Moving the line?

As our readers will know, we have long been critical of Defra's 'maginot' zoning lines on a map. Badgers can't read, and cattle on 3 or 4 year testing regimes may have already been infected. As no testing is required prior to any sale, let alone dispersal sales, prospective purchasers may inadvertently import trouble.

The parish testing map on the right of the pic, is the new improved 'red' zone requiring annual testing and all the paraphernalia that goes with it. A buffer of two year testing edges it to the east, and further east, but only a couple of miles from acknowledged hot spots, trade continues as normal.

Last October, several dairy farmers purchasing high quality and high priced animals from a big dispersal sale from beyond Defra's 'maginot' line, bought trouble. We heard of this quite early on with the Holstein jungle drums beating loudly as cattle purchased days before, became reactors or inconclusives during routine tests in their new herds from Glos. to Cornwall and as far away as Norfolk. One particular cow that we know of was condemned on slaughter, with generalised TB. Thus a purchase of several £thousand only days before, was 'worth' peanuts on Defra's tabular valuation, and nothing at all as salvage clawback.

But although the sale was mid October, Defra's cattle tracing mechanism has moved about as fast as a sloth on Valium in following up purchases from this sale - as the Eastern Daily Press reports.
Ken Procter, who is the former president of the Holstein Cattle Society explains:

We bought three cows on October 14. We had them tested. One failed and the others were inconclusive. They were only with us for four days," said Mr Proctor, who as a precaution put the cows into isolation on another holding, which does not have cattle.

When re-tested on December 19, two cows were both positive for bovine TB and have since been slaughtered in early January. Although he will receive some compensation, the loss on the breeding cattle will be more than £1,000 per head.

But Mr Proctor, who said that the disease had to be kept out of Norfolk, was concerned about the whole approach to testing: "The speed at which cases are tackled is horrendous. What really irritates me is that they still hadn't followed up the farm where the cows had been, and we didn't get a letter until about three weeks ago. They had waited four months before sending out tracing letters."

This farm was outside Defra's red area, and outside its buffer zone - which one presumes will now have migrated a tad further east?

'Fluid' data = questionable results.

After the remains of the ISG (in the shape of the outpourings from Christl Donnelly's computer), further boosted our Minister for (some) Animal's Health in his decision not to cull badgers in TB hotspots, we have patiently attempted to deconstruct the origins of that data.

We could not criticize the ISG computer, nor would we. But as we pointed out in this posting the costs from which their data was drawn, was decidedly questionable. Farmers Guardian explores this further this week (sorry - no link) with quotes from a WLU manager, who said it would be

"pointless and misleading" to judge the cost effectiveness of any future culls on the basis of the "hugely inefficient" trials.

But so like Melville's Captain Ahab, roped to Moby Dick and ultimately destined for the bottom of the ocean, our minister is clinging maniacally to his very own whale. The RBCT.

John Bourne, chairman of the ISG pointed out on more than one occasion to the EFRA committee, that 'culling as undertaken in this trial' was not to be taken as a bench marker for any future cull. His WLU personnel, based in just two areas spent an inordinate amount of time in their vehicles, and racked up over a 1,000,000 miles a year visiting Krebs triplets hundreds of miles apart. Defra having advertised their locations, the teams then had to run the gauntlet of Animal Rights activists, removing, damaging and destroying traps. Police activity varied tremendously as well, with Staffordshire enjoying their policing from urban coppers used to trouble, up with which they would not put. By contrast, the south west triplets had to run the gauntlet of almost uninterrupted terrorism, intimidation and damage to farms, as well as traps.

