£2.8 million - The Pathman project.

In October 2000 Defra instigated a project to investigate the 'Pathogenisis and diagnosis of tuberculosis in cattle - complementary field studies". Known as the 'Pathman project', this work was designed to investigate the undiscovered reservoir of cattle Tb missed by the skin test - or so it seems to us. The correct term, is " to advance the understanding of cattle-to cattle transmission of bovine tuberculosis in Great Britian'. But its core result seems to have escaped notice.

200 tuberculin reactor cattle at standard interpretation of the skin test, were collected ex farm and paired with 200 in contact animals. Blood samples were drawn and nasal mucous samples were collected; then the animals were slaughtered and subject to a two hour (at least) thorough postmortem examination. The bloods were sent for trace element testing, as were liver samples which are much more accurate, and also immunological assays to check past disease exposure.

The in-contact animals were kept on farm at the Boxworth research establishment for seven weeks, in isolation. During this time several bloods were drawn, and up to seven nasal swabs taken to "detect early stage disease and m.bovis excretion". At the end of the holding period, another skin test was performed and then the animals slaughtered under the same procedure as the reactors.

(3.4 TB50)The results were only slightly better than those performed in 8 minutes by SVS postmortems, in that just over half the reactors had VL (55 per cent) and thus half did not and would record NVL. The in-contacts recorded 14 per cent macrospopic lesions and on the 7 week skin retest, 15 of these 200 animals had become reactors at standard interpretation. The site of lesions most commonly found were in the thorax of the cattle, with head lesions second. Very few were found in the abdominal cavity, (3.2) and even less if lesions were not apparent elsewhere.

32 animals in the study were found to have lung lesions, and the range of postmortem VLs was much higher (89 per cent) in yearlings and calves than in other classes. Dairy cattle had the lowest confirmation rate at 34 per cent, a point noted by the investigative team. (Table 5)

Investigation into other inputs such as vaccinations or exposure to other diseases gave mixed results. (table 10) Having antibodies to Johnes disease (m.avium paratuberculosis) was associated with confirmed bTb in both dairy and non dairy reactors but in the in contact animals it was thought to be "not statistically significant". Antibodies to Leptospira, were strongly associated with bTb in in-contact dairy cattle - but the opposite in non dairy contacts. In reactors there was no association. Having antibodies to liver fluke was associated with lower risk in all categories.

Selenium and copper were investigated and it was found that levels of selenium tended to be higher in dairy animals than non-dairy. The conclusion was that a lower liver level was associated with an increased risk of bTb, but that the association 'was not statistically significant'. (table 12) Other categories found a slight correlation. Dairy animals were significantly and consistently "less likely to have bTb confirmed by culture, than beef or other production classes" involved in the study. (4.8)

Considering the amount of emphasis placed on cattle to cattle transmission by the ISG, it is interesting to note that in the Pathman project, not a single one of the 1543 nasal mucosal samples of which 1006 proved clear of contamination - including those from the 32 reactors found to have lung lesions - proved positive for m.bovis, a point missed by the ISG when describing the project in their final report. How could John Bourne have missed that, one might ask? It was mentioned at least four times (4.6) (3.6)the executive summary and the conclusion.

"M.bovis was not detected by bacterial culture in any of the nasal mucus samples." and "The results suggest that large concentrations of M.bovis are not present in the nasal passages, and the shedding of M.bovis, if it occurs, is rare in naturally infected GB cattle."

To be fair (and why should we be?) the paper points out that the researchers 'have not looked at transmission through mouth respiration and coughing', and they conclude, rather strangely we think, 'that these could remain potential sources of disease transmission'. We think they would like to do another trial; but think about it. Cattle graze and eat with their heads lower than their gut, thus any mucous in the lungs passes towards the exit - which in all the cattle we've known is the nose and not the mouth. Cattle with pneumonia will pant for sure, but any discharge from an excess of mucous in the lungs exits from the nose and not the mouth. Hence, as cattle keepers, not scientists, our cryptic comments.

But also making a cryptic observation in this week's Veterinary Record, are R.M.Q.Sainsbury and Dr. John Gallagher, both remarking on the lack of onward transmission from these 1006 samples, and others in a complimentray study not noted by the ISG. They point out that the final report of the ISG "used data somewhat inconsistent with those in the recently published 'Pathogenisis and diagnosis of tuberculosis in cattle - complementary field studies'".

"In total over 1500 nasal mucus samples were taken in order to ascertain whether tuberculosis (bTB) was passed from cattle to cattle via the respiratory tract. Micobacterium bovis was not isolated from any of these samples despite lesions being found in the lungs of 32 of the cattle. Also quoted in the study are the results of an ongoing, separate longitudinal study of reactor animals [SE3033]where no bacilli have been detected in approximately 1000 nasal mucus samples from a further 40 reactors [ taken at varying time intervals]"

Returning to the ISG final report, the letter continues:

"In appendix 1, the ISG report does mention the pathogenisis and longitudinal studies, but appears to play down the significance of their results despite the fact that both studies confirmed 'on the ground' experience of many working in this field, that is, that cattle-to-cattle spread is uncommon on infected farms."

The writers emphasise their point thus;

"This point is crucial. In the ISG report it is stressed that infected cattle have 'serious implications for the maintenance and persistence of the disease in infected herds, and for the spread of the disease to neighbouring herds and to other parts of the country'. This is used to justify the recommended further rigorous movement controls and additional testing (recommendations 21 - 29) and would inevitably lead to the slaughter of many more cattle."

And they conclude:

"The overall conclusions of this Defra published report have increased our grave concerns regarding the ISG recommendation that controls on cattle alone would be relied upon to reduce the incidence and the spread of bovine Tb. We believe the ISG has seriously overstressed the importance of cattle-to-cattle spread, and the adoption of this recommendation will not control the disease. Progress will only be made when the original source of cattle infections is addressed and that means facing the reality of the large reservoir of Tb in wild badgers."

We agree with that conclusion, and have already pointed out the crass futility of repeating such cattle-only measures, attempted by greater men than John Bourne and with such stunning success

And after £2.8 million, Professor Bourne missed the histology conclusion on those mucus samples completely. They were all negative. Every one.

It may be churlish to point out the obvious, but we will point it out nevertheless; that is, if micobacterium bovis wasn't plastering the pastures and cattle feed troughs of GB, then the disease status of those cattle unfortunate enough to fall over it would not be called into question. But as it has been, surely the negative-for-onward-transmission results of every mucosal sample taken, deserves a higher profile?
See SE3013 here

"Lesions typical of bTb"

That was the post mortem report on the bullock Shambo, slaughtered last night after a three month standoff at the Skandavale sanctuary in SW Wales.

We have deliberately kept a low profile on this issue. Emotions running high do not a good posting make. That said, having religiously (if you'll pardon the pun) offered up cattle every 60 days for testing, enduring the stress, abortions, bruises and loss of milk yield / growth associated with this, had sleepless nights imagining lumps and bumps where there were none - and missing the vital couple which condemned another good cow to the skip - we realise only too well the anguish of the monks of Skandavale. As do the owners of the 11,860 cattle slaughtered in GB to May this year; which correlate neatly with government predictions of a 20 per cent annual rise in Tb incidence in the absence of any 'new dynamics' to control the disease - it's 21.6 per cent actually, but let that pass.

This point was well made in a letter to farming press from a beef breeder this week, who pointed out that the emotional, spiritual and added financial costs have never been taken into account when so-called commercial cattle are taken for slaughter after a positive bTb test. The writer, a farmer from Gwent explained;

A routine test a few years ago found three reactors and an inconclusive in our herd. A few months before our bins had been tipped over nightly and we had seen badgers hobbling away.

We had been led to believe from Defra that having a sett on our land would protect us from bTB from roaming badgers. However, on examination, this sett and all the badgers in it had died out.

What had they 'died out' with, one wonders? Was the farm open to allcomers, or were the badgers she saw raiding dustbins, the remnants of the original group? Not good news anyway. She continues:

I am also extremely angry that badger trusts have been trying to make out it is a lack of hygiene/good husbandry. At least Shambo reacting positive disproves this nonsense.

This is a very good point. So many times those of us who 'farm' animals, are the butt of ignorance and prejudice concerning the conditions in which they are alleged to have been kept. The contributers to this site range from keepers of just 20 organic angus cattle roaming 80 acres to several hundred cattle on several thousand acres. Shambo fitted none of these boxes - but bTb did not make the distinction either.

Our animals were all from the same family, so I suspect a genetic tendency to be more susceptible to the disease, but they were all summer calvers and had not been housed or fed. Our herd is closed, we use AI and they had no contact with other cattle. What was worse was that a Belgian Blue in-calf heifer that was inconclusive was also slaughtered. Tests came back negative for her – so she had to die to prove she did not have the disease.

When an animal proves postive for bTb on standard interpretation of the test, results are automatically rolled back to a severe interpretation which may scoop up those who would otherwise have been inconclusives and subject to retest. Regularly testing, in the absence of a wildlife reservoir, will pick up any cattle who may be incubating bTb, ahead of lesions, which is the case with this heifer. (And 42 of ours as it happens. About half of all the cattle slaughtered prove both NVL and culture negative.)
The monks of Skandavale face that situation now, with animals which tested inconclusive ratcheted down to a more severe interpretation after Shambo's positive results.

