests and increasing the length of time it took for results to be made known simply been a cynical ploy to reduce statistics and thus head off a cull of diseased badgers, he asked.
Animal Health Minister Ben Bradshaw had ruled out a cull this year on the back of the latest statistics - thus retaining support from the animal rights lobby."Is it a fiddle of the statistics?" asked Mr Ainsworth, whose East Surrey constituency is not affected by diseased badgers.
Farmers agreed that in the Westcountry the testing campaign had certainly been getting slower - and receiving the results back was now very slow indeed, they said."TB had been virtually eradicated from farming, but because of what is happening with wildlife it's back with a vengeance," said Rob Mortimer, who hosted one of Mr Ainsworth's visits. "Something must be done quickly, as it is now accepted that it's being transmitted through wildlife."
Defra's comment on Mr. Ainsworth's inane jibe, with which we agree, was to point out that in fact 16% more cattle were tested in the current year nationally, than in 2005. But the figures are there for anyone with half a brain to look at. The main drop in Tb incidents (or detection of incidents, depending on one's point of view) was for Jan - March, peaking at almost 30% less than 2005, so if the Right Honourable Member for East Surrey is correct, less cattle should have been tested during that period. About 30% less? He's wrong. Lightweight, inane, out of his depth, ill prepared and an embarassment. And wrong.
In 2005 Jan - March in the West region, (from where he was 'campaigning') there were 7,121 herd tests involving 862,020 cattle.
Compare this to Jan - March 2006, when the Shadow Minister impliedthat "deliberate slowing down of tests had manicured the figures", vets carried out 7,230 herd tests involving 913,419 cattle. So in that period, which saw the biggest drop in incidence, SVS actually tested 51,419 more cattle and 119 more herds than in 2005. Hardly a drop in cattle tested then? Or herds?
Nationally in 2005 Jan - March there were 15,390 herd tests and 1,649,543 cattle tested and in 2006, as Defra's spokesman correctly pointed out, 17,385 herd tests and 1,807,805 cattle tested. Not a drop in testing then, 'manicured' or otherwise.
And Her Majesty's Opposition get paid for purveying this sort of rubbish? Playing to the gallery may sound good, but this industry deserves better than cheap soundbites, dreamed up 2 minutes before the press arrive.
Thursday, August 31, 2006
Sooooo Predictable.
There are times when the predictable is so obvious that, like the ‘elephant in the room’, it is unseen by those closest to the beast. We saw it with the previous Industry Strategy on bTb, when a three pronged attack on the disease, worded to happen simultaneously, together and concurrently was whittled down to two parts acceptance by government - and the appallingly unnecessary, polemic ‘consultation’ which predictably and conveniently kicked any action on infected badgers into the long grass. Pre movement testing, and tabular valuation stay, and as we have said, Defra got its ‘quid’ but failed to deliver the ‘pro quo’.
Last week, industry ‘stakeholders’ – how we hate that word – met in London to thrash out yet another Industry Strategy. The core of the agreement is as follows:
* That a Strategy working group be set up, aligned with DVM areas involving vets, farmers, the SVS and other ‘stakeholders’, to advise on policy for the area and create local Tb management groups.
* Licences would be applied for to cover the area – by individual farmers or for a designated area is by no means clear at this stage – and culling would be carried out by contractors employed by landowners.
* First choice methods would be cage traps and shooting , with CO gassing and occasionally stop snaring , when these methods are approved.
* Initially culling to be focussed in hot spot areas, within a framework of larger control area of up to 300 sq km and using if possible, hard geographical boundaries.
Other points in the Strategy outline deal with vague reference to those words beloved of government;
* Partnerships, provision of resources, industry and Government working together, focus and public information. We are surprised they missed out 'holistic' . Has that one fallen off the radar?
Full story on this link:
http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=4178
So what happened to the last initiative and why should this one be any different ? Well, for a start, Defra have their pre movement testing, paid for by farmers. No sunset clause on it, and at a confirmed reactor rate of about 120 found out of 102,000 cattle tested, not a value for money exercise either – but then it is not Defra’s money.
They also have tabular valuation, the second tranche of the original three pronged attack, but with no action whatsoever on the maintenance reservoir of bTb in wildlife, and despite the alleged ‘drop’ in detection – we don’t buy ‘drop in incidence’ – farmers are still unable to obtain bTb insurance to cover higher value animals – at any price. Insurance cover should have been the pay off for returning to tabular valuation, but ‘exposure to risk is too great’ the man-from-the-Pru still says.
So what can be the lever this time? As our readers will have realised by now, we have a disturbingly cynical view of any weasel words from either Defra or the NFU that mention ‘partnership’. It usually means that Government want something, and need ‘industry’ support to sell what they want, to farmer members. – and the rest of us. The Minister says 'Jump', and the industry 's finest from the other side of their politically revolving door answer "How high?". In Parliamentary questions (archived on this site) our Ben, yup he’s still there bless him, (doesn’t want to be, but let that pass) spoke of ‘rationalisation’ of disease compensation; that was about 18 months before he achieved it via tabular valuations.
And on 31st March 2004, Column 1462W, Mr. Bradshaw, bruised from his FMD carnage and under not inconsiderable pressure from the Treasury with bTb costs spiralling at a 20 per cent growth rate per year, answered a question on disease levies, thus:
"The levy we have in mind would be raised on a per head basis, on all animals susceptible to any disease covered by the levy fund. Different rates of levy would be set for different categories of animals, in line with the categories which are set for the compensation regime".
You see where we’re coming from? The authors of this site have no problem in principle with levies – providing, and it is a big proviso – that government take their part of this much vaunted ‘partnership’ seriously. Prevention and insurance should be first choice, and would be if this disease - bTB - was under control. But we understand that even a proposal of a shared ‘responsibility’ between the Insurance companies and such industry levies, overseen by Defra, was laughed out of court a couple of years ago. That was a ‘No’ then.
So what have we got this time? Another Industry strategy working as a Trojan horse for unpopular measures, while Government have no intention whatsoever in delivering their half of the bargain? And what a bargain! Examined carefully, we see ‘farmer’ licenses and ‘farmer’ employed contractors using cage traps. And over an area of 300 sq km, when the diminutive John Bourne achieved his wonderful exercise in badger dispersal in just 100 ?? And ‘farmers’ will be paying for the privilege, when control of bTb ( a Grade 3 pathogen) is totally and completely Defra’s responsibility. Absolutely brilliant.
And the pay off this time? We think levies. Sold to a gullible and politically lightweight industry as a ‘joint initiative’ against a promise vaguely and certainly no time soon, of badger control by farmers. Been there, done that. Got the pre movement testing, and tabular valuation. But no insurance offers and no sick badgers sorted. And we see no reason to suppose this will be any different. The farming 'industry', aka the NFU, has a history of taking hard talk to the wire. But no further. And government know that, and use it. Unfortunately we now have a complete lack of HM's Opposition, since Owen Paterson's foray into battle with his questions, visits to see other country's solutions and enquiries into PCR technology. In Parliamentary Questions, he asked about the influence of these populous 'stakeholder' focus groups. Ben's enlightening answer should be "engraved on the hearts of all who take part - preferably without anaesthetic", a highly descriptive phrase plagiarised from our partner Richard, on www.eu.referendum.blogspot
27th January 2004: Col 246W
"Ministers consider carefully the advice of these bodies in formulating policy. However, there is no requirement for Ministers or the Department to abide by their advice, nor do these bodies have any formal power to veto departmental proposals".
That would seem pretty clear. You do as you're told, and we do as we like - and we do not like culling badgers. Ever. But we are quite happy to let 'farmers' do it for us. And pay for it. And they'll also pay a levy for the privilege.
Game, set and match to Defra.
Last week, industry ‘stakeholders’ – how we hate that word – met in London to thrash out yet another Industry Strategy. The core of the agreement is as follows:
* That a Strategy working group be set up, aligned with DVM areas involving vets, farmers, the SVS and other ‘stakeholders’, to advise on policy for the area and create local Tb management groups.
* Licences would be applied for to cover the area – by individual farmers or for a designated area is by no means clear at this stage – and culling would be carried out by contractors employed by landowners.
* First choice methods would be cage traps and shooting , with CO gassing and occasionally stop snaring , when these methods are approved.