All this data was adding £thousands to each badger actually caught, until protocol was tweaked in 2003/4, but this is what was entered into Donnelly's computer, which prepared the base for her conclusions. Although our PQs told us quite unequivocally that:

"Information on the costs of trapping as a 'proactive' culling method in the RBCT cannot be used to to assess the resources required to clear an area of badgers, because this would require the use of snares, poisoning or gassing which have been ruled out by the government on welfare grounds. The RBCT clears as many badgers as possible from the Proactive areas using cage traps, but this removes, at best, 80 per cent of the badgers". [ 148659: 22/ Jan 2004]

But Prof. Donnelly's computer has done precisely that. So what about the cattle side of the RBCT? Constant, or a fluid, ever moving base?

Most of our contributors were involved in one or other of the triplets, so as well as general points, we can make observations from personal experience.

When the 'trial' was first announced and meetings held to explain it, farmers who attended and were already under TB restriction were not well pleased to learn that they didn't qualify. As didn't herds who had had the benefit of a Ministry badger clearance in the previous three years. Whether this restriction on potential entrants carried on, we are unable to say, but certainly herds were allowed to leave and to join the trial at any time during its duration. Thus it was not unusual to have different cattle herds involved at different times of the trial, and thus the results of any badger dispersals associated with these herds, were not a constant over the whole time period.

Another tweak was boundary change. The triplet areas were mapped in 1997 as circles, but phone calls to our contributors over the course of the trial indicated a degree of 'fluidity' in areas covered. Two farmers in Hereford and Devon, having been excluded from the trial at its inception, were included after 2004. And a Parliamentary Question, confirmed:

"All areas were modified marginally to include or exclude whole farm premises following surveying and prior to initial proactive culling."

Fair enough, but after four years? Blocks of land in excess of 200 acres suddenly hoovered up, that had not been included before? The answer continued and gave us a grudging 'yes':

"On occasions slight changes in treatment boundary have been agreed by the ISG [ ] in response to changes observed in badger activity and social group organisation."[150894] 28th Jan 2004 ."

Define 'slight' if you will. So what do we understand from that? Boundaries were drawn, setts mapped, farms and cattle herd details entered, then a social group of badgers see the WLU boys approaching and leg it? With the Defra landrovers in hot pursuit? Over a different farm and different cattle from those mapped in 1997?

Sounds a bit like it.

And even the basis for trapping appeared to change. In the ISG 4th report a 'TB Breakdown' is described as - "A cow or herd of cattle found to suffer from TB", a description which needed TB to be confirmed by lesions or culture to trigger a removal of badgers. But later, the Final report has 'Breakdown' explained as either a

Confirmed breakdown "when cattle are proven (eg by postmortem examination to have TB) or a TB incident, when one or more cattle in a herd shows evidence of exposure to M.bovis, the infectious agent of bTB (ie reacts to the tuberculin test)

If indeed these significantly different definitions in the two reports were adhered to, (and it may explain why one of our contributers whose 'TB breakdown' was not confirmed for two years, was ignored by the WLU teams from 2001 - 2003) this would certainly skew the resultant data would it not?

But all this - and we have no doubt there will be more - is the basis for the latest pronouncements from the ISG computer. And their extraordinarily skewed conclusions which have sprung from it. Or as the ISG has treated, and continues to treat bTB as a disease of cattle, was those conclusions actually the beginning?

"Doing nothing

...... [ ] and allowing TB to spread through the UK badger population, is not necessarily a position of moral superiority".

As the thorny question of targeted badger culling refuses (quite rightly) to lie down, Veterinary Times last week published a thought provoking Point-of-view, from T.O Jones, MBE, BVSc, CBiol, FBS, FRCVS on how this may be achieved.[ sorry no on-line link, so we'll summarise.]

The piece begins by describing the TB situation in West Wales, which has led to the Welsh Assembly's intention to pioneer a targeted cull of badgers in that area. We have covered some farmer's stories from this area here (Trioni Farms) and here (Cilast herd) But how will Wales actually carry out the deed? So much red tape is wrapped around this animal, that cage trapping and shooting appear to be favourite - not ideal, in fact far from it, which is why Mr. Jones puts his eloquent pen to paper.