And no less distressing is it to those of us faced with a cattle lorry on a one-way-trip. At least Shambo wasn't pregnant:

It was one of the saddest days of my life when I saw them go on the lorry – we had ridden the BSE and foot-and-mouth fiascos only to be brought to our knees financially by bTB. What is not taken into account is the ongoing financial loss, the loss of their calves the next year, the fact that their calves did not thrive as well as if they had been on their mothers milk (and their grieving, looking for mum), and the strain of subjecting suckler cattle to continual testing.
.... our stress, labour and devotion to our cattle is as nothing, not even considered by Defra and the Government.

the writer concludes:

If Shambo has highlighted these facts then this high profile case has been worth it. We must never again allow our feelings to be swept aside and must be vociferous in our efforts to cull infected badgers and make the Government see sense.
We have already determined that we will not be prepared to go through such a harrowing experience again. Our herd has a healthy profile, age and health wise, again but we would sell up rather than rebuild a second time.

Elizabeth Smith, Llan Farm, Goytre, near Usk, Gwent.

Peturbation - update

Following on from our posting below where we explored Professor, Sir John Kreb's proposals for his trial in 1997, and the reality of what the ISG delivered, a dialogue on 'peturbation' and its effect of the ISG results ensued, the basics of which we post below.

We wondered why previous clearances had been so successful and the RBCT so dramatically the opposite. What was this so-called 'edge effect' of Bourne's trial and why was it not apparent in previous clearences - or if it was, why not a problem?

We were accused of naivity in 'ignoring the results of the trial', to which we replied:

Which trial?
This posting explored the protocol proposed by Professor, Sir John Krebs in 1997 for the latest effort by the ISG. It is quite clear from his recommendations that to avoid peturbation (and thus increased spread of disease), many things should be done and conversely, other things should not.
It is equally clear that these recommendations were not followed by the ISG in the current trial, with entirely predictable consequences.

Smaller, more targetted but intense clearances over a longer (than 8 nights) time frame would appear from past policies to have a far better effect as Professor Krebs explained in 1997. A policy which was supported by Professor Steven Harris in his

"alternative to the RBCT" which we explained in July 2004.

We pointed out that the The RBCT showed how NOT to carry out a cull, from information which was known already : not that it should not happen at all, a point with which our questioner agreed - with reservations.

You're right when you say that it showed how not to carry out a cull - an experiment isn't always there to show how to do something but also that something isn't the right thing to do. But you miss my point which is: more intense culling would not have prevented the perturbation which caused the rises in incidence that were seen. Therefore your constant harping about how they should have culled more intensively is completely irrelevant as it wouldn't have actually improved the result in terms of lower cattle incidence.

We had not missed the point at all, but it was a point with which we did not agree, for the following reasons:

The results from Thornbury, the 'Clean ring' strategy and Professor Harris' proposed alternative to the Krebs RBCT do not support your conclusion. And from our posting here, even Professor Krebs realised how not to do his trial.

You are saying that peturbation occurs if any or all of a group are removed, I think.
We agree that of course another group would gradually expand territory to fill that gap, but we also pointed out from a badger expert's extensive research, that the first dominant scent marker to define that new territory would prevent territorial scrapping and bite wounding.

We then explored what we have learned as cattle farmers about badger behaviour in this situation.

Is it possible that when an entire social group is removed then the next badgers moving quickly into the area may be diseased 'dispersers' from neighbouring groups? Is that why a more prolonged culling stratgy, even on a small scale worked? And after this, the inevitable recolonisation is from a healthier, more stable group?

In other words, it is not the first foray into an infected population (especially with cage traps) which is important, it the the second one which mops up dispersers and those missed the first time around? Thus to prevent the spread of disease, that second or even third clearance should be within a very short period of time and certainly not the years the ISG took.

We pointed out that past policies of large scale of intensive clearance (Thornbury) worked extremely well with "no other contemporaneous change identified that could have accounted for the reduction in [cattle] Tb incidence within the area” [Hansard 24thMarch 2004 Col 824W [157949]. The Thornbury clearance, (begun when cattle incidence reached 5.4 percent) was not so very long term either, starting in December 1975, and ending in August 1976. After which badgers were able to recolonise clean ground, their numbers recovering to pre cull levels, but the area remained clear of Tb in cattle for in excess of 10 years.

Smaller clearances in response to Tb breakdowns, which targetted setts (and groups) implicated in a farm or group of farms breakdown during the ‘clean ring’ strategy were also successful, and from contributers to the site who were involved, lasted about 6 / 8 weeks.

And we agreed with the questioner's point of leaving the social group intact, while querying the peturbation effect of this:

We do wonder if provided the group is left intact, or conversely removed completely the ‘peturbation’ effect is overstated? When a food source is available, Prof. Roper's research showed up to three groups sharing feed during night filming in Glos. cattle sheds. And we have told on this site of 84 badgers crossing a small field nightly, on their way to be served peanuts for the benefit of paying viewers in a Staffordshire wildlife park. That would be around 8 groups on Harris methodology, would it not?

CSL’s hand fed Woodchester badgers often make forays into adjacent territory: “Temporary and permanent dispersal from one group to another occurs regularly” Hansard: 17th March 2004. Col 274W [157988].

The point we were trying to make here is NOT to remove the strongest, leaving the sick, old and weak behind as the RBCT did – at least for its first 4 years. WLU operatives have commented on this site that after that the ISG did listen – a little bit – and refined trapping protocol accordingly, with better results.
Thus we cannot agree your conclusion that better culling would have made no difference to the results of the RBCT. That’s hypothetical and not born out by the examples above.

Experience has shown that even smaller clearances are successful if carried out thoroughly. And last years’ PCR trial from Warwick found about 64 per cent of the setts in the Glos. hotspots showed negative for Tb, so any movement of badgers from these would be without immediate risk to cattle, or to other badgers.

Our questioner thought we had made two opposing answers to badger clearances but we had not:

We have not altered tack at all on this site. We do not favour wipe out - of any species, just tuberculosis.

But we cannot see the sense in criticising the basis or conclusions of the RBCT, and then trying to cherry pick bits of it, while expecting government to ignore its less palatible proposals. In the interim and final ISG reports, Bourne intimated that a bigger cull with 'hard' boundaries would be more successful. It would, but the boundaries and scale would be so big as to be unworkable - in our opinion. That is not to say that some groups / politicians may not grab this as a possibility.

What they ignore is the ISG's seductive prediction of a drop in cattle Tb of 15 percent if more cattle measures are adopted, over and above preMT, now into its second year.

The only way this will happen is if gamma and more frequent testing (difficult if you are aleady doing it every 60 days) takes out 15 percent more cattle. How killing more cattle but faster can answer the problem, while leaving a reservoir behind in badgers, we explored in our post here.



And we are aware that any such proposal on badger control could inevitably have extra cattle controls bolted on, despite the past futile experience which we have described above: from past (bitter) experience, government have a nasty habit of dividing their agreement 'packages', prior to implementation.

We think what this boils down to, is to understand how badger ecology - away from the well drained, well fed population at Woodchester - operates, and use this to 'manage' a now widely infected population in areas of endemic tb. And for several years now, that is what the authors have tried to do (understand that is - it is government's responsibity to control bTb, not farmers.)

Cattle testing on a regular (annual) basis of course is part of this, but in isolation from clearing infection from wildlife reservoirs, it has been shown to be totally ineffective.

It is futile to repeat past mistakes; but we must learn from them, including the latest debacle and move on from strategies which proved succesful, using up to date technology as back up.

"A Landmark judgement.."

".. in the history of religious worship in the UK".

So said the Hindu forum of Britain's spokesman, Ramesh Kallidai after the ruling by the High Court in Cardiff yesterday, which quashed the slaughter notice issued by the Welsh Assembly on 'Shambo' the bullock who tested positive for bTb.

Tuberculosis is very serious zoonosis, unmoved by religious derogations, Hindu or otherwise. And from the viewpoint of those of us who have religiously (forgive the pun) obeyed OIE and European health directives, rigorously implemented by our own Ministry, yesterday's verdict was a slap in the face - if not a bullet - for every Church of England, Roman Catholic, Methodist or Non-conformist cow slaughtered on the alter of political expediency over the last several years.

The verdict appears to have hinged on the Hindu right to 'manifest' its religious beliefs under the European Convention of Human rights. The Welsh Assembly have launched an appeal and the case will be heard in London on Friday.

Story here

A comment from virologist Dr. Ruth Watkins, herself a farmer in a Tb hotspot, originally posted on www.warmwell.com we add below:

The option Skanda Vale have chosen is the difficult long and expensive path. This is in contrast to culling and taking the money.
Further testing for infection in Shambo, and perhaps in some at least of the other bovines, must be done in the USA if not also in the UK, and paid for. Treatment will cost at least £5000 (treating an elephant was $40000 in 2005) Treatment will require the supervision of experienced vets, perhaps distantly from the elephant and other zoo treatment schemes, as well as a vet in the UK.