* Initially culling to be focussed in hot spot areas, within a framework of larger control area of up to 300 sq km and using if possible, hard geographical boundaries.
Other points in the Strategy outline deal with vague reference to those words beloved of government;
* Partnerships, provision of resources, industry and Government working together, focus and public information. We are surprised they missed out 'holistic' . Has that one fallen off the radar?
Full story on this link:
http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=4178
So what happened to the last initiative and why should this one be any different ? Well, for a start, Defra have their pre movement testing, paid for by farmers. No sunset clause on it, and at a confirmed reactor rate of about 120 found out of 102,000 cattle tested, not a value for money exercise either – but then it is not Defra’s money.
They also have tabular valuation, the second tranche of the original three pronged attack, but with no action whatsoever on the maintenance reservoir of bTb in wildlife, and despite the alleged ‘drop’ in detection – we don’t buy ‘drop in incidence’ – farmers are still unable to obtain bTb insurance to cover higher value animals – at any price. Insurance cover should have been the pay off for returning to tabular valuation, but ‘exposure to risk is too great’ the man-from-the-Pru still says.
So what can be the lever this time? As our readers will have realised by now, we have a disturbingly cynical view of any weasel words from either Defra or the NFU that mention ‘partnership’. It usually means that Government want something, and need ‘industry’ support to sell what they want, to farmer members. – and the rest of us. The Minister says 'Jump', and the industry 's finest from the other side of their politically revolving door answer "How high?". In Parliamentary questions (archived on this site) our Ben, yup he’s still there bless him, (doesn’t want to be, but let that pass) spoke of ‘rationalisation’ of disease compensation; that was about 18 months before he achieved it via tabular valuations.
And on 31st March 2004, Column 1462W, Mr. Bradshaw, bruised from his FMD carnage and under not inconsiderable pressure from the Treasury with bTb costs spiralling at a 20 per cent growth rate per year, answered a question on disease levies, thus:
"The levy we have in mind would be raised on a per head basis, on all animals susceptible to any disease covered by the levy fund. Different rates of levy would be set for different categories of animals, in line with the categories which are set for the compensation regime".
You see where we’re coming from? The authors of this site have no problem in principle with levies – providing, and it is a big proviso – that government take their part of this much vaunted ‘partnership’ seriously. Prevention and insurance should be first choice, and would be if this disease - bTB - was under control. But we understand that even a proposal of a shared ‘responsibility’ between the Insurance companies and such industry levies, overseen by Defra, was laughed out of court a couple of years ago. That was a ‘No’ then.
So what have we got this time? Another Industry strategy working as a Trojan horse for unpopular measures, while Government have no intention whatsoever in delivering their half of the bargain? And what a bargain! Examined carefully, we see ‘farmer’ licenses and ‘farmer’ employed contractors using cage traps. And over an area of 300 sq km, when the diminutive John Bourne achieved his wonderful exercise in badger dispersal in just 100 ?? And ‘farmers’ will be paying for the privilege, when control of bTb ( a Grade 3 pathogen) is totally and completely Defra’s responsibility. Absolutely brilliant.
And the pay off this time? We think levies. Sold to a gullible and politically lightweight industry as a ‘joint initiative’ against a promise vaguely and certainly no time soon, of badger control by farmers. Been there, done that. Got the pre movement testing, and tabular valuation. But no insurance offers and no sick badgers sorted. And we see no reason to suppose this will be any different. The farming 'industry', aka the NFU, has a history of taking hard talk to the wire. But no further. And government know that, and use it. Unfortunately we now have a complete lack of HM's Opposition, since Owen Paterson's foray into battle with his questions, visits to see other country's solutions and enquiries into PCR technology. In Parliamentary Questions, he asked about the influence of these populous 'stakeholder' focus groups. Ben's enlightening answer should be "engraved on the hearts of all who take part - preferably without anaesthetic", a highly descriptive phrase plagiarised from our partner Richard, on www.eu.referendum.blogspot
27th January 2004: Col 246W
"Ministers consider carefully the advice of these bodies in formulating policy. However, there is no requirement for Ministers or the Department to abide by their advice, nor do these bodies have any formal power to veto departmental proposals".
That would seem pretty clear. You do as you're told, and we do as we like - and we do not like culling badgers. Ever. But we are quite happy to let 'farmers' do it for us. And pay for it. And they'll also pay a levy for the privilege.
Game, set and match to Defra.
Friday, August 18, 2006
More on 'Going Dutch'.
A surf around the website of the makers of ID Lelystad tuberculin, imported since June 2005 as a 'stopgap' measure when VLA's production facility at Weybridge encountered problems, turned up some interesting kinks in the does-it-work v. doesn't-it-work conundrum.
As you will see from our posts below, the CVO is blaming her vets, both LVI's and SVS for 'testing procedures' which she says are not to the book. That these 'procedures' include such offences as not measuring the skin on jab day or measuring only one site, is included in the critism. I don't think that the basal skin measurement is going to alter too much in 72 hours, and most vets check it again when measuring anyway, so how that invalidates the test, I fail to see, but let that pass. Positioning the needle to deliver the antigen sub cutaneously instead of intradermally may also skew results - but that has not just happened in the last few months.
She has also studiously ignored the 2mm 'tightening' up to the test interpretation chart on oedemous reactions, introduced by her Department in February and certainly she has completely buried the comment in her report, relating to that 2mm difference; that it will "mean 24 per cent of incidents are missed, or detected later".
But on the CIDC Lelystad website, a comment on antigen sensitivety caught our eye - or the eagle eye of our Cornish contributer Matthew 1, to be precise. See Tuberculin Principle
The potency /level of both avian and bovine antigen in the Weybridge produced product was 2,500 iu/dose. And although both bovine antigens originate from UK supplied AN5 strain, the product which VLA imported from CIDC Lelystad was 2500 iu/dose on the avian antigen, but 3000 iu/dose on the bovine. But that isn't the whole story.
According to the Dutch website;
" In eradication programmes (when the prevalence of TBC infected cattle is significant) the use of Bovine Tuberculin PPD 2000 is recommended. In herds free of TBC, the use of Bovine Tuberculin 5000 is recommended, to increase the sensitivity of the test."
So ID Lelystad advise increasing the potency of bovine antigen for more sensitivity. But has that sensitivity at whatever level, been developed to find Dutch bTb strains, or the UK's?
More on the Dutch product at their : page: Tuberculin
On another part of the Dutch Animal Health site is a comment that using just the intradermal skin test and slaughter of reacters, the Netherlands achieved 'official bTb free status' some years ago, and as such, can now just undertake slaughterhouse surveillance only. The report was 2000, but said that Holland now did no routine testing unless a reactor is found at slaughter, and then skin tests are done on the host herd and any contiguous herds, backed up with PCR for speedy results. Well, well, well.
Amazing what the intradermal skin test can achieve, "in the absence of a wildlife reservoir". And not too much sympathy or patience with our troubles I suspect.
As you will see from our posts below, the CVO is blaming her vets, both LVI's and SVS for 'testing procedures' which she says are not to the book. That these 'procedures' include such offences as not measuring the skin on jab day or measuring only one site, is included in the critism. I don't think that the basal skin measurement is going to alter too much in 72 hours, and most vets check it again when measuring anyway, so how that invalidates the test, I fail to see, but let that pass. Positioning the needle to deliver the antigen sub cutaneously instead of intradermally may also skew results - but that has not just happened in the last few months.
She has also studiously ignored the 2mm 'tightening' up to the test interpretation chart on oedemous reactions, introduced by her Department in February and certainly she has completely buried the comment in her report, relating to that 2mm difference; that it will "mean 24 per cent of incidents are missed, or detected later".
But on the CIDC Lelystad website, a comment on antigen sensitivety caught our eye - or the eagle eye of our Cornish contributer Matthew 1, to be precise. See Tuberculin Principle
The potency /level of both avian and bovine antigen in the Weybridge produced product was 2,500 iu/dose. And although both bovine antigens originate from UK supplied AN5 strain, the product which VLA imported from CIDC Lelystad was 2500 iu/dose on the avian antigen, but 3000 iu/dose on the bovine. But that isn't the whole story.