He points out that this method is unlikely to achieve even 80% of the target group at best, with the RBCT's halo of 'peturbation' and spread of bTB by distressed untrapped badgers as a result. (We continue to attribute this 'perturbation' phenomenon to the Badger Dispersal Trial, and that alone, because it was not evident in previous AH culls.) And of course, there has to be a 'closed season' from February to May to avoid leaving cubs to starve underground by shooting lactating females. All in all, a pretty poor effort if one is serious about disease control.

The use of carbon monoxide (CO) Mr. Jones suggests, is worth looking at, with a machine which uses it for rabbit control being tested in Australia. He then asks if this is not available in the UK, in cylinders? or as solid (concentrated) frozen CO?

"Many humans would opt for an unpremeditated, painless euthanasia during sleep as their exit of choice. Pure unadulterated CO poisoning might well be acceptable for such an approach in badgers."

Also a possibility is Carbon dioxide (CO2) and possibly pure nitrogen. Pointing out that:

"Mobile on-site nitrogen generators are used in the oil industry, but are presumably too large for the Welsh countryside. But would it be worth purpose building a small one? One litre of liquid nitrogen produces 683l of gaseous nitrogen at normal atmospheric pressure and could have a place in euthanasia apparatus."

As Mr. Jones points out, badgers obligingly live in their setts during Defra's working hours and during prolonged cold periods may not emerge for several weeks when they are said to be in a state of 'torpor'. "Could they not", he asks "be euthanased while in 'torpor', during this period?"

"Collection and disposal of carcases would not be problematic [ with gassing] A 100 per cent cull, with no perturbation could be anticipated. Setts could be blocked or collapsed to hinder recolonisation in the sure knowledge that no live animals were present."

Much of this thought provoking essay, calls on other industries to throw their respective hats into the ring and offer ideas for practical administration of a humane gas to these subterranean animals.

The delivery of gas into badger setts has been trialled both by Defra and Porton Down when with their very own unique buckets and spades, they built an artificial sett - each. And despite howls from the Badger Trust, gas was available in adequate quantities at all parts of the sett - once they'd blocked up the entrances.

Mr. Jones argues that a targeted cull of badgers in bTB hotspot areas, followed by a gradual infiltration with vaccinated, healthy badgers would deliver the nirvana of healthy badgers, healthy cattle (and cats, dogs, alpacas, llamas, goats, pigs ..... ed)

"Our country has an established meline TB problem - some badgers suffer from TB and spread it to healthy badgers. A lingering death from progressive TB in a proportion of infected badgers is painful. What action is suggested? Doing nothing, and allowing TB to spread through the UK badger population is not necessarily a position of moral superiority"

Policy on the hoof

We have become used to our department's habit of altering policy on a whim, or making it up as they go along. And that evolutionary process is arguably better than the 'cognitive dissonance' which affected them over FMD.

However, not to acknowledge such departmental developments is stooping very low indeed.

A letter from Mr. D. Denny, B.Vet., MRCVS published in Farmers Guardian Feb 12th., pointed out that there were many sticks with which to beat farmers but few incentives in government's handling of TB.

"The handling of the TB crisis is typical of the micro management of farmers by politicians with their own agendas. Instead of giving farmers incentives, the Eradication Group recommends more superfluous, petty and expensive impositions on farmers, none of which will have any significant impact in controlling TB."

A longstanding critic of 'vaccinating ' badgers already endemically infected with TB, Mr. Denny then remarked on the protocol of the vaccine scoping trial, pointing out that having to purchase their own vaccine was "hardly an incentive" to its success.

We covered Defra's on-the-hoof developing protocol for their latest prevarication wheeze, here. And in mid-December, such a purchase was on the cards.

These people are being asked to tender to trap and vaccinate 'x' number of badgers in an area of land, not yet decided? And the badger surveying, we understand, will not be in the hands of the contractors tendering for the job, but 'someone else'. Someone who may assess numbers correctly, but may not. And if they do not, then tough.