Selection of drugs (at least three different antibiotics) will need to be carefully made and Shambo monitored for drug toxicity and drug levels. Treatment will probably have to be for 9 months.

It is our understanding that the cocktail of drugs for the synergistic treatment of Tb are among the very few not licensed for animal use - or not in the UK. The side effects of the human antibiotics are so severe that we have been told patients are encouraged to complete their long course by payments. If further testing involves the use of PCR, American or otherwise, that is the least of Skanda Vale's worries. More urgent is the need to persuade Defra / Welsh Assembly / Imperial College to release the assay needed to fuel the thing.
We too wondered about the elephant. Diagnosis? How? Treatment?

Shambo will be kept in isolation, more remote than his current temple, and require the attention of the monks every day for drug dosing, and general care.

After treatment he should be able to rejoin his herd fellows, the bachelor group. What is the source of his infection? Are there other cases in the cattle herd at the monastery? These questions may need an answer.

It is our understanding that a further herd test revealed 5 more animals with inconclusive test results. However, in a press release last week, the Welsh Assembly intimated that IF severe interpretation had been applied to this test, that would ratchet up to 2 more reactors and another bunch of inconclusives. After contact from the Skandavale community, we were happy to put the record straight. See here .
From personal experience, the disease situation at Skandavale appears to 'amplifying' (in Defra speak) rather than resolving. Further tests will confirm.

Provided testing does not harm Shambo the monks I understand would be willing to allow testing to benefit science, and continue testing for TB on Shambo throughout his treatment which is likely to be recommended anyway based on the model of treating elephants.

Human patients of the prolonged and particularly nasty cocktail of antibiotics, often do not complete their courses, as we have said before, and have to be 'encouraged' with cash. This prolonged course of treatment may benefit science - or not - but at what cost to Shambo? It is our understanding of the disease, that provided lesions have not formed, then a prolonged antibiotic regime may work. However if they have formed, only surgery will remove them. Otherwise the nature of tuberculosis is that such lesions 'wall up', lying dormant often for decades, but breaking down into full blown disease when the body is subject to stress or other disease challenges. All this is known and acted on already.

I believe finally whenever Shambo dies a detailed post mortem and specimens for culture should be done, as on elephants, to determine the success of treatment.

Dr. Watkins concludes:

As a small farmer myself on annual TB skin testing in my parish (the occurrence of TB in this part of Carmarthenshire is recent in the last few years) if my favourite and glorious bull Arthur was skin test positive I could not afford or accomplish the above. He would have to be culled. Indeed as a trading farmer and one who receives the single farm payment (unlike the monks who have never received any state payments) I must abide by the current rules even if I think the policy could and should be improved (as most other farmers feel as well) Reprieving Shambo does not give a licence for treating commercial farm animals. Really the monastery is a hospice for animals, just as it provides hospice care for humans. Any animal on the monastery is not in contact with other farm animals ever again and no animal products are given or sold to the public.

Fair point, but where did the original m.bovis infection come from? Shambo was Inconclusive last year, but resolved on a retest. This year he did not, and now a further 5 - 7 animals are invloved.

The risk of being infected from bovine TB being shed on the breath of an infected and shedding bovine is very small- exactly how small is not known.

This is absolutely true, and the recently published pathogenisis report SE3013 confirms it. Of 1006 mucosal samples taken from 200 reactor animals and 200 'in contact' animals from farms suffering prolonged Tb breakdowns, and this after a 2 hour postmortem on each, ALL were negative. The ISG report refers to the 32 animals found to have visible lung lesions, but omits to point out that samples taken from them and the other 358, were negative for onward transmission.

Removing Shambo will have no impact on bovine TB infection. Indeed the infected badgers, deer, other animals and undisclosed bovine animals on farms continue to live, move about freely - or not quite so freely if farm animals. Our problem with bovine TB in the UK remains as bad as ever despite our testing and culling of cattle (largely by the skin test). We need some fresh thinking on the issue and a more holistic solution.

With thanks to www.warmwell.com

Postscript;

The appeal against the Wesh Assembly's notice of slaughter on this animal was held in London on Friday, and Monday the court delivered their
verdict

Krebs v. RBCT

It has become apparent through comments posted to the site that our criticism of the RBCT, (which we reserve the right to refer to as a 'badger dispersal trial'), has rattled not a few cages. But it is only in latter years that the trial has been referred to as the 'RBCT' in total, rather than the 'Krebs Trial' or the 'Krebs RBCT'. The author of the trial has just melted away, and we wondered why this should be.

One of our contributers met Professor Krebs some time ago, when he expressed concern at the way 'his' trial was being carried out. Contributers to this site saw first hand what happened on farms within the trial areas, and operatives and managers concerned in its implementation have also voiced concerns. But how does that compare with the recommendation protocols offered in 1997 by Professor, Sir John Krebs?

We have now obtained sight of a copy of the proposals from the trial's originators, and in them, Professor Krebs explains why they were important to his trial's outcome.

P126 In explaining the efficacy of previous policies:

7.8.3 The gassing and clean ring strategies, in effect, eliminated or severely reduced badger populations from an area and appear to have had the effect of reducing or eliminating TB in local cattle populations. The effect lasted for many years after the cessation of culling, but eventually TB returned.

7.8.4 The interim strategy, introduced following the Dunnet report, is not likely to be effective in reducing badger-related incidence of TB in cattle for the following reasons:

(i) The policy involves removing badgers from a limited area (the reactor land or the entire farm suffering the herd breakdown if the former cannot be identified) ; but social groups of badgers may occupy several setts covering more than one farm.

(ii) Partial removal of groups could exacerbate the spread of TB by peturbation of the social scructure and increased movement of badgers.

(iii) There is no attempt to prevent recolonisation by badgers of potentially infected setts; even if infectivety in the setts is not a problem, immigrant badgers may bring new infection.

In addition, the current operation of the interim strategy involves a delay (27 weeks in 1995) to the start of the removal. The average period from the herd breakdown to the completion of the removal was 41 weeks in 1995.

7.8.5 In common with the clean ring strategy and the live test trial, the effectiveness of the interim strategy is further underminedf by the failure to remove lactating sows which may also be infected. We recognise that culling lactating sows has a welfare cost in terms of cubs left in setts, but this needs to be balanced against wider animal health and welfare considerations for both cattle and badgers.

So, the originators of the Krebs trial protocol recognised that gassing and clean ring strategies worked for several years by reducing or eliminating Tb in cattle, and conversely they considered the 'interim' strategy to be ineffective for the following reasons: that it split social groups of badgers, thus exacerbating peturbation and territorial social structure. It also 'failed to prevent recolonisation of potentially infected setts'- (except by placing 3 sticks across the entrance) - and it allowed lactating sows to offer transmission of Tb to their cubs. It was also very slow in delivering follow up action to a herd breakdown.

In another part of the proposals (7.8.9) Professor Krebs reiterates some key features which he said were likely to influence the effectiveness of any reactive strategy:

(i) The size of the area cleared, (including the extent to which this takes into account badger territory)

(ii) The efficiency of the badger removal operation (to ensure all infected badgers are removed and minimise any problem of peturbation associated with partial removal of social groups)

(iii) The prevention of recolonisation for a sufficient period.

One would assume from that critique that all these failures of the interim strategy and recommendations for the efficacy of a new ££multi million trial would be taken note of by the operators of the RBCT. But in that assumption, one would be quite wrong. Wildlife Manager , Paul Caruana's experience of working under ISG instructions gives a vastly different picture of the methodology employed. And this is backed up by comments on the site from others involved in trial operations.

The original Krebs methodology:

7.8.14 We suggest that the most appropriate Reactive strategy would be to target culling at social groups where a badger-attributed breakdown has been identified. This would involve removing all badgers, including lactating sows, from all social groups with territories including the breakdown farm (or reactor land if this can be rigorously identified). There should be sufficient follow up to ensure that every member of every social group which could have caused the initial breakdown has been removed.

7.8.15 Ideally recolonisation of setts should be prevented for a period of time under the reactive strategy. This would be costly. We therefore consider that costs should be balanced against potential benefits in deciding whether this should be included in the detailed experimental design. In any event given the lack of data on recolonisation times, we recommend that further research should be done on this in areas subject to both reactive and proactive control strategies.

7.8.17 The Proactive strategy would involve total removal of complete badger social groups from localised areas at high risk of breakdown, before breakdowns. This strategy would require regular monitoring and also revisiting after two or three years to deal with renewed badger populations.

Other proposals explored in the Krebs document include stop-snaring as as alternative to trapping, taking into account efficacy, cost and welfare considerations. Farmer particiaption and MAFF involvement in the trial is proposed and Krebs predicted a 20 per cent reduction in Tb over five years.


To reiterate what actually happened:

* That the RBCT attempted badger removal operations using cage trapping for 8 nights only, during their infrequent visits. There was significant interference, particularly during the first 4 years of operations, and many removals were attempted during winter months, when little badger activity above ground is expected.

* No follow up occurred at all. No checks on setts and no confirmation of complete clearance of a social group. No culling at all took place in 2001, because of biosecurity imposed by FMD. Thus all areas within the trial, both reactive and proactive went at least 2 years between these incomplete removals. Some, including our contributers, experienced 3 years of such peturbation chaos.