According to the Dutch website;
" In eradication programmes (when the prevalence of TBC infected cattle is significant) the use of Bovine Tuberculin PPD 2000 is recommended. In herds free of TBC, the use of Bovine Tuberculin 5000 is recommended, to increase the sensitivity of the test."
So ID Lelystad advise increasing the potency of bovine antigen for more sensitivity. But has that sensitivity at whatever level, been developed to find Dutch bTb strains, or the UK's?
More on the Dutch product at their : page: Tuberculin
On another part of the Dutch Animal Health site is a comment that using just the intradermal skin test and slaughter of reacters, the Netherlands achieved 'official bTb free status' some years ago, and as such, can now just undertake slaughterhouse surveillance only. The report was 2000, but said that Holland now did no routine testing unless a reactor is found at slaughter, and then skin tests are done on the host herd and any contiguous herds, backed up with PCR for speedy results. Well, well, well.
Amazing what the intradermal skin test can achieve, "in the absence of a wildlife reservoir". And not too much sympathy or patience with our troubles I suspect.
Wednesday, August 16, 2006
Tb Policy and the badger culling trials.
In a letter to the Veterinary Record, August 12th., eight leading bTb veterinary experts continue to pile the pressue on the RBCT, or to be more precise, the Krebs’ exercise in badger dispersal.
Responding to a letter from the Chairman, Lord High Executioner, Judge and Jury of the ISG and the trial, Professor John Bourne, Messrs. McDiamid, Daykin, Smith, Ashton, Davies, Turnbull, Muirhead and Gallagher write that:
"…the use of ‘robust statistical methods’ will not derive the correct assumptions from flawed basic data."
They point out that:
"A high trapping efficiency was fundamental to the proper conduct of the trial, yet Defra, whose staff carried out the actual trapping at the direction of the ISG, conceded a very low efficiency of 20 – 60 per cent". And they remind Professor Bourne of the evidence given to the EFRA committee by one of his own Wildlife Team, in which he describes the poor conduct of the trials.
Using answers to Parliamentary Questions archived on this site, they remind the good Professor that during his badger ‘culling’ trial, "…of 15, 666 traps set, 8981 had been interfered with (57 percent) and a further 1827 (12 percent ) were stolen up to October 2003. And in April 2004, the Minister revealed that the trapping efficiency had been as low as 30 percent" .
They point out that, in their opinion, "that the trials had been compromised as well as the trapping approach, seems difficult to refute, despite the ISG’s protestations".
"While the ISG claims its trials were ‘robust’, the grossly inefficient culling methodology caused social disruption and dispersal of infected badgers on a vast scale, unseen in previous trials" (This was our contributer’s experience too - from Staffordshire to Cornwall.)
The letter concludes by reminding readers of previous work all of which officially recognises the badger as a maintenance host of bTb in the UK, a fact which Bourne and his colleagues tend to skate over with a euphemistic note that "badgers contribute to Tb in cattle", while applying their collective concentration to more cattle based measures.
"It (the ISG) confines its recommendations to ‘more vigorously adopted and applied cattle based measures’. Yet we know from earlier work, not always appreciated by the ISG, that cattle have been acting as sentinels of localised disease in badger communities.
Detection and slaughter of sentinels with even greater vigour, yet not addressing the source they are signalling, must be one of the most irrational epidemiological concept yet. We reiterate our warning that the ISG’s advice based these flawed ‘trials’ must be treated with extreme caution. It is also noteworthy that since 1998, the bTb problem has deteriorated so seriously that herd breakdowns have returned to a level not seen since the 1950’s."
Responding to a letter from the Chairman, Lord High Executioner, Judge and Jury of the ISG and the trial, Professor John Bourne, Messrs. McDiamid, Daykin, Smith, Ashton, Davies, Turnbull, Muirhead and Gallagher write that:
"…the use of ‘robust statistical methods’ will not derive the correct assumptions from flawed basic data."
They point out that:
"A high trapping efficiency was fundamental to the proper conduct of the trial, yet Defra, whose staff carried out the actual trapping at the direction of the ISG, conceded a very low efficiency of 20 – 60 per cent". And they remind Professor Bourne of the evidence given to the EFRA committee by one of his own Wildlife Team, in which he describes the poor conduct of the trials.
Using answers to Parliamentary Questions archived on this site, they remind the good Professor that during his badger ‘culling’ trial, "…of 15, 666 traps set, 8981 had been interfered with (57 percent) and a further 1827 (12 percent ) were stolen up to October 2003. And in April 2004, the Minister revealed that the trapping efficiency had been as low as 30 percent" .
They point out that, in their opinion, "that the trials had been compromised as well as the trapping approach, seems difficult to refute, despite the ISG’s protestations".
"While the ISG claims its trials were ‘robust’, the grossly inefficient culling methodology caused social disruption and dispersal of infected badgers on a vast scale, unseen in previous trials" (This was our contributer’s experience too - from Staffordshire to Cornwall.)
The letter concludes by reminding readers of previous work all of which officially recognises the badger as a maintenance host of bTb in the UK, a fact which Bourne and his colleagues tend to skate over with a euphemistic note that "badgers contribute to Tb in cattle", while applying their collective concentration to more cattle based measures.
"It (the ISG) confines its recommendations to ‘more vigorously adopted and applied cattle based measures’. Yet we know from earlier work, not always appreciated by the ISG, that cattle have been acting as sentinels of localised disease in badger communities.
Detection and slaughter of sentinels with even greater vigour, yet not addressing the source they are signalling, must be one of the most irrational epidemiological concept yet. We reiterate our warning that the ISG’s advice based these flawed ‘trials’ must be treated with extreme caution. It is also noteworthy that since 1998, the bTb problem has deteriorated so seriously that herd breakdowns have returned to a level not seen since the 1950’s."
...and still we kill the 'canaries in the coalmine', without listening to the song they sing.
Tuesday, August 15, 2006
Going Dutch. "A 2mm difference..."
A 2 mm difference in swelling, will mean 24 percent of incidents are missed or detected later"
We remarked on this 2mm in our post below 'It Ain't what you do ...", but have now had time to read the whole file. A "small difference in performance", the lady said. Define 'small' in the context of the above passage from the full statement, and redefine 'small' after reading the description of the reactions described in more precise epidemiological terms by her staff at VLA as a "statistically significant difference". And remember - just 2mm.
The Chief Veterinary Officer has issued a report (317 KB) on the recent reduction in the number of new TB incidents in Great Britain. See in particular p. 12 and 14 of the 23 page pdf.
Note: The slaughterhouse cases referred to in the paper are 'Confirmed', and have been added to CNI found at herd tests. The samples submitted by MHS for culture from slaughterhouse examinations of carcasses are up by a not insignificant 35 - 75 percent on last year. (Defra figures Jan - March +75%, Jan -May +50% and Jan - June +35%)
Also, we make the 'herds under restriction from a TB incident to total 4.55 percent, (up slightly on last year) and not 3.5 per cent quoted. Defra are probably using the lower Confirmed Incident figure.
That 2mm figure is also of significance in the new TB 64 Interpretation Chart revised by Defra in February (TB64 & TB64a Revised 02/06) and issued to LVI's conducting bTb intradermal testing, which we also mentioned in the posting below.
The interpretation sheet instructs:
"All skin swellings with an increase of more than 2mm in the thickness of the skin fold must be recorded as positive reactions, as should any swelling irrespective of size, showing oedema .
+ Positive - an increase of more than 2mm in skin thickness or any reaction with oedema.
Veterinary practitioners who have had the oportunity to study the new test interpretation chart, have remarked on a 'marked tightening up' of reactions which may be described as 'oedemous', with the result that even a 0 (zero measurable) rise on the bovine lump, but if showing oedema will classed as an Inconclusive on a standard interpretation, and a Reactor on severe interpretation of the test.
So what have we got here? An annex and graph towards the end of a long pdf file - which bears little relation to the CVO's press statement at the beginning. A new, improved 'Revised Interpretation Chart' issued at the peak of the 'drop' in cases, and coincidentally at the peak of the use of ID Lelystad tuberculin - which is not mentioned at all. And of course the continued mention of that 'small difference in performance' by the lady, which is a rather glib translation of the report's actual description of a "statistically significant difference" between ID Lelystad bovine antigen and the UK product. Of 2mm perhaps? Which when number crunched through Defra's computers arrives at the staggering conclusion, that "a 2mm difference in swelling will mean (not might, or maybe - WILL) 24 per cent of incidents are missed or detected at a later stage". And if the test is a routine one, that 'later stage' will be a year or more.