Both vaccines and cages are to be the responsibility of the contractor, and their purchase, storage and maintenance, together with assessed labour and area to be covered will be the basis of the quotation offered. This is so vague as to be like catching smoke. Especially as by the date tenders have to be submitted, the majority (80 per cent)of surveying will not have been completed.

As this project unravelled, potential contractors trying to get to grips with exactly what it was they were tendering for, apparently pointed out the vagaries of this smoke and mirrors idea and along with Santa's little helpers, and after the inevitable departmental New Year jollies, came the clarity of a rethink on some of the cost sharing. Particularly those on the purchase of vaccines for an unknown number of badgers, on an unsurveyed patch of land of indeterminate size.

Thus in this week's Farmers Guardian, and curt note appears from a representative of our beloved Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, stating that Mr. Denny is incorrect in his statement that 'contractors would have to buy their own BCG vaccine'.

"That is not the case. The cost of the vaccine used in the BVDP will be funded by Defra".

We are delighted of course, to give our readers an update of Defra policy, even as it evolves. But not so delighted that they omit to mention that it had been updated, implying errors on the part of a comment made ahead of the now acknowledged policy change.

We also note no mention was made of the meat of Mr. Denny's letter which concluded "demoralised farmers must be given incentives, not petty reforms".

"Nothing short of a targeted cull of infected badgers will result in any improvement in the TB crisis".

Thus in the absence of howls of derision, we assume that with that final statement, Defra's representatives must agree.

The money trail

Today we have 'borrowed' a posting from our co-editor who tells the tale of his own bitter experience in attempting to fly in the face of 'science'.

There was a time when scientists chased information, de-constructed that information and formed considered opinions. Now it seems the conclusion is what drives 'research'.

Dr. North points out:

Anyone who has the remotest idea of how academia works will know instantly how corrosive this sort of money really is. Department heads, anxious for funding to keep their empires going, would tailor their research proposals to ensure that they conformed with the programme objective. Without being told, they would know that to submit a counter-hypothesis [] would be to invite instant oblivion. The chances of getting funding would be nil.

Dr. North then relates his own first hand encounter with the Ministries who steer our industry.

I actually saw this at first hand after the 1988 Salmonella-in-eggs scare. With food poisoning in the headlines, the issue suddenly became fashionable in the halls of academia and the Research Councils, MAFF (as it was then) and the Department of Health were suddenly throwing huge amounts of money at the perceived problem.

It was at that time that I decided to do my own PhD, offering a counter-hypothesis that the "egg scare" was an artifact, arising from poor investigational technique, institutional bias and many other factors, including scientific fraud – yes ... we've been there before.

Naturally, Dr. North was unable to get funding, his presence on campus "could prejudice the ability to tap into the well of funds aimed at supporting the prevailing hypothesis." So much for 'investigative science'. But one brave pioneer did take him on. The consequences of which were that:

"He was summonsed down to London and grilled by MAFF officials. Only under the most stringent of conditions was his funding stream allowed to continue, which included my (Dr. North) being excluded from all the government-funded activities in the department.

Having seen the complete bias under which the RBCT worked, the scorn and derision poured on previous work, scientific and veterinary experience by a self seeking bubble of individuals, all circling around each other, we see a depressing parallel. As Dr. North says, of this 'political science':

Basically, it is bought and paid for – it will follow the money. [] ... "scientists" will dutifully fill in their grant applications, proposing to do precisely that. Those who do not conform fall by the wayside – they simply do not get funded.

Then, of course, the overwhelming weight of funded papers is taken as proving the point, and evidence of the "consensus". But it is money, not science, that is talking.

The basis of the RBCT was graphically explained by its leader, ISG chairman Professor John Bourne, who said quite openly to the EFRA committee:

"We repeatedly say "culling, as conducted in the trial." It is important [that] we do say that. Those limitations were not imposed by ourselves. They were imposed by politicians."