* Badger social groups were split, and during later years boundaries of trial areas were changed to accomodate this.

* No action was taken at all to prevent recolonisation of setts thought to be cleared.

* A closed season operated from February to May to allow lactating sows to rear cubs.

* There was absolutely no involvement with participating farmers, or local MAFF officers.

As well as a rebranding of the 'Krebs' RBCT, the ISG are at pains to point out that their aim was never to 'cull all the badgers' as proposed by Professor Sir John Krebs. This particular protocol is now downgraded to a mere 'population reduction'. And then there is the ISG's unique and notorious 'edge effect'; a phenomenon which if the original methodology proposed by Professor Krebs had been observed, may not have been evident at all.

The original Krebs' prediction of a 20 percent reduction in incidence was correct, but unfortunately by not following Professor Kreb's protocol with regard to implementation of the trial, the trial operators achieved exactly the results that Krebs described as 'unlikely to be effective' during the interim strategy in his report of 1997.

A 280 per cent rise ...

We are grateful for sight of a press release from the office of Daniel Kawczynski, the member of parliament for Shrewsbury, who has seen an 'amplifying' problem with bovine tb in his constituency. In 2000 the area revealed 39 new herd incidents among its cattle herds. But a parliamentary question answered this week shows that there were 149 NHIs during 2006. And that is just over the 20 per cent per annum rise in incidence predicted by Defra - which would produced a figure of 140 herds.

SHREWSBURY MP RAISES CONCERNS OVER GROWING RATE
OF BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS

Shrewsbury & Atcham MP Daniel Kawczynski, and chair of the All Party Parliamentary Dairy Group will this week announce plans for the All Party Group to assess the difficulties faced by farmers over Bovine Tuberculosis.

The renewed efforts on this front come after the recent government report that was less conclusive in its prescription over how to deal with badgers in the spread of bTB than had been expected, and puts much of the onus on farmers to act. In addition Mr Kawczynski recently tabled a question over bTB in his own constituency county of Shropshire. The results where startling.

The Parliamentary Question answered that in 2006 there where 149 new herd bTB incidents, compared to only 39 in 2000. This is over a 280% increase in new incidents. Mr Kawczynski MP commented ‘this is not a sign that the governments current policy is working. Further more it is of great concern that over these last six years the incidents have increased so dramatically, this cannot be due to farmers alone, as they are complying with the strict DEFRA regulations.’

He continued ‘It is my understanding that Shropshire, and the South West are hardest hit by the bTB outbreaks, but increasing like this how long is it before it spreads further? A solution has to be sought, and soon, that is more than just further regulations on the cattle industry. As a result I will be looking into bTB over the summer recess, and the APPG on Dairy Farming will be taking a further look into the matter in the Autumn in direct relation to the dairy industry, and lobbying the Government for action.’

ENDS

Notes:
The PQ in question can be found through Hansard at www.parliament.uk, reference number [147671] answered on the 12th of July 2007.
........................................................

This is a successor to PQs asked during 2004, which invited the previous Minister of State to assess the incidence of TB in cattle in 2008, assuming no increase in activity by her department and the continuance of Defra's current (non) measures.
The answer then was:
"With no new changes in policy, or disease dynamics, we would theoretically expect a 20 percent year on year increase in the compensation bill."

That PQ answer went on to describe measures to reduce compensation paid for slaughtered cattle, with 'rationalised compensation payments', without actually spelling out that the numbers of cattle slaughtered would not alter, only the amount for which Defra were prepared to compulsorily purchase them. Neither did the answer satisfactorily address the cost of that 20 percent year on year increase of extra testing, tuberculin antigen, transport, slaughter, post mortems, samples, tracing and associated paperwork. All of which would very quickly eat up any saving in the one third of the Tb budget aimed at 'compensation'.

PQ 26th Jan 2004 Col 3W [148657]

A tale of two countries

At the ISG meeting on June 19th., John Bourne gave a petulant and derisory thumbs down to the results achieved by the Republic of Ireland in their struggle to control bTb in the country. Irrelevant, he said.

Different country. Different countryside. Different objectives, Bourne intimated. But not it has to be said, different badgers, different strain of micobacterium bovis or different cattle. Different politicians with different paymasters? - maybe.

In an in depth interview with Irish farming minister Mary Coughlan, and an overview of the Irish policies by veterinarians in charge, Farmers Guardian analyses strategy and results. Two countries. Two similar problems. Two very different approaches. And two very different outcomes.

A decade ago, the UK and the Republic of Ireland both had tough decisions to make about how to deal with rising incidences of bovine TB in cattle, and the potential role played by badgers in spreading it. The UK set up the Randomised Badger Culling Trials (RBCT) in 1998 to gauge the impact of badger culling on bTB incidence.

During the 10 years it was taking to find no solutions to the problem, a ban was imposed on badger controls outside the trial areas.
Meanwhile, bTB incidence was trebling from just over 700 confirmed herd outbreaks in 1998 to around 2,000 in 2005 and 2006.

Ireland took a different approach. Shorter and more straightforward trials between 1997 and 2002 convinced the Government that the only way it was going to get on top of the bTB problem was to tackle both sources of infection.

Since 1998, the number of cattle bTB reactors in Ireland has fallen by 46 per cent.

While acknowledging that the badger culling is only one of a number of contributing factors, Irish Agriculture Minister Mary Coughlan said recently she was ‘satisfied that the badger removal policy had made a significant contribution to the improvement of the situation’.

Not so, says the Independent Scientific Group on bovine TB, which has gone out of its way to stress that the Irish experience is not relevant to the UK.

Presenting his report at an open meeting in London, ISG chairman John Bourne played down the success of badger culling in Ireland, suggesting it was not having the impact the figures coming out of there suggested.

More importantly, differences in badger populations, environmental conditions, farming practises, trial design, capture methods and social attitudes add up to make the Irish trial and policy irrelevant to the UK, he said. Plus, he said, the current Irish badger culling policy ‘seeks to eliminate badgers from 30 per cent of the land mass’, a situation that would be ‘politically unacceptable’ in the UK.

(This is point which has come up in comments on the site; more on its context and accuracy later from the Irish deputy veterinary officer)

Michael Sheridan, deputy chief veterinary officer explained how the approaches differed from the start. “While the RBCT was comparing policy options, we had a very simple experiment to assess whether the disease in badgers was a constraint to making progress on the bovine side. In the Four Area trials (1997-2002), we took badgers out of an area as far as possible and it showed clearly that if you do, that you make significant progress on the bovine side. Existing measures begin to work and you go well beyond where you are.”

“
While the RBCT showed only marginal benefits from culling, in the Irish Four Areas trial, it was associated with a 60 per cent drop in bTB in cattle herds under restriction. Mr Sheridan said this was hardly surprising, given the way the trials were set up. The four areas chosen in Ireland were much larger than the 100sq km RBCT areas and, unlike the RBCT, were specifically designed to prevent the so-called ‘edge effect’.

Having established that the presence of bTB in badgers was a major constraint to eradicating from cattle, the Irish Government was then able to set about solving the problem.

“The trials showed if you succeed in taking badgers out of the equation you make progress with eradicating the disease. The next logical step was to invest in the only long-term solution that is allowable and feasible – vaccination. So have put our efforts into that,” Mr Sheridan said, “But that is still a few years away, so in the meantime we have introduced an interim culling policy. The trials showed if you succeed in taking badgers out of the equation you make progress with eradicating the disease.”.

This approach enabled the Government to gain the support of farmers and the acceptance, at least, of the public and Irish animal welfare groups, who, he said, appreciate that culling is a ‘necessary’ medium-term measure while a more ‘environmentally acceptable’ one is developed.

Mr Sheridan refuted Prof Bourne’s claims, also spelled out in the ISG report, about the scale of the culling policy.

“It’s wrong to say we are doing it over 30 per cent of the country – that is an upper limit and it is not a target. Currently 11 per cent of the land mass is subject to culling controls,” he said. It is also not eradication. It is a reactive cull that takes place where there is clear epidemiological evidence badgers have caused major breakdowns. We do not see it as a long-term solution, but it is necessary until we get a vaccination policy in place. John Bourne may have misinterpreted what he was told, but I am not saying he has said anything wrong. He can say whatever he wants.”

The contrast with the UK is stark.
But what the Irish policy (at least they have one - ed) demonstrates, is that where there is a will there is a way. The Irish approach has been geared to finding solutions, backed by common sense, science and political consensus – from the way the trials were set up, to the decision-making process and the development of practical policies.

While UK has waited and waited for a trial, that cynics say appears designed only to prolong the wait further and still cannot find the political will to move forward, Ireland has been acting. And bTB incidence is falling.

Mr Sheridan said Ireland now had a ‘road map’. The reactive culling policy was moving it ‘in the right direction’ until a more sustainable long-term solution is found. He was adamant, too, that the Irish approach was cost-effective when placed against the ‘to do nothing’ approach that would see disease incidence continue to rise in cattle.