And as we said in our post below, it may be small to the CVO but that 2mm in a scale of 0-5mm for a Reactor on standard and 0-3mm on severe interpretation, with the extra proviso of 'any oedemous reaction' to be classed as positive even if not measurable, is life or death to some poor cow, and a pass or a fail for the herd - and yet another inconsistant in the convoluted life of the RBCT, the data for which, prior to its ritual torture in the hands of the statisticians, is gleaned from the numbers of herd breakdowns, as determined by the intradermal skin test...
And if we have joined the dots correctly, and we have no reason after reading this report, to think that we have not, the Lelystad bovine tuberculin antigen has missed almost a quarter of bTb cases. This up until February 2006, when the new 'TB64 / revised 02/06' interpretation chart made a belated attempt to tighten up the readings to cope with a 'statistically significant difference" in reaction. In which case, the drop in cases is not a drop in incidence of bTb at all, it is a drop in detection, and that is quite different.
Interesting.
We remarked on this 2mm in our post below 'It Ain't what you do ...", but have now had time to read the whole file. A "small difference in performance", the lady said. Define 'small' in the context of the above passage from the full statement, and redefine 'small' after reading the description of the reactions described in more precise epidemiological terms by her staff at VLA as a "statistically significant difference". And remember - just 2mm.
The Chief Veterinary Officer has issued a report (317 KB) on the recent reduction in the number of new TB incidents in Great Britain. See in particular p. 12 and 14 of the 23 page pdf.
Note: The slaughterhouse cases referred to in the paper are 'Confirmed', and have been added to CNI found at herd tests. The samples submitted by MHS for culture from slaughterhouse examinations of carcasses are up by a not insignificant 35 - 75 percent on last year. (Defra figures Jan - March +75%, Jan -May +50% and Jan - June +35%)
Also, we make the 'herds under restriction from a TB incident to total 4.55 percent, (up slightly on last year) and not 3.5 per cent quoted. Defra are probably using the lower Confirmed Incident figure.
That 2mm figure is also of significance in the new TB 64 Interpretation Chart revised by Defra in February (TB64 & TB64a Revised 02/06) and issued to LVI's conducting bTb intradermal testing, which we also mentioned in the posting below.
The interpretation sheet instructs:
"All skin swellings with an increase of more than 2mm in the thickness of the skin fold must be recorded as positive reactions, as should any swelling irrespective of size, showing oedema .
+ Positive - an increase of more than 2mm in skin thickness or any reaction with oedema.
Veterinary practitioners who have had the oportunity to study the new test interpretation chart, have remarked on a 'marked tightening up' of reactions which may be described as 'oedemous', with the result that even a 0 (zero measurable) rise on the bovine lump, but if showing oedema will classed as an Inconclusive on a standard interpretation, and a Reactor on severe interpretation of the test.
So what have we got here? An annex and graph towards the end of a long pdf file - which bears little relation to the CVO's press statement at the beginning. A new, improved 'Revised Interpretation Chart' issued at the peak of the 'drop' in cases, and coincidentally at the peak of the use of ID Lelystad tuberculin - which is not mentioned at all. And of course the continued mention of that 'small difference in performance' by the lady, which is a rather glib translation of the report's actual description of a "statistically significant difference" between ID Lelystad bovine antigen and the UK product. Of 2mm perhaps? Which when number crunched through Defra's computers arrives at the staggering conclusion, that "a 2mm difference in swelling will mean (not might, or maybe - WILL) 24 per cent of incidents are missed or detected at a later stage". And if the test is a routine one, that 'later stage' will be a year or more.
And as we said in our post below, it may be small to the CVO but that 2mm in a scale of 0-5mm for a Reactor on standard and 0-3mm on severe interpretation, with the extra proviso of 'any oedemous reaction' to be classed as positive even if not measurable, is life or death to some poor cow, and a pass or a fail for the herd - and yet another inconsistant in the convoluted life of the RBCT, the data for which, prior to its ritual torture in the hands of the statisticians, is gleaned from the numbers of herd breakdowns, as determined by the intradermal skin test...
And if we have joined the dots correctly, and we have no reason after reading this report, to think that we have not, the Lelystad bovine tuberculin antigen has missed almost a quarter of bTb cases. This up until February 2006, when the new 'TB64 / revised 02/06' interpretation chart made a belated attempt to tighten up the readings to cope with a 'statistically significant difference" in reaction. In which case, the drop in cases is not a drop in incidence of bTb at all, it is a drop in detection, and that is quite different.
Interesting.
Thursday, August 10, 2006
New Gamma Interferon trial announced.
Defra today announced a new trial using gamma interferon as a back up to the Intradermal skin test from October 2006. Emphasising that the skin test - an internationally recognised diagnostic tool - will still remain the primary test, (even though his CVO implies retraining is necessary to make sure they all do it properly) Ben Bradshaw announced further specific and limited use of gamma interferon as back up.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/control/gamma.htm
The announcement describes the proposed use of gamma interferon in England and Wales, as follows;
"Under this new policy the g-IFN test will be applied mainly in 3 and 4 yearly testing parishes in an attempt to ensure that infection in such areas does not become established in cattle or wildlife. The test will also continue to be available to use as a disease control tool in TB hotspot areas.
From October 2006 the use of g-IFN test will be mandatory, to enhance sensitivity and detection of infected cases, in the following prescribed circumstances:
*All confirmed new incidents (CNI) in 3 or 4 year parish testing intervals (PTIs), including those that fail to resolve through repeated skin tests or where complete or partial de-population is contemplated .
*Confirmed incidents failing to resolve (with Visible Lesions), despite taking bio-security precautions in 1 and 2 year PTIs, including those herds where a complete or partial de-population is contemplated
*Used at the first Inconclusive Reactor (IR) retest in unresolved IRs in herds in 1 and 2 year PTIs.
Additionally, the test will be used occasionally to enhance specificity in the following limited circumstances:
*Non-specific reactor procedure for unconfirmed breakdowns in 2, 3, or 4 year PTIs
*Suspected fraudulent reactors
More information on these prescribed circumstances is detailed below.
Background
As set out in the Government strategic framework for the sustainable control of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain, the Government will continue to develop a sound scientific evidence base by supporting research to improve our understanding of the disease and generate new tools, particularly in relation to diagnostics and vaccines."
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/control/gamma.htm
The announcement describes the proposed use of gamma interferon in England and Wales, as follows;
"Under this new policy the g-IFN test will be applied mainly in 3 and 4 yearly testing parishes in an attempt to ensure that infection in such areas does not become established in cattle or wildlife. The test will also continue to be available to use as a disease control tool in TB hotspot areas.
From October 2006 the use of g-IFN test will be mandatory, to enhance sensitivity and detection of infected cases, in the following prescribed circumstances:
*All confirmed new incidents (CNI) in 3 or 4 year parish testing intervals (PTIs), including those that fail to resolve through repeated skin tests or where complete or partial de-population is contemplated .
*Confirmed incidents failing to resolve (with Visible Lesions), despite taking bio-security precautions in 1 and 2 year PTIs, including those herds where a complete or partial de-population is contemplated
*Used at the first Inconclusive Reactor (IR) retest in unresolved IRs in herds in 1 and 2 year PTIs.
Additionally, the test will be used occasionally to enhance specificity in the following limited circumstances:
*Non-specific reactor procedure for unconfirmed breakdowns in 2, 3, or 4 year PTIs
*Suspected fraudulent reactors
More information on these prescribed circumstances is detailed below.
Background
As set out in the Government strategic framework for the sustainable control of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain, the Government will continue to develop a sound scientific evidence base by supporting research to improve our understanding of the disease and generate new tools, particularly in relation to diagnostics and vaccines."
It ain't what you do.....
... it's the way that you - or in this case vets doing Tb testing - do it.
So concludes Debbie Reynolds, the Chief Veterinary Officer in a news release today, which targetted veterinary practitioner's 'application' methods of the intradermal tuberculin skin tests as a factor in the drop in cases, rather than the Lelystad tuberculin used in their guns. Well that will make friends and influence people won't it?