"At the end of the day I think you have to accept that it is the price society puts on a badger. [ ] In this country there is a price on a badger and on badger welfare".

"Whatever has driven that I do not know but the fact is that a price has been put on the badger in this country which related to the way we were able to carry out our scientific work. That is exactly what we report".

And as we saw last week, this particular politically driven gravy train shows no sign of stopping.

Costs - and Defra costs

This week saw the publication of a further tranche of material from the ISG's electronic abacus. Professor Christl Donnelly having agreed that when badgers are removed, cattle TB reduces, sometimes significantly - then concluded in this paper that removing badgers was too expensive.

Quotes from the farming press ask expensive for whom? But we will take our own line and examine answers to Parliamentary Questions on the trial protocol and its efficacy, communications from WLU staff working on the RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial and our personal experiences of their efforts - all of which have informed us just how the ISG went about their task of trying to cull badgers and the influence this had on their costs. These costs of RBCT cage traps averaged £3,799 per sq KM per year, (updated within this paper to £17,709 per sq KM ?) and form the basis of the paper published this week.

From a submission to EFRAcom in 2006, a culling trial manager stated:

" The whole basis of Krebs was to remove badgers off the ground. For the first four years, that effort was farcical, due to restrictions placed upon us. The trial had too many flaws in it to be trusted to produce meaningful evidence. How much weight do we give the latest ISG report, detailing their ‘robust’ findings to the minister? If it were down to me and my staff, very little".

And on the subject of using anything to do with trial costings, the submission was emphatic...

The costs for a future culling policy must NOT be based on Krebs costings. The Wildlife Unit have many great ideas on how to reduce costs vastly should the State remain involved in it. Give the Unit a chance to see how innovative it can be when it comes to reducing operating costs. Krebs was ridiculously expensive for what it delivered.

However, this latest paper appears to rely on 2005 costings of badger culling as carried out during the Krebs trial referred to in such scathing terms above. As usual the figures in this mathematical modelling exercise are subject to 'assumption' but what isn't, is the raw, unadulterated information from the trial, gleaned by answers to our PQs over a similar time scale to Donnelly's 'assumed' costs.

The RBCT relied on cage trapping over a very short period of 8 nights annually, with locations widely advertised. Operations were co-ordinated from two VI centres: Polwhele near Truro in Cornwall and Aston Down near Stroud in Glos. Approximately 133personnel from these sites covered all ten trial areas. Thus WLU operatives from Truro, after visiting farms on their home turf could head north on the M5 / M6 for Staffordshire via Hereford, while Aston Down's staff were also covering many miles at exorbitant and unnecessary cost.

[141974] The number of WLU staff employed on the RBCT was 133 in 2003/04, at a cost £6.8 million.

So what were they doing? Catching badgers? Nope. Not all the time. In fact not much of the time.

[1509079] In 2003, 1,130,000 miles were driven in WLU official vehicles, which equates to 2 - 3 hours travelling per person, per day.

How many times to the moon and back is that mileage? And as local expertise was not used, overnights, B&B and security allowances were also stacking up to the tune of around £130/day per operative, over and above their usual salary. That's £500 a week for each operative + salary. All presumably included within the ISG costs of their very own unique method of trying to trap badgers. We are unaware if Prof. Donelly's or the rest of the ISG team's own remunerations were included in the total.

So what of the efficacy of their attempts?

[141971] Of 15,666 traps sited in the RBCT to October 2003, 8,981 were 'interfered with' and 1,827 disappeared.

A pretty poor success rate then, if almost 70 percent of the traps set at dusk were empty in the morning. And the cost to the trial of traps damaged was answered thus:

[150494] (Over a similar time scale to the PQ above), 6,239traps suffered damage and 1,926 were stolen or lost at a cost of £50 each.

So, £408,250 to be added to 'costs' of not catching badgers in cage traps. But how did all this affect how efficiently the RBCT was able to do what it allegedly intended? i.e to catch and cull badgers?