"Our policy all along has been to deal with diseases in both species,” he said. “Addressing the disease in cattle on its own won’t work – you have to deal with the badger issue in parallel. You can’t remove a herd of cattle and leave a sett of diseased badgers behind. You have to act realistically and deal with both sides of the problem. It is worth putting proper effort and resource into having a healthy badger population and a healthy cattle population.”

"Addressing the disease in cattle on its own, won't work", Mr. Sheridan said.
And he should know. Ireland tried it in the late 1980's as described in our posting below. And it definitely did not work. Why on earth would it? It is like leaving one side of hospital ward with patients suffering endemic infectious disease, while removing patients from the other side to the mortuary; drawing a heroic line down the middle and expecting new patients on the other side not to succomb to infection. And yet by ignoring the reservoir of infection in badgers and proposing extra cattle controls, this is precisely what John Bourne has promised ministers will reduce cattle tb in the UK by around 15 per cent per year. A 'virtual line' in the sand.

Can we really afford to ignore what is happening just across the Irish Sea? asks the Farmers Guardian's Alistair Driver. Full story here

Condemned to repeat past mistakes?

The ISG report very confidently asserted that cattle controls alone would reduce bTb in the herds of Great Britian by around 15 per cent a year. Convincing stuff. But does it stand up to scrutiny?

We have already referred to the utter futility of nailing cattle firmly to the floor, while allowing an infected wildlife reservoir to flourish around them in our posting here During what became known as the the 'Downie era', the Republic of Ireland operated cattle controls along the lines of those proposed by the ISG.

At the beginning of these, reactors numbered approx 30,000. And at the end? 35,000.

But in England too, these same measures were tried, and we are grateful for the diligence of those who operated them, for their archive trawls to support their memories of the regime.

Backgrund
In Great Britain after 15 years of a voluntary Attested Herds Scheme, the first Compulsory Eradication Areas were announced. Between 1952 and 1960, more and more CERs were announced until the whole country was covered. By the end of 1960 eradication was deemed complete. Reactor prevalence was reduced from an original estimate of 40% in 1934 to 0.04% in 1965. It was expected that the disease would continue to occur sporadically until the end of the century as a result of animals with walled off lesions developing clinical disease in old age or as a result of stress, but in a few areas, the number of reactors exceeded expectations.

One such was in West Cornwall and a Scottish DVM was parachuted into the Duchy in the early 1970’s, to lance this “ boil” of infection which was blighting the Ministry of Agriculture’s Tb clearance maps.

Much like Professor Bourne, the late William Tait was determined to wipe out the elusive cattle reservoir of bTb. To this end he instigated synchronised Tb testing, more regular testing (see below), applied severe interpretation to all Tb tests, cohort slaughter of a group of cattle if one reactor was found and whole herd de-population. Cattle movements were limited to licensed markets only. He also attempted to ‘disinfect’ farms under his surveillance, and was probably responsible for the demolition of more 'cob' cattle byres in west Cornwall, than anything before or since. Up with steam cleaning, they could not put and collapsed around his ears.

Some of these measures are documented in reports from the CVO 1972 - 1976 as follows:

From The Report of the Chief Veterinary Office 1972
“During the year, a departmental team conducted an enquiry into the persistent bovine tuberculosis problem in the West Penwith area of Cornwall. The report on the team’s findings and recommendations was published in July.”

and from 1973

From The Report of the Chief Veterinary Office 1973
“The recommendations by the departmental team of enquiry into the persistent bovine tuberculosis problem in the West Penwith area of Cornwall were accepted and implemented whenever possible. Thus the discriminating standard of tuberculin test interpretation was continued in West Cornwall and synchronised testing at 3 months intervals was introduced in those areas having the highest reactor incidence in the previous 3 years. Intensive investigations into the incidence of tuberculosis in wildlife, and in particular the badger, continued.”

In the CVL section of the same report:

“…bovine tuberculosis remains a problem in some clearly defined areas in the South West Region. Various investigations of the commonly recognised sources of infection failed to reveal a possible origin and a wild life reservoir of infection was considered to be a possible explanation for its persistence.”

and 1974

From The Report of the Chief Veterinary Office 1974
Records that the Penzance area was on 6 month testing and that there was a continuing problem in the SW region with a reactor prevalence of 0.891% compared with the rest of the country’s 0.015%

So, no dramatic fall in cattle reactors to show for the cattle carnage then?

It goes on to refer to:

“relatively high incidence in young stock that had been turned out to grass while housed calves on the same premises which had not been out remained free

.

The reports for 1976 and 7 make no mention of special measures in SW Cornwall but refer increasingly to badger gassing in the SW and a reduction in reactor prevalence.

From their extensive memories of this 'test, condemn and slaughter cattle' spree of the late William Tait, officers who operated the cattle controls say he was 'very fierce' over their implementation. As we see from the CVO reports, 3 month testing in some areas, 6 monthly in others and absolute condemnation if reactors were found.
But no reduction in reactors. For that we have to look to the reports for 1976, which make no mention of any 'special cattle measures' for west Cornwall, but they do report progress and a 'reduction in cattle reactor prevalence' after gassing of badger setts was introduced.

Many of these cattle controls are proposals now resurrected by the ISG. But what has been forgotten, say current and ex DVM’s who operated them three decades ago, is that all these measures, while costing the taxpayers and the cattle industry dearly and severely denting confidence in the Ministry responsible, “had no effect whatsover on the incidence of Tb in cattle, when it came from a wildlife source”.

By 'condemning' the cattle, and ignoring these past cattle-only policy failures, history suggests that those operating the measures proposed by the ISG are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Dear Minister.....

A group of veterinary scientists and former MAFF /Defra senior officers who were successful in so very nearly eradicating bTb from the cattle herds of Great Britain over the last decades, have written an open letter to the new Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, voicing their concern over the RBCT trial, and ISG's subsequent report.

We are grateful for the opportunity to publish it in full:

TB policy and the ISG findings

We are a group of former veterinary officers from the State Veterinary Service who have specialised in the investigation and control of bovine tuberculosis over many years. We have previously expressed our serious concerns to the Minister for Animal Health and Welfare about the poor conduct of the Randomised Badger Culling Trials but following the publication of the ISG’s final report we are writing to caution you against serious misinformation given in this report that may lead to an erroneous policy judgement.

As a consequence of the many problems encountered the interim DEFRA report concluded that the efficiency of the culling operation in the proactive culling areas was from 20% to 60% . These figures imply a social disruption and dispersal of 80% to 40% of infected communities ensuring an outward spread of infection. Following the many adverse comments over this poor culling rate the ISG have since adjusted their efficiency as being from 32% to 77%.

Perusal of the ISG’s final report shows that five of the ten initial culls were carried out in mid Winter (4 in Dec/Jan, 1 in Nov to Jan) which is well known to be the least successful time for trapping. Also the mean number of trapping days was only eight per annum. Consciously choosing such a course of action ensured this first cull removed minimal numbers of badgers and maximised social disruption and subsequent dispersal. At site B, Putford, Devon the second cull was also in the Winter exacerbating the disruption. Overall 16 of the 51 culls were conducted at this time.

We have long known that poor culling rates can spread infection and the initial cull must always attempt to maximise the removal of as many sett inmates as possible to avert this problem. It must be remembered that the last large cull, using the same cage trapping method, which was at Hartland, Devon, in 1984 resulted in a fall in confirmed herd outbreaks of TB in cattle from 15% of herds to 4% in 1985. Thereafter annual incidence declined and held at around 1%. In excess of 80% to almost 90% of badgers were removed which required protracted trapping efforts in some of the area. No so called edge effect was found.

The decision by the ISG not to completely remove badgers from the proactive cull areas as recommended in the Krebs report so as to “quantify the contribution made by badgers to the cattle problem” was clearly an error of judgement. The decision rather to reduce the number of badgers and “maintain this population suppression” was scientifically unsound leaving too many variables. This approach would have been expected to induce widespread social disruption.

The ISG have not used good scientific method in their culling approach and the results obtained reflect this. All the assumptions with regard to culling in the RBCT are thus based on flawed data.

We have found no evidence in the ISG report of the “huge reservoir of undiagnosed infectious cases of TB in the cattle population” to which Prof Bourne alluded to repeatedly at the final ISG Open Meeting in London. We consider this assertion to be unfounded.

We wish to caution you about the over statements by the ISG regarding cattle to cattle transmission and poor performance of the tuberculin test. Historically in Ireland and in West Cornwall during the early 1970s draconian testing and slaughter approaches alone made no effect on the incidence of new herd outbreaks. Also this test has facilitated official eradication of TB from all the EEC Member States except UK and Ireland. While the situation in Ireland has greatly improved, with a combined policy of testing and slaughter of reactor cattle and removal of infected badgers, the UK is alone in having a deteriorating problem.

If you follow the ISG recommendations regarding this approach without addressing the primary badger reservoir of infection increasing numbers of cattle will continue to be slaughtered as the TB epidemic continues to escalate. Also more badgers will become infected and the situation in other animals sharing the same habitat will worsen. Currently these include deer, alpacas, lamas, sheep, pigs and domestic cats and ferrets. The possibility of spread to man from some of these animals is real.

Regrettably no significant progress will be made unless effective culling of infected communities of badgers is initiated and rigorously applied.