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2006/060810b.htm
A quote from the report:
"Debby Reynolds, the Chief Veterinary Officer, who was asked by Ben Bradshaw in June to undertake a review of the apparent fall in the number of new TB incidents, has concluded that there has been a real reduction in the number of new TB incidents, but that it is too early to determine whether this is a temporary phenomenon or likely to become a sustained trend. Dr Reynolds has considered whether the switch in tuberculin supply from that manufactured by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency to that purchased from Holland could have caused this reduction. She has concluded that the small difference in performance between the two tuberculins is not significant enough on its own to have had such a significant impact, particularly against the background of the evidence in the DNV Consulting report about the variation in the way the test is carried out. Further analysis will be carried out to try to reduce the level of uncertainty around these conclusions."
Whaaaat? Would that be the ' small difference' which provoked Defra's Feb 2006 re-interpretation chart? The loss of about 2mm of sensitivety / specificity which made a Pass on the old interpretation chart into either an Inconclusive or a Reactor - from February? No mention then of the batch (s) which provoked not a single reaction at all, or was that down to 'testing procedure' as well? And did all those veterinary practioners who now face retraining, have a mental block together, all of them forgetting how to test cattle just after Christmas en masse . Must have been a good party.
And how delicious that the Lelystad tuberculin has been in the country from June 2005, and in use in the RBCT areas during the Krebs' trial, but without the benefit of Defra's new update and 'markedly tighter' (veterinary opinion, not ours) interpretation chart. What will that do to the already tortured data of the Krebs results - all of which rest on the number of cattle breakdowns, as tested and recorded by SVS and LVI personnel, who are now to undergo 'retraining' - and using serum which the CVO herself says 'has a small difference in performance"?
Madame, with the greatest of respect, a 2mm difference in performance is not 'small'. With only 5mm to play with, or under severe interpretation 3mm, as the late Tony Hancock pointed out, "It might only be a small amount to you, but it is the difference between life and death for someone". Or in this case some cattle, and certainly the difference between pass or fail, and a herd breakdown and a clear test.
So concludes Debbie Reynolds, the Chief Veterinary Officer in a news release today, which targetted veterinary practitioner's 'application' methods of the intradermal tuberculin skin tests as a factor in the drop in cases, rather than the Lelystad tuberculin used in their guns. Well that will make friends and influence people won't it?
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2006/060810b.htm
A quote from the report:
"Debby Reynolds, the Chief Veterinary Officer, who was asked by Ben Bradshaw in June to undertake a review of the apparent fall in the number of new TB incidents, has concluded that there has been a real reduction in the number of new TB incidents, but that it is too early to determine whether this is a temporary phenomenon or likely to become a sustained trend. Dr Reynolds has considered whether the switch in tuberculin supply from that manufactured by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency to that purchased from Holland could have caused this reduction. She has concluded that the small difference in performance between the two tuberculins is not significant enough on its own to have had such a significant impact, particularly against the background of the evidence in the DNV Consulting report about the variation in the way the test is carried out. Further analysis will be carried out to try to reduce the level of uncertainty around these conclusions."
Whaaaat? Would that be the ' small difference' which provoked Defra's Feb 2006 re-interpretation chart? The loss of about 2mm of sensitivety / specificity which made a Pass on the old interpretation chart into either an Inconclusive or a Reactor - from February? No mention then of the batch (s) which provoked not a single reaction at all, or was that down to 'testing procedure' as well? And did all those veterinary practioners who now face retraining, have a mental block together, all of them forgetting how to test cattle just after Christmas en masse . Must have been a good party.
And how delicious that the Lelystad tuberculin has been in the country from June 2005, and in use in the RBCT areas during the Krebs' trial, but without the benefit of Defra's new update and 'markedly tighter' (veterinary opinion, not ours) interpretation chart. What will that do to the already tortured data of the Krebs results - all of which rest on the number of cattle breakdowns, as tested and recorded by SVS and LVI personnel, who are now to undergo 'retraining' - and using serum which the CVO herself says 'has a small difference in performance"?
Madame, with the greatest of respect, a 2mm difference in performance is not 'small'. With only 5mm to play with, or under severe interpretation 3mm, as the late Tony Hancock pointed out, "It might only be a small amount to you, but it is the difference between life and death for someone". Or in this case some cattle, and certainly the difference between pass or fail, and a herd breakdown and a clear test.
Latest bTb figures
"There has been a substantial reduction in the number of new TB incidents in January - June 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. The provisional statistics presented here indicate that this reduction is 19%, although this figure will reduce as further test results are input by AHDOs. It is too early to draw any conclusions about whether the decrease is a temporary or a more sustained reduction and further analysis is needed to identify the reasons for the fall. However, it is likely to be caused by a complex combination of factors. There is no evidence at the moment that the switch in tuberculin supply has caused this reduction although further analysis is required before this can be confirmed."
See: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/stats/latest.htm
If this paragraph seems familiar, then that is because it has been used in the last three months to express Defra's comments on its monthly bTb statistics, posted on the Defra website. The only difference in wording being the percentage drop: "April : 27%, May: 20% and now June: 19%." but these statistics are are an amalgum of several months, from which it is difficult to see the whole picture. And we would respectfully point out, produced by a department who comfortably airbrushed out almost 50% victims of its FMD culling spree.
So what is the story behind the figures? For sure 'other influences' will have had an effect. But how much? Two blazing hot summers will influence the time that m.bovis survives on cattle grazing ground, but the same dry hot weather will put badgers under stress as the ground is too hard to dig, and natural water supplies short. Any infectious disease has a 'bell curve' of a rise in cases, followed by a drop, and tuberculosis may have peaked in the badger population and be waning. Even farmers may have reached the end of their tethers and with the introduction of tabular valuations, be sorting out their own badger / cattle bio security. But all these factors, would have had to have happened together and at the same time last autumn, for the skin tests (for that is what Defra's statistics are based on) to have shown such a dramatic change early this year. And even this is only half the story.
Further analysis of the past 4 months are interesting. Defra's headline figures are for 'New Herd Incidents'. That is herds at a routine test, which were classed as 'clear' and are going under restriction for the first time. It is these herds which saw the drop of almost 30% in Jan - March, then 27% Jan - April, 20.2% Jan - May and 18.7% currently Jan - June. But what of Defra's other figures?
Cattle slaughtered over the last 4 months are consistantly over 30% less than 2005. (Range 36.6 - currently 33%) That is good news, but slaughterhouse cases, that is cattle found by MHS examination are up by much more than that. Range +75% - +35% currently.
Herds under Tb restriction through a bTb incident (as opposed to overdue test/data) are steady at between 1 - 3% less than last year. So although the new herd incidents are down (or not being found) the herds under restriction figure has barely changed. Jan - March -1%, Jan - April -3,5%, Jan - May - 1.7% and currently to June -1.9%, so they are not being cleared.
But the bad news behind this headline is that herds registered on Vetnet, from which Defra draw their statistics, are down too, so the percentage of herds under bTb restriction is actually UP on 2005. Jan - March 3.65% (up +0.05%) Jan- April 4% (=) Jan - May 4.33% (+0.03%) and currently Jan - June 4.55% (+0.02%)
So, a huge drop in February / March in new herd incidents , while not sustained but is still dramatically less than last year: cattle slaughtered are consistantly down over one third for each of the last 4 months - but slaughterhouse cases up by at least the same amount. The total number of herds under restriction, barely changed while the percentage of these herds, drawn from total registered herds is up. And just to throw a real spanner in the works, in February some AHDO's sent out a 'Revised bTb interpretation chart- TB64 02/06', to their local vets.
This indicates a marked tightening up on interpretation of the skin test, with zero tolerance to any oedema at all in the area jabbed. Below a 2ml rise on skin thickness, even '0' and '1' ml are classed as IR or Reactor, whether or not they matched by an avian rise of the same type. 2ml can be the difference between a Pass and an Inconclusive, or an Inconclusive and a Reactor.
Although we have no grounds on which to base this comment - yet - we suspect that Lelystad tuberculin has given a slightly different reaction from the UK serum, a fact that VLA have only just caught up with. It maybe also strain specific, in that our UK serum identified some or all of the UK strains better. And we also suspect a completely duff batch - for whatever reason - sometime after Christmas which accounted for the precipitous fall in Jan - March. Time will tell.