Yours faithfully

Dr J Gallagher, former Senior Veterinary Investigation Officer, Devon and Cornwall, former Independent Consultant to DEFRA TB Research Division.

R.M.Q.Sainsbury, former Specialist TB Veterinary Officer, Truro.

W.G.A.Ashton OBE, former Divisional Veterinary Officer, Truro.

J.Cohen, former Specialist TB Veterinary Officer, Taunton.

J. I. Davies, former Regional Veterinary Officer, South West.

R.H. Muirhead MBE, former Specialist TB Veterinary Officer, Gloucester.

A.J.Proud,. former Specialist TB Veterinary Officer, Gloucester.

Dr J. A. Smith, former Specialist TB Veterinary Officer, Gloucester.

A. T. Turnbull, former Head Notifiable Diseases Section, Tolworth, former Veterinary Advisor to Krebs TB Review Group.

Are cattle really the cause ...

.. of bTB spreading across the country?

For sure, if a cow is carrying Tb when she is loaded onto a cattle lorry, she is unlikely to have miraculous cure on the journey to her new home. But of what long term significance, that is cattle movement and the opportunity to entrench disease in new areas, is this?

The ISG report having heavily loaded their Microsoft software with cattle data, concluded that it was significant - (but then again if badger data was weighted against this by a large degree, it would be) But over the last thirty years, microbiolgists at VLA, Weybridge have been analysing and logging spoligotypes from badgers taken in removal operations or road kill up to 1997, and mapping their results.

As we explained in our posting here , those patterns have not changed over time, despite millions of cattle movements, some of which may have been cattle carrying infection.


Farmers Guardian ,as part of an ongoing exploration of bTb research done prior to the ISG report and the way forward after it, this week has comments on this work from ex Divisional Veterinary Officer, Roger Sainsbury, and epidemiologist Dr. Richard North.

Having seen the VLA maps, now published in the ISG final report, and in the case of Mr. Sainsbury, been instrumental been instrumental in creating his own, both conclude that the geographical clustering of strains seen, is not compatible with the theory of cattle to cattle spread.

Footnote to this posting:
Four of us who began this site operated cattle herds with minimal if any 'on' movements of bought in cattle. Two contributers had a purchased bull, every ten years or so. Matt 3's dairy herd had 'No bought in Cattle' confirmed by BCMS on their database. All of us have suffered ongoing and prolonged Tb breakdowns.

Information now to hand, confirms that the spoligotype found in Matt 3's cattle was a single unique strain, and that was matched exactly by the spoligotypes found in 3 postmortemed badgers taken on his land by the RBCT team.

More on 'Shambo'

We explored the ins and outs of the problems facing the Welsh Assembly when a hindu 'sacred' bullock tested positive for TB here

But time and TB tests move on, and as 'Shambo' the bullock awaits his fate in his straw 'shrine', "two more animals at the centre have also proved positive, and five others returning 'inconclusive' results."
So said a spokes person from the Welsh Assembly. But we are happy to draw your attention to an edit below:

Update Please see comment on posting below, where the Skanda Vale community have pointed out that the '2 more reactors and 5 inconclusives' referred to in the FG report are hypothetical at the moment, as without the slaughter and postmortem of Shambo, bTb has yet to be officially 'confirmed' on the premises. Thus the 'severe interpretation' of the early June test is, they point out, premature.

In the absence of postmortem confirmation of disease, the inference is that the Welsh Assembly has 'assumed' positive Tb in Shambo, thus involving 7 more animals, or a typo missed out a vital 'if' from the positive disease status in the news release.

Confrontation looks on the cards for newly appointed Welsh Assembly minister, Jane Davidson. Full story here

"not a lot of bloody help to us..."

... was how the now recycled (again) Lord Rooker described what wasn't made clear after ten years and several £million, in the ISG 280 page report.

(From PQ's archived on this site, we are certain that the epidemiological information which his Lordship sought is within his department - ed)

Speaking at Derbyshire county show last week, Lord Rooker - at the time of his interview, Food and Farming Minister - confirmed that cabinet opinion after receipt of draft chapters of the document, had been on the verge of instigating the go ahead for action to be resumed where wildlife were implicated in herd breakdowns. The final unequivocal conclusions of the ISG, contained in a letter from its chairman, and presumably based on these 'draft chapters' "took a lot of people by surprise". Lord Rooker also criticised the ISG for going beyond its remit, and "deviating off into practical and financial issues, which was not really what they were asked to deal with".

Describing his contact with owners of herds 'closed' to incoming cattle for 30 years, now under restriction, an exasperated Lord Rooker asked the question we have posed "how did that come from cattle-to-cattle transmission?".

Lord Rooker confirmed that a cull of wildlife reservoirs of Tb was still on the agenda. "It does mean to say it should not be part of the armoury."

Full report in Farmers Guardian

'The use and abuse of mathematical models..

We are grateful for a comment on the site which explores the contents of the ISG report, and compares to the ISG conclusions. We have said often, and will continue to say that computer modelling of infectious disease progression is an unproven sport. Certainly, its benefit during FMD were debatable. And after that debacle, several eminent scientists explored the procedure


That such methodology may be 'peer reviewed' is not in question, but its content may be lacking, weak, assumed or 'tortured' to fit the model. We quote from our contributer's view on just this type of prediction, and its subsequent conclusions which have been described by some as 'coherent argument' offered by the ISG to support their unequivocal conclusions.

To quote F J Bourne:
'Scientific findings indicate that the rising incidence of disease can be reversed and geographical spread contained, by the rigid application of cattle-based control measures alone.' (ref. his letter to Miliband).

‘The ISG also conclude that rigidly applied control measures targeted at cattle can reverse the rising incidence of disease, and halt its geographical spread……….Having shown that the main approach to cattle TB control should be rigorously targeted to cattle, we hope that the overwhelming scientific evidence we have provided to support this view……..’(ref. the ISG press release of 18th June 2007.)

‘Our modelling work indicates that implementation of cattle control measures outlined in this report are, in the absence of badger culling, likely to reverse the increasing trend in cattle disease incidence that has been a feature in GB for decades. It is also possible that more effective cattle controls will lead to a decline of the disease in badgers, although the timescale for this is likely to be slow.’ (ref. Chairman’s overview, section 12.)

‘ Analysis of a simple mathematical model suggests that rigorously enforced movement testing would halt the epidemic and indeed produce some steady decline in incidence…..’(ref. Recommendations and Conclusions. Section 31.)

The comment continues, emphasising that the above quotes were read before reading the main body of the report. The writer admits surprise at these conclusions, but asserts the report was read with an open mind, the reader ready to be reluctantly convinced. What the reader was not expecting was such a lack of scientific rigour in the arguments. As a full analysis is not possible here, the writer concentrates on the mathematical modelling that seems to be the basis of the ISG’s ‘overwhelming scientific evidence’ as follows:

‘

7.24 The effect of changes cannot be assessed directly from available data but simple mathematical models, combined with the large amount of data now assembled, do allow some very tentative predictions. The infection rate concerns all sources of infection for cattle, local infection for example across farm boundaries, infection from animals bought, in particular but not only, from high incidence areas, and infection from wildlife, especially badgers. All these are important but their relative importance, and that of cattle-to-badger transmission, cannot be estimated directly’ .

"So far, so good. The predictions are tentative, indeed, very tentative, and the relative importance of the most important data is unknown. So what scientific or even logical explanation can there be for the next sentence?"

’In the following calculations we assume all three sources to be roughly equally important.’

"If there is available evidence to show that that assumption is a reasonable one what is it? We know that Bourne does not believe there to be such a thing as a closed herd".

‘People claim to have a closed herd, but they simply do not exist’ (Bovine TB seminar for MPs September 14th 2004).

"There is overwhelming evidence that closed herds do exist, so there is one piece of evidence that he is not taking into account at all". (This site was set up by four owners of such herds, precisely for that reason - ed)

"From section 7.19 there is some discussion of the mathematical model , and towards the end of that section the report says":

7.29 These conclusions are subject to substantial uncertainty and should be taken as broad guidance only.

The comment continues: "That is the conclusion I would expect a reputable scientist to come to. There are too many uncertainties and unknowns, and the model is too simple. Substantial uncertainty is not overwhelming scientific evidence".

Kitching et al say in their paper "The Use and Abuse of Mathematical models": …..Rev.sci.tech.Off.int.Epiz.2006.25910, 000-000)

It is not necessary to be mathematically literate to appreciate that no model will produce the right output, when fed the wrong input. In the future, care should be taken to ensure that lessons are learned – a bad model is like a bad x-ray because it invariably results in erroneous conclusions and a wrong course of action

.’

(Incidentally, I would very much recommend reading the whole article. There is much more that is very relevant.)

The writer concludes: "So how can such vague inputs into the ISG model come to such a concrete conclusion as this":

‘Analysis of a simple mathematical model suggests that rigorously enforced movement testing would halt the epidemic and indeed produce some steady decline in incidence…..’(ref. Recommendations and Conclusions. Section 31)

The writer also notes that Christl Donnelly, vice-chairman of the ISG, worked on the mathematical model for FMD, which was the basis of the paper published by Kitching et al and entitled "The Use and Abuse of Mathematical Models".

From the outside, looking in

It is enlightening to see an overview of how others see our efforts to eradicate bTb, and their reaction to the flood of papers and research generated. Did we say 'beneficial crisis'? Yes, we did.

An insight from New Zealand microbiologist, J M O'Donnell, working in the field of immunology we post below, particularly in the light of the ISG's conclusion that bearing down on the disease only in cattle, will have a disproportionate effect on overall disease incidence if the wildlife reservoir left.

Commenting on the Gilbert study of cattle movements, Mr. O'Donnell says:

This study could also be interesting to contrast with the known spread of BTB in general regions. As it predicts BTB spread based on cattle movements, it does immediately present a means to experimentally verify it on the ground (so to speak). Given their model, it should be expected that movements from areas with BTB should be associated with the detection of certain Mycobacterium bovis spooligotypes (basically strains). This is because the imported infected cattle should bring with them their M. bovis types and therefore spread that to the uninfected herd. Over time, based on what cattle movements went into a region and what spooligotypes infected cattle bought with them, you would expect to see those spooligotypes in subsequent herd breakdowns.

Here is where I become somewhat skeptical. It’s known from previous experiments which have analysed the spooligotypes of M. bovis from badgers and cattle that these tend to be shared between the two species (see part III). This also tends to be isolated by geographical regions, with a mixture of spooligotypes but only a few ‘oddball’ ones that aren’t shared between badgers and cattle. In the model predicted by Gilbert et al., 2004, where cattle movement is the primary motivator for BTB spread it also implies cattle to cattle spread. The lack of spooligotype mixing between regions from studies conducted in Ireland (for example) have shown spooligotypes of M. bovis tend to be similar in a region but not between them, raises concerns over cattle movement as a predictor of M. bovis. It may be likely that cattle movement helps to spread the infection to a new region, but is not sufficient to determine if the disease will be able to establish in the new region.

More response to the ISG report

We are pleased to post the latest response to the ISG report on badgers and bovine Tb, received from VAWM. (Veterinary Association for Wildlife Management)

In a slick, 7 hour, well orchestrated performance in London on Tuesday, June 19, members of the Independent Scientific Group, chaired by Professor John Bourne, told an audience of vets, scientists, farmers and other interested parties what would be the effect of carrying out a nationwide cull of badgers using the methodology of the Randomised Badger Culling Trials. However what they neglected to say was, in contrast to all previous trials in England and Ireland over the last 3 decades, the culling rates in the proactive zones (recently upgraded as 32-77%) were hopelessly inadequate. And it came as no surprise therefore that only a modest reduction in cattle TB was recorded in the proactive zones and badgers that were missed migrated into surrounding areas to infect more badgers and more cattle. Ten years and £45m later we’ve learnt nothing significant we didn’t know already.

There are a number of reasons why the culling rates were so poor – inadequate number of days trapping per year, wrong time of year, non consent areas of land in the proactive zones, inconsistent farm participation and the method of culling, which allowed significant interference by saboteurs, all of which would have to be overcome in any nationwide culling programme. But although bovine TB may now be the most difficult animal health problem we face in Britain today it has only been made difficult by two decades of neglect. The disease was practically brought under control in the mid 1980s by a systematic programme of testing and slaughtering of cattle reactors and strategic culling of badgers in endemically infected areas. And the badger is probably one of the easiest species of wildlife to cull if done properly, since it lives underground by day in identifiable setts (compare this to the problem in New Zealand, which they have tackled, where the possum is the wildlife reservoir).

Professor Ivan Morrison vividly illustrated how the problem has escalated in England from some 400 cattle reactors slaughtered in 1984 to just over 30,000 in 2005. He also provided evidence that cattle are highly susceptible to TB and may shed infectious tubercle bacilli in the early preclinical phase of the disease. But what he could not say was how significant this may be in the epidemiology of the disease. The ISG believe it to be highly significant but this ignores how effective control measures were up to the mid 1980s and it is worth noting that the CVO in 1995 wrote that 90% of all cattle outbreaks were badger related and less than 10% due to cattle sources. It seems hardly credible that this situation will have changed in the intervening decade.

Professor Morrison also told us what many in the audience already knew that the tuberculin skin test does not pick up all infected animals in a herd. But whilst this may be so it is the tool that has worked in the past. And it may be added it is the test that has been successfully used world wide to eradicate the disease in cattle. Professor Morrison went on to recommend that the gamma interferon test should be developed and used in conjunction with the tuberculin test. But considerable doubt was cast on the benefit that this might bring.

There can be little doubt that the recommendations of the ISG, based on the findings of the RBCTs, are sound. And if such a trial were to be used as the basis of a nationwide cull it could be disastrous. But the recommendation to bear down more and more on the disease in cattle, whilst ignoring the huge reservoir of infection in badgers, defies all logic. It also ignores the chronic welfare problem for the badger.

Professor Bourne’s valedictory hope was that the weighty 290 page report generated by the ISG, now sitting on the Secretary of State’s desk, should “endure”. It is fervently to be hoped that it does not provide the same 10 year excuse for inaction as did the Kreb’s report in 1997.

www.vet-wildlifemanagement.org.uk

Any comments direct to VAWM please, and not to the blog.

Stitch-up, revisited

A comment on our posting a year ago, where a Somerset landowner, who is also a MRVS veterinary surgeon gave his views on the execution of the RBCT dispersal trial, made us sit back and think.

Not ususally supporters of 'conspiracy' theories - we tend to err on the side of egos and their associated and inevitable cock-ups - but could the RBCT been done any differently? Why was it so designed to inflict on groups of badger the very methods which would give a known result? It was certainly not as Krebs originally intended. But now, a convenient airbrush has diluted that all important 'Cull all badgers' in a Proactive area, and 'Cull all badgers in response to confirmed Tb in cattle' to a mere 'population reduction'.

We re-post both the article from John Cohen, BVetMed, MRCVS and today's comment on it.

"As a landowner in one of the 'trial' areas, I had the dubious pleasure of being invited and attending Professor Bourne's meeting to explain the aims and implementation of the Krebs trial to landowners. His presentation was fluent, forceful and full of spin. During the presentation, he pontificated on some events in the history of badger / bovine TB in Dorset. Unbeknown to him, these were events that I had been personally involved with and knew full details of.
It was very educational to me.

I realised that he was describing the facts in a strictly accurate - yet totally misleading - way, so the impression given was the opposite to the truth."

That the trial is severely flawed - in my opinion, fatally so - is self evident to any objective scientist. A sound experiment, for that is what the 'trial' purported to be, depends on knowledge of, and control of, all the variables. This trial had no control.

In the 'proactive' areas no culling took place during the lactating periods, and 20 percent of the babgers were left behind. It would seem that there was, effectively, not a great deal of difference between proactive and reactive areas.If one allows for the unofficial culling that took place in the no treatment areas, these results are skewed. No matter how the statistics are applied the conclusions drawn can be challenged by a competent sixth former.

Over the past 25 years or more, many veterinary officers have diligently collected masses of data on thousands of breakdowns, and have had their work scrutinised by a sceptical mini panel. All that work, together with that of the veterinary investigation officers, has been effectively been ignored by both Krebs and Bourne. The results of the inquiry and the trial appear to have more to do with egos of eminent men, than science or truth. Bourne's insulting personal response to the points raised by Paul Caruana is no less than I expected from this most arrogant of men."

That broadside, with which we fully agree, was launched by John Cohen, BVetMed, MRCVS of Chard, Somerset, and printed in Veterinary Times, June 12th. 2006

And a comment on this from one of the Wildlife team operatives (we guess) working with The RBCT, came the following insight :

"Well, you've really been stitched up by John Bourne and his scientific report this time !

As one of the staff working on the Krebs Trial, we all knew John's views before the trial really got underway. He had always said, as he does now, that the problem lies with cattle. "It is a cattle disease and it has to be treated this way" is what he has always subscribed to. Both he and Chris Cheeseman clearly wanted the result that they have now delivered - kill infected cattle, leave infected badgers alone !

Were the results made to fit their theories? It does make you think !

How can that possibly be a way forward ? The source has to be removed, or we had all just as well give up cattle farming once and for all ! The article written by Paul Caruana, one of the Wildlife Unit's more sensible and realistic field officers, said it all- but where did it get him? ( he was disciplined for those who didn't know) before he left Defra last year. After he submitted his article, both he and the majority of the wild life Unit's managers were summoned to meet with Ben Bradshaw. They unanimously agreed what a waste of time the trial had been, and that things should have been done much more efficiently and effectively. None of them gave credence to the results that came out of the trial. If that doesn't tell you what a farce the Krebs Trial was, nothing will.

There is a way forward for all concerned. PCR technology, coupled with Government paid pre/post movement testing will do the trick. Target sick badgers, sick cattle, have the reassurance of the gamma interferon test behind you and , hey presto, things will surely improve ?! Clearly, to all of us, there is no political will to get on top of this disease, as has been shown by the sacking of all of the Wildlife Unit staff before Krebs was even finally reported. They do not want any part in the culling of sick badgers, and that is unlikely to change without some fierce and voiciferous lobbying from the farming community, the NFU and all other interested parties.