But as far as International Trade goes, while our herd incidents are at 4.55% of the national herds and rising, we are as far away from Tb free trading as ever.
Sunday, August 06, 2006
Snippets.
As well as the much publicised new 'Advisory Group' which we covered in the post below, this week has seen a few more interesting snippets. As more information comes to hand, we will update.
* We do not propose to cover in any detail the Badger Trust's spokesman's convoluted reasoning with his calculater, that 3000 cattle may enter the food chain with undisclosed bTb. His target appears to be the intradermal skin test, and its alleged accuracy. Suffice to say that parliamentary questions covered this one in spades, with the unequivocal answers that in the abscence of a wildlife reservoir, it was used all over the world as the primary diagnostic tool for bTB under both OIE rules and EU Directive 64/432/EEC , with no problems whatsoever [8/12/2003 Col. 218W 141968] and [30 /01/2004 Col 540W 150492] and [25/03/2004 Col 989W 159061].
Cattle carcasses traded as beef have to undergo both an ante mortem (skin test) and post mortem examination for bTb. So in accusing Defra of allowing infected animals into the food chain, Mr. Lawson is in effect accusing the MHS (Meat hygiene Service) operatives, whose job it is to examine every carcass for signs of disease, of slack practise. Pretty smart.
* We expect Defra to announce a Gamma Interferon trial costing just under £750,000 - but only in areas of 3 or 4 year testing. For large parts of the country, now subject to persistant and pernicious drip feed from wildlfe, it is felt (we are told) that GI is " a complete waste of time". Without action on that wildlife reservoir, everything is a waste of time and money - but let that pass. We could point out however, that for the 3 and 4 year testing regimes Gamma Interferon is still under international trade directives a secondary tool. The intradermal skin test is the primary. But as in other countries, it may speed up diagnosis of animals in the 30-50 day latent period.
*The third snippet, is probably the most important, not that we would expect the voluble Mr. Lawson to agree with our emphasis. More on this as we get it, but this deals with the EU and a 'one size fits all' policy towards cattle testing.
Since the 1950's when a single jab was administered to detect bTB, and heaps of dead cattle indicated that something was amiss, the UK has developed the 'Comparative' intradermal skin test. Our environment is condusive to large flocks of birds, which share pasture with cattle - and carry tb. Avian tb. So the veterinary profession developed our comparitive test. And certainly it is our experience that if cattle are exposed to chicken farming at close contact, or to seagulls, rooks, pheasants or pigeons then the top bumps are very evident. But more importantly, they bring up a bovine bump too.
A Midlands vet, ordering tuberculin for pre movement testing, was recently asked "is this for export cattle?".
When querying why the difference, he was told that cattle for export could only have a single bovine jab. More questions were asked on this, and the answers (verbally at the moment) were that the bulk, if not all of mainland Europe manages with a single jab. And they think the UK should do the same, in fact as we know from the Veterinary certificate covered in our posts Sept. 2004 , http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2004/09/update-russia-and-tb.html the level of bTB in the UK and Ireland is giving our EU masters serious indigestion. So, a derogation - a year's grace - has been agreed whereby the UK can continue with a compartive skin test, not only for exports, but ALL TESTS. But after that .......
One size fits none? We may have to comply with EU Directives and use a single one - pigeons, pheasants, rooks, seagulls or not.
* We do not propose to cover in any detail the Badger Trust's spokesman's convoluted reasoning with his calculater, that 3000 cattle may enter the food chain with undisclosed bTb. His target appears to be the intradermal skin test, and its alleged accuracy. Suffice to say that parliamentary questions covered this one in spades, with the unequivocal answers that in the abscence of a wildlife reservoir, it was used all over the world as the primary diagnostic tool for bTB under both OIE rules and EU Directive 64/432/EEC , with no problems whatsoever [8/12/2003 Col. 218W 141968] and [30 /01/2004 Col 540W 150492] and [25/03/2004 Col 989W 159061].
Cattle carcasses traded as beef have to undergo both an ante mortem (skin test) and post mortem examination for bTb. So in accusing Defra of allowing infected animals into the food chain, Mr. Lawson is in effect accusing the MHS (Meat hygiene Service) operatives, whose job it is to examine every carcass for signs of disease, of slack practise. Pretty smart.
* We expect Defra to announce a Gamma Interferon trial costing just under £750,000 - but only in areas of 3 or 4 year testing. For large parts of the country, now subject to persistant and pernicious drip feed from wildlfe, it is felt (we are told) that GI is " a complete waste of time". Without action on that wildlife reservoir, everything is a waste of time and money - but let that pass. We could point out however, that for the 3 and 4 year testing regimes Gamma Interferon is still under international trade directives a secondary tool. The intradermal skin test is the primary. But as in other countries, it may speed up diagnosis of animals in the 30-50 day latent period.
*The third snippet, is probably the most important, not that we would expect the voluble Mr. Lawson to agree with our emphasis. More on this as we get it, but this deals with the EU and a 'one size fits all' policy towards cattle testing.
Since the 1950's when a single jab was administered to detect bTB, and heaps of dead cattle indicated that something was amiss, the UK has developed the 'Comparative' intradermal skin test. Our environment is condusive to large flocks of birds, which share pasture with cattle - and carry tb. Avian tb. So the veterinary profession developed our comparitive test. And certainly it is our experience that if cattle are exposed to chicken farming at close contact, or to seagulls, rooks, pheasants or pigeons then the top bumps are very evident. But more importantly, they bring up a bovine bump too.
A Midlands vet, ordering tuberculin for pre movement testing, was recently asked "is this for export cattle?".
When querying why the difference, he was told that cattle for export could only have a single bovine jab. More questions were asked on this, and the answers (verbally at the moment) were that the bulk, if not all of mainland Europe manages with a single jab. And they think the UK should do the same, in fact as we know from the Veterinary certificate covered in our posts Sept. 2004 , http://bovinetb.blogspot.com/2004/09/update-russia-and-tb.html the level of bTB in the UK and Ireland is giving our EU masters serious indigestion. So, a derogation - a year's grace - has been agreed whereby the UK can continue with a compartive skin test, not only for exports, but ALL TESTS. But after that .......
One size fits none? We may have to comply with EU Directives and use a single one - pigeons, pheasants, rooks, seagulls or not.
New Advisory Group - Talking the Talk.
Peter Jinman, a veterinary practioner from Hereford and former president of the BVA (British Veterinary Association) is to head a new advisory group on bTB.
Established by Defra, the group will replace the Tb forum, and will advise ministers and the Chief Veterinary Officer on practical policies to help control the disease. It will also play a leading role in Defra's "engagement with interested organisations". We hear that members of this elite squad will meet Mr. Jinman in small groups, thus leaving him the role of 'referee' in Defra's proposed 'engagement', whose remit includes:
* Working in partnership with Defra to develop Tb control policies in England and providing a practical perspective on delivery.
* Ensuring the views of all interested parties are taken into account in developing Tb control policies, and to help develop a shared understanding on possible control options.
* Acting as a conduit of information between Ministers and the CVO by responding to their requests for advice, and advising on issues of concern to interested organisations.
Defra was keen to point out that members of the group would serve as individuals, as would Mr. Jinman, and would not represent any organisations that they may be associated with. And our own 'little Ben' , Minister for animal health and welfare, Mr. Bradshaw commented that effective control of Tb would only be possible in partnership with farmers, veterinary surgeons, wildlife groups and other interested parties. He welcomed Peter Jinman's role in this.
We wish the group every success. But from Lord Recycled-Rooker's comments on BBC 5 live this week coupled with David Miliband's political expectations and the Badger Trust's scurrilous attempts to kneecap the meat industry, don't expect it soon. We would also take the opportunity to remind readers (and Mr. Jinman ) that control of bTb - a group 3 zoonosis, already spilling into other species - is the responsibility of Defra. Talk of 'partnerships' make are good soundbites. But they are a comfort blanket of prevarication and hot air when it comes to infectious disease control. Defra may be 'talking the talk', but we do not expect them to 'walk the walk' any time soon. And Parliamentary Questions 27/01/2004 Col 246W 150543 tells us that:
" Ministers consider carefully the advice of these bodies in formulating policy. However, there is no requirements for Ministers or the Department to abide by their advice, nor do these bodies have any formal power to veto departmental proposals".
Quite.
Established by Defra, the group will replace the Tb forum, and will advise ministers and the Chief Veterinary Officer on practical policies to help control the disease. It will also play a leading role in Defra's "engagement with interested organisations". We hear that members of this elite squad will meet Mr. Jinman in small groups, thus leaving him the role of 'referee' in Defra's proposed 'engagement', whose remit includes:
* Working in partnership with Defra to develop Tb control policies in England and providing a practical perspective on delivery.
* Ensuring the views of all interested parties are taken into account in developing Tb control policies, and to help develop a shared understanding on possible control options.
* Acting as a conduit of information between Ministers and the CVO by responding to their requests for advice, and advising on issues of concern to interested organisations.
Defra was keen to point out that members of the group would serve as individuals, as would Mr. Jinman, and would not represent any organisations that they may be associated with. And our own 'little Ben' , Minister for animal health and welfare, Mr. Bradshaw commented that effective control of Tb would only be possible in partnership with farmers, veterinary surgeons, wildlife groups and other interested parties. He welcomed Peter Jinman's role in this.
We wish the group every success. But from Lord Recycled-Rooker's comments on BBC 5 live this week coupled with David Miliband's political expectations and the Badger Trust's scurrilous attempts to kneecap the meat industry, don't expect it soon. We would also take the opportunity to remind readers (and Mr. Jinman ) that control of bTb - a group 3 zoonosis, already spilling into other species - is the responsibility of Defra. Talk of 'partnerships' make are good soundbites. But they are a comfort blanket of prevarication and hot air when it comes to infectious disease control. Defra may be 'talking the talk', but we do not expect them to 'walk the walk' any time soon. And Parliamentary Questions 27/01/2004 Col 246W 150543 tells us that:
" Ministers consider carefully the advice of these bodies in formulating policy. However, there is no requirements for Ministers or the Department to abide by their advice, nor do these bodies have any formal power to veto departmental proposals".
Quite.
Sunday, July 23, 2006
Dear Mr. Miliband...
In a letter to the newly appointed Secretary of state for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, a core group of leading experts on the control of bovine tb in practise, has pointed out the weaknesses of the 'robust science' his department is leaning on, to avoid its obligations in eradicating bovine tb.
Farmers Guardian has the piece in this week's edition:
http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=3470
and we are grateful for sight of their core list of RBCT failings which we reproduce below:
FAILINGS OF THE RANDOMISED
BADGER CULLING TRIALS
Our view that the RBCTs were fatally flawed by a poorly conceived and badly implemented methodology is based on the following facts.
Poor culling efficiency.
1. Commenting part way through the RBCTs Mr Bradshaw noted culling efficiency was as low as 30% in some triplets (1). And in the consultation document the final trapping efficiency was reported to be 20 to 60%. (2). Previous trials were carried out to far more exacting standards; virtually 100% clearance was effected by gassing in the Thornbury and Steeple Leaze Trials whilst the clearance at Hartland, using trapping, achieved well over 80% removal. In the two Irish trials over 80% removal of badgers was achieved.
2. Inadequate number of days’ trapping per year.
Badgers were only trapped on average for 8 days per annum in the proactive triplets (3). This low level of trapping activity is wholly inadequate to remove sufficient badgers to reduce spread of infection to cattle. The DEFRA Wildlife Unit (WLU) customarily continued trapping for as long as necessary sometimes up to 3 months to ensure complete removal of all badgers on infected farms.
3. Substantial areas of land unavailable for culling.
In total 32% of land in the proactive areas was unavailable for culling with variations in different triplets from 18% to 57% (3). Thus substantial areas of land within culling triplets were left to support infected populations of badgers and provide a retreat for badgers dispersed by inefficient culling on adjacent land.
4. Inconsistent farm participation.
Consent status for culling inevitably altered as landowners withdrew permission to cull and new occupiers changed consents or prohibitions dictated by previous owners (3). Thus, the number of farms participating in particular triplets was variable, as was the time during which they were culled.
5. Significant interference with trapping and poor trapping strategy
The Independent Scientific Group naively posted the start time and place of the first trapping exercise on their website thus assisting the threatened animal activist interference. This interference persisted and by October 2003 had resulted in 8,981(57%) of 15,666 traps being interfered with and a further 1,827 (12%) being stolen (4). The ISG allowed trapping at setts to continue for 4 years (1998-2001) despite widespread interference, and it was only after Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001, following pleas from the WLU, that traps were laid away from setts on badger runs to avoid interference (5).
6. Failure to clear badgers effectively
The number of badgers killed in the Proactive Triplets was 8892 over 8 years. This figure is inevitably lower than it should have been due to the failure to achieve culling across all 10 triplets for 4 years. And once culling had started in all areas in 2002-03, the total number of badgers removed in that year was 2057 and in each subsequent year well over half this number was again removed, demonstrating that these areas had never properly been cleared of badgers. (3).
7. Inappropriate timing of culls
Badgers show greatly reduced activity during late autumn and winter. Thus trapping is likely to be relatively ineffective during November to January (February-April is the closed season when culling is prohibited). However, in the RBCTs, 15 out of the first 30 culls (culling years 1 to 3) took place in November, December or January and 16 of the total of 51 culls (29%) were in these months despite WLU’s advice to the contrary (3). As a result, some triplets went 2 years without an effective cull eg. Triplet B, North Devon (5).
8. Unscientific abandonment of the Reactive Culling Triplets
This occurred in 2003 when three triplets (D, I and J) had only completed one year’s culling, and a further 4 triplets only completed 2 year’s culling. This was regarded by many, including Professor Godfray in his independent review of the RBCTs (6), as a precipitate and unjustified decision, no doubt brought about by the sharp rise in disease in the reactive triplets attendant on the gross badger disturbance caused by poor culling methodology. The ISG should have understood the cause of the rise in cattle infections and could have rectified the situation had they listened more carefully to the WLU’s advice and redoubled their efforts to cull more effectively (5).
9. Temporary abandonment of the trials during 2001.
The unavoidable suspension of tuberculin testing of cattle and control of badgers in seven of the 10 areas for a year during the FMD crisis completely disrupted the RBCTs for at least a year.
J.M.D
J.G
L.H.T
July 2006.
References
(1). Hansard, 29 April 2004, column 1189
(2). DEFRA (2005) – Controlling the spread of bovine tuberculosis in cattle in high incidence areas in England: badger culling.
www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/badgers-tbcontrols/consultation.pdf
(3). Donnelly, C.A. and others (2006) Positive and negative effects of widespread badger culling on tuberculosis in cattle. Nature 439, 843-846 (and Supplementary Information)
(4) Hansard, 8 December 2003, column 218 W
(5). EFRA Select Committee, 6th Report into bTB, 8 March 2006, ref BTB 33 Evidence from Paul Caruana, WLU, Truro.
(6) Godfray H.C.J. and others (2004) Independent Scientific Review of the Randomised Badger culling trials and associated epidemiological research.
Ends.
As farmers with land within RBCT areas in three counties, we would agree, adding our own experiences of this protracted farce which include the introduction of several hundred acres into a Devon 'Pro active' trapping area - half way through the 'trial'. Boundaries were changed and changed substantially. And not only did our SW 'Matthew 5' not have a 'reactive ' cull for three years, a correspondent in Wiltshire was similarly ignored in a so-called proactive area!
And of course the much hyped figures of RBCT badger dispersal, were taken only from its first dismal year. The data has to be tortured for another seven years, until we see the full extent of its 'achievements'. And clouding those waters are the numbers of cattle breakdowns, on which this data relies, somewhat out of kilter with expectations and trends, i.e DOWN.
With a mixture of Lelystad tuberculin, the weather (the man in the moon?) thrown into the melting pot of possible explanations. On the other hand, the final years of the RBCT could just have worked. Now there's a thought.
Farmers Guardian has the piece in this week's edition:
http://www.farmersguardian.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=3470
and we are grateful for sight of their core list of RBCT failings which we reproduce below:
FAILINGS OF THE RANDOMISED
BADGER CULLING TRIALS
Our view that the RBCTs were fatally flawed by a poorly conceived and badly implemented methodology is based on the following facts.
Poor culling efficiency.