Something has to happen, and soon. Ten years have been wasted on the Krebs trial, with outcomes that have affected us all. More badgers, more TB, more financial hardship, worse morale in the whole of the farming community- what has to happen before somebody in Government has the guts to make the decision that is needed ?
I am in total despair over it".

This comment rang some disturbing bells. In 1997 one of our contributers heard Dr. Cheeseman of CSL's Woodchester Park, tell shell shocked cattle farmers at a Cheshire meeting that they could not separate Tb infected badgers from the cattle herds on which they depended. "Where you are farming cattle, you are essentially farming badgers; they predate on cattle habitat." And answering the question of biosecurity, Dr. Cheeseman delivered the bombshell: "You can't " he said, "you get rid of your cattle".

That was after describing the effects of peturbation on diseased communities of badgers, the levels of infection they carried and possible transmission opportunities. Which is why we say the RBCT told us nothing we didn't (or Cheeseman et al didn't, know before). We are told that Dr. Cheeseman repeated his "Get rid of cattle" blast at an October meeting in 2006.

And that is a most extraordinary statement for a government advisor to make.

Robust science - or political science?

"The shock waves created by the release of the final report by the so-called Independent Scientific Group on TB (ISG) have left many bewildered as to how on earth the current TB epidemic is to be controlled.

The ISG is unequivocal that culling of badgers will cause the epidemic to worsen. They consider culling likely to spread infection by causing social disruption leading to a dispersal of infected badgers that would result in the problem spreading to neighbouring areas.

They refer to this as the “perturbation effect” and consider it almost an insuperable problem. While this must be music to the ears of Ministers, getting them off the hook yet again, is this really a valid reason – or is it more of the political science we have already heard from the ISG ?"

In a focus article for Farmers Guardian , Dr. John Gallagher, former head of MAFF Veterinary Investigation Services for Devon and Cornwall, and former Independent Advisor to MAFF's Chief Scientist Group, questions the 'robust' basis of the RBCT.

"... from 80 per cent to 40 per cent of infected badgers were dispersed to spread their infection, making this more a study in dispersal of TB rather than a culling trial to control it. "

and:

"In the MAFF annual report of 1995, the chief veterinary officer stated that 90 per cent of outbreaks were considered due to infected badgers and this was also affirmed by MAFF’s senior TB epidemiologist. Indeed, in the two gassing trial areas the complete cessation of TB in cattle following removal of the badgers indicated that they were the sole source of infection. Thus there, and throughout the areas where TB infection is endemic in badgers, cattle have been acting as sentinels of active disease in the badger. But the ISG say they have been unable to quantify the role of badgers in cattle outbreaks, although they do admit they can be a source of infection for cattle."

and concludes:

"...the one unequivocal finding from the ISG is that if culling is not done completely disruption of badger groups and their dispersal will result.

But it makes you wonder whether this is really robust science or political science?"

Those of us suffering prolonged bTb breakdowns, with no bought in cattle to blame, no cattle contact via other contiguous herds (and accused on this site of shunting cattle around illegally), are considering the report carefully - as we suspect are the people who have the political clout to challenge it. All we will say at this stage, is what we have said throughout this long debate, that those of us involved with the 'trial' agree with every word Dr. Gallagher has said.

Drafts and leaks

We were as puzzled by the swings and roundabouts of media leaks which accompanied the ISG's final report, as much we suspect, as were our readers..

In our post of last week, we described a media feeding frenzy, but saying totally the opposite of the previous week's press. The Sunday Times on June 10th had Defra all geared up, apparently with Cabinet approval, to sanction a cull of badgers. But one week later, a further flurry of weekend paperwork lobbed in the direction of the Telegraph and the Observer, said 'No way, no time, no cull'.

Both media leaks were attributed to the ISG report, and a Parliamentary question answered by the Right Honorable Barry Gardiner, may shed light on this extraordinary process of 'briefing the press'.

Mr. James Paice (South-East Cambridgeshire) (Con): Notwithstanding the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Fylde (Mr. Jack), Professor Bourne has said that the Government ruled out a widespread badger cull from the outset of the study by the Independent Scientific Group. Does that
21 Jun 2007 : Column 1504
not prove that the consultation that took place more than a year ago was a complete waste of time? We know that the final report was on the Minister of State’s desk a month ago—

Barry Gardiner: That is not true.

Mr. Paice: The Minister should read the ISG report, which clearly identifies the date on which the Minister of State received the final report. Ministers had a month in which to come up with conclusions, yet all that they have announced is further deliberation and delay. Moreover, it is four years since the Conservative party advocated the polymerase chain reaction test. It has taken four years—until next month—for research to begin on that.

Is not the record of the last 10 years one of constant delay and prevarication in dealing with TB, while taxpayers, farmers and cattle have had to suffer? When will the Department make some real decisions, and get a grip on this dreadful disease?

Barry Gardiner: I find it difficult to respond to that, because it was not really a question. It was a rant, and uncharacteristically ill-judged on the part of the hon. Gentleman—in stark contrast to the contribution of the Chairman of the Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Fylde (Mr. Jack).

I am well aware, as is the whole House, of the cost of bovine TB to farmers and, indeed, the taxpayer. It is absolutely right that we should look at the ISG report. The hon. Gentleman made some remarks about the timing of the report. He will know that draft chapters are very different from a final report complete with recommendations and conclusions. That certainly did not arrive at the time that he suggested.

We will consider the report carefully, and will give it due importance in policy making. We will listen to the industry and take account of the Select Committee report, and we will make our policy decisions in due course.

So what is Mr. Gardiner saying to the less than unruffled Jim Paice?
We read his reply, that government received certain draft parts of the 280 page ISG tome, and this before bits were added or subtracted. The addition (or subtraction) which appeared in the final analysis was not available to Ministers before June 10th, but it was, in all its glory afterwards. And it contradicted the draft.

The intriguing question is who passed those drafts to government, which clearly indicated that a cull would be effective? And what was added / subtracted after June 10th to turn that completely on its head?

Cash v. science

A critical review of the current situation relating to funding of universities, funding of political parties and 'scientific' projects comes at a timely moment from Dr. James Irvine who says of the ISG report:

"It would be easy to get a peer review of an article that was in favour of badgers, rather than cattle. Anyway, what scientist is going to stick his neck out to criticise a government appointed committee that has been deliberating for 10 years? He would have to live on Mars".

Members of the ISG 'magic circle' have been active too, in resurrecting 'badger set-aside'. Dr. Irvine quotes Prof. John McInerney at a Tb conference at the Moredun Institute in 2006 who suggested:

" .. that perhaps we should just accept the disease and not farm in these “hotspot” areas - a truly extraordinary thing to say, especially within the precincts of the Moredun Research Institute. But, in the event, this is maybe what the ISG is advising Government in its final report, although not explicitly saying so. Professor McInerney claimed that the ISG trials have been the most detailed ever carried out in the UK. It is just a pity that they have been so fundamentally flawed".

Dr. Irvine's highly perceptive article with useful links to previous Tb reports can be found on his Land-care website.

"What have I done wrong?"

A comment on a previous posting alerted us to the case of a sad Tb breakdown in an East Devon herd, which again we will quote in full:

In response to the article written by Trevor Lawson from the Badger Trust (WMN, June 5), I had to write in disgust. I ask Mr Lawson: What have I done so wrong?

I am the fourth generation to run our family dairy farm which started at the turn of the 19th century. During those years we have established our own closed herd of cows; we breed entirely from our own livestock, with the exception of purchasing two cows from my uncle when he retired from milk production in the late 1980s.

Until this day, no other livestock has been introduced to our herd of approximately 150 cows. We are passionate about our livestock and the countryside and were among the few to avoid the outbreak of foot and mouth disease and have never had a case of a cow with a TB reaction to any of the routine TB checks that have taken place annually for longer than I have been running our farm.

Mr Lawson, our boundaries are well kept and, because of the demise of the dairy industry where ten years ago there were 14 dairy farms in the Sidbury Valley, East Devon, now there are only three and none of these border our farm.

Can you imagine my shock and horror to discover that on June 6 three of our cows reacted to the TB test and had to be humanely killed immediately, plus, 21 inconclusively confirmed, to be rechecked in 40 days.

It is my understanding that this particular strain of TB is only carried by cows, deer and badgers. I am not a scientist and as the deer population is controlled in our valley, this leads me to believe that this outbreak can only have been introduced by one source, the roaming wild badger.

Mr Lawson, I would never want to see our badger population decimated by either man or TB, but we have to work together. Is there any way that representatives from DEFRA, NFU and the Badger Trust can meet to discuss a positive way forward to deal with this problem?

Mike Coles

Sidbury

Over to you Trevor. Another closed herd, now with a bTb problem that if our contributer's experiences are anything to go by, will not go away any time soon. Mike Coles is in there for the duration. Five years, six or longer of 60 day testing and slaughter. And that will continue until the non-bovine source of his problem is taken out of circulation. Or are you going to suggest, as has been suggested to us, that his CTS / BCMS records are 'incomplete' and that Mr. Coles has been engaging in 'moonlighting' cattle with unrecorded movements? We really hope not.....


Letter published in the Western Morning News 19th. June.