1. Commenting part way through the RBCTs Mr Bradshaw noted culling efficiency was as low as 30% in some triplets (1). And in the consultation document the final trapping efficiency was reported to be 20 to 60%. (2). Previous trials were carried out to far more exacting standards; virtually 100% clearance was effected by gassing in the Thornbury and Steeple Leaze Trials whilst the clearance at Hartland, using trapping, achieved well over 80% removal. In the two Irish trials over 80% removal of badgers was achieved.
2. Inadequate number of days’ trapping per year.
Badgers were only trapped on average for 8 days per annum in the proactive triplets (3). This low level of trapping activity is wholly inadequate to remove sufficient badgers to reduce spread of infection to cattle. The DEFRA Wildlife Unit (WLU) customarily continued trapping for as long as necessary sometimes up to 3 months to ensure complete removal of all badgers on infected farms.
3. Substantial areas of land unavailable for culling.
In total 32% of land in the proactive areas was unavailable for culling with variations in different triplets from 18% to 57% (3). Thus substantial areas of land within culling triplets were left to support infected populations of badgers and provide a retreat for badgers dispersed by inefficient culling on adjacent land.
4. Inconsistent farm participation.
Consent status for culling inevitably altered as landowners withdrew permission to cull and new occupiers changed consents or prohibitions dictated by previous owners (3). Thus, the number of farms participating in particular triplets was variable, as was the time during which they were culled.
5. Significant interference with trapping and poor trapping strategy
The Independent Scientific Group naively posted the start time and place of the first trapping exercise on their website thus assisting the threatened animal activist interference. This interference persisted and by October 2003 had resulted in 8,981(57%) of 15,666 traps being interfered with and a further 1,827 (12%) being stolen (4). The ISG allowed trapping at setts to continue for 4 years (1998-2001) despite widespread interference, and it was only after Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001, following pleas from the WLU, that traps were laid away from setts on badger runs to avoid interference (5).
6. Failure to clear badgers effectively
The number of badgers killed in the Proactive Triplets was 8892 over 8 years. This figure is inevitably lower than it should have been due to the failure to achieve culling across all 10 triplets for 4 years. And once culling had started in all areas in 2002-03, the total number of badgers removed in that year was 2057 and in each subsequent year well over half this number was again removed, demonstrating that these areas had never properly been cleared of badgers. (3).
7. Inappropriate timing of culls
Badgers show greatly reduced activity during late autumn and winter. Thus trapping is likely to be relatively ineffective during November to January (February-April is the closed season when culling is prohibited). However, in the RBCTs, 15 out of the first 30 culls (culling years 1 to 3) took place in November, December or January and 16 of the total of 51 culls (29%) were in these months despite WLU’s advice to the contrary (3). As a result, some triplets went 2 years without an effective cull eg. Triplet B, North Devon (5).
8. Unscientific abandonment of the Reactive Culling Triplets
This occurred in 2003 when three triplets (D, I and J) had only completed one year’s culling, and a further 4 triplets only completed 2 year’s culling. This was regarded by many, including Professor Godfray in his independent review of the RBCTs (6), as a precipitate and unjustified decision, no doubt brought about by the sharp rise in disease in the reactive triplets attendant on the gross badger disturbance caused by poor culling methodology. The ISG should have understood the cause of the rise in cattle infections and could have rectified the situation had they listened more carefully to the WLU’s advice and redoubled their efforts to cull more effectively (5).
9. Temporary abandonment of the trials during 2001.
The unavoidable suspension of tuberculin testing of cattle and control of badgers in seven of the 10 areas for a year during the FMD crisis completely disrupted the RBCTs for at least a year.
J.M.D
J.G
L.H.T
July 2006.
References
(1). Hansard, 29 April 2004, column 1189
(2). DEFRA (2005) – Controlling the spread of bovine tuberculosis in cattle in high incidence areas in England: badger culling.
www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/badgers-tbcontrols/consultation.pdf
(3). Donnelly, C.A. and others (2006) Positive and negative effects of widespread badger culling on tuberculosis in cattle. Nature 439, 843-846 (and Supplementary Information)
(4) Hansard, 8 December 2003, column 218 W
(5). EFRA Select Committee, 6th Report into bTB, 8 March 2006, ref BTB 33 Evidence from Paul Caruana, WLU, Truro.
(6) Godfray H.C.J. and others (2004) Independent Scientific Review of the Randomised Badger culling trials and associated epidemiological research.
Ends.
As farmers with land within RBCT areas in three counties, we would agree, adding our own experiences of this protracted farce which include the introduction of several hundred acres into a Devon 'Pro active' trapping area - half way through the 'trial'. Boundaries were changed and changed substantially. And not only did our SW 'Matthew 5' not have a 'reactive ' cull for three years, a correspondent in Wiltshire was similarly ignored in a so-called proactive area!
And of course the much hyped figures of RBCT badger dispersal, were taken only from its first dismal year. The data has to be tortured for another seven years, until we see the full extent of its 'achievements'. And clouding those waters are the numbers of cattle breakdowns, on which this data relies, somewhat out of kilter with expectations and trends, i.e DOWN.
With a mixture of Lelystad tuberculin, the weather (the man in the moon?) thrown into the melting pot of possible explanations. On the other hand, the final years of the RBCT could just have worked. Now there's a thought.
Saturday, July 15, 2006
Just like double decker buses...
....either none arrive at all - or two come together. And so it was with Defra's Tb statistics. Shock, horror and nothing (that we can find) in February, then the March figures diluted with missing February and a still-increasing January. Defra released figures for the four months to April only a week ago, unusually pointing out a drop in incidents / cattle slaughtered of 27 percent. Which was less than Jan - March 29 . 'something' percent, but we won't dwell on that.
But the figures for May are now published, also showing a 'drop' over the 'five months' - of 20 percent. Defra explain:
"There has been a substantial reduction in the number of new TB incidents in January - May 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. The provisional statistics presented here indicate that this reduction is 20%, although this figure will reduce as further test results are input by AHDOs. It is too early to draw any conclusions about whether the decrease is a temporary or a more sustained reduction and further analysis is needed to identify the reasons for the fall. However, it is likely to be caused by a complex combination of factors. There is no evidence at the moment that the switch in tuberculin supply has caused this reduction although further analysis is required before this can be confirmed."
As the switch to Lelystad happened progressively from last autumn and the parachute drop in numbers only occurred after Christmas, and then only in certain counties, with that we would agree. However, we do hope that Defra's "analyses" include batch numbers of the tuberculin which in some instances gave no 'reaction' at all, not a single lump, for over a month. But we wouldn't bank on them asking those sort of questions, to the right sort of people.
Anyway, it seems to us, that there has now been a dramatic increase in herds going under Tb restriction, and cattle slaughtered. The tuberculin intradermal skin test is working again. Whatever happened to the serum in late January / February, ain't happening now. An extra 324 herds are under restriction from last month, and Defra shot 1,911 cattle (568 in April)
And Defra's unannounced almost 30 percent drop in cases, is now 20 percent.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/stats/latest.htm
But the figures for May are now published, also showing a 'drop' over the 'five months' - of 20 percent. Defra explain:
"There has been a substantial reduction in the number of new TB incidents in January - May 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. The provisional statistics presented here indicate that this reduction is 20%, although this figure will reduce as further test results are input by AHDOs. It is too early to draw any conclusions about whether the decrease is a temporary or a more sustained reduction and further analysis is needed to identify the reasons for the fall. However, it is likely to be caused by a complex combination of factors. There is no evidence at the moment that the switch in tuberculin supply has caused this reduction although further analysis is required before this can be confirmed."
As the switch to Lelystad happened progressively from last autumn and the parachute drop in numbers only occurred after Christmas, and then only in certain counties, with that we would agree. However, we do hope that Defra's "analyses" include batch numbers of the tuberculin which in some instances gave no 'reaction' at all, not a single lump, for over a month. But we wouldn't bank on them asking those sort of questions, to the right sort of people.
Anyway, it seems to us, that there has now been a dramatic increase in herds going under Tb restriction, and cattle slaughtered. The tuberculin intradermal skin test is working again. Whatever happened to the serum in late January / February, ain't happening now. An extra 324 herds are under restriction from last month, and Defra shot 1,911 cattle (568 in April)
And Defra's unannounced almost 30 percent drop in cases, is now 20 percent.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/stats/latest.htm
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)