[157954] There has been a level of illegal activity and interference with the operation of the RBCT which is certainly undesirable and could be considered significant. Culling stopped for a variety of reasons, including interference from activists and weather. Some activities led to trapping being extended or prematurely suspended.

But presumably the costs which now form the basis of Donnelly's paper were not suspended? WLU personnel were paid to set traps; whether or not they succeeded in catching badgers in them, we are unable to extrapolate from the ISG data.

Given such skewed protocol, operated under bureaucratic straitjackets and unbridled costs the average cost per badger caught and dispatched would be £thousands. And yet in spite of all the aforementioned and acknowledged problems, Donnelly confirms a drop of an average of 30% in new herd breakdowns of TB. (a figure which in itself is misleading, as herds under restriction at the beginning of the 'trial' did not qualify for badger removals, and although forming mini-hotspots within the ten triplets, are not included in RBCT data.) And 30 per cent is very meaningful if you happen to one of that number.

Dividing these extraordinary WLU 'costs' during the RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial by the number of badgers they actually managed to catch is a crude assumption, but it is the only one available to them. Their trial, their data, their conclusions.

But commenting on the paper, Professor Bill Reilly, President of the BVA, said:

“This paper clearly demonstrates that badger culling did have an impact on the incidence of bovine TB in cattle, which is a very positive outcome.

The Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT) was undertaken in very specific circumstances and it could be misleading to extrapolate the findings to any future control programme".

Quite.

The ISG final report and everything which has sprung from it, confirmed (again) that badgers do transmit TB to cattle, but it showed us quite clearly how NOT to deal with that situation.

Update: New bTB leaflet for Camelids

Defra have updated their advice leaflet on Tuberculosis in Camelids, which may be accessed on this link.

They point out that:

Transmission can occur between animals, from animals to humans, more rarely from humans to animals and between humans.
Transmission is predominantly through exposure to respiratory aerosols from an infectious animal. Camelids have a habit of spitting a mixture of gastric contents and saliva and this could increase the risk of transmission, particularly in the later stages of infection when lesions are present in the lungs and bowel.

In their new missive, and keen on the bio-security angle, Defra also advise that water troughs (and feed?) be offered '3 feet off the ground' to prevent the ingress of badgers.

Aim to make salt and mineral blocks inaccessible to badgers by raising them off the ground. Water troughs should also be raised at least three feet above the ground to prevent badger access.

.

Filming carried out by Professor Tim Roper of Sussex University showed badgers feeding from cattle troughs set at 4 feet 3 inches off the ground, which as Defra were helpful to point out in answers to our Parliamentary Questions, is too high for cattle (or camelids) to access. Thus to comply with Defra's advice may involve the modification of both camelids and cattle with one of these.

BCG - how it works

From Dr. Ueli Zellweger we have received the following explanation of how BCG vaccination - the live attenuated strain of Mycobacterium bovis known as Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) - works.

Defra are keen to use this in hotspot areas (where badgers are known to have endemic tuberculosis) The vaccine may or may not work, they really do not know, but are on record as hoping 'it won't make matters worse'. The jabs will need to be repeated at least every twenty months. And that, together with advice on bio security, constitutes Defra's 'eradication policy' for tuberculosis in England..

Why BCG does not perform like other Vaccines

In any normal infection the body defence works by production of vast amounts of antibodies. Such antibodies can also be stimulated by ordinary vaccines for all kinds of bacteria and virus diseases and they can be traced in blood which makes diagnosis with various techniques fairly easy.

But this does not work for Tuberculosis – it never did and it never will do – because the tubercle bacteria have a waxy coat to which antibodies cannot attach. Tuberculosis therefore causes a so called humoral body defence; that means the very slowly multiplying bacteria are attacked by enzymes and white blood cells mainly. These are killing or even digesting the bacteria by a method called phagocytosis resulting in crumbly pus in the so called tubercles – whole heaps or lumps containing several 1000 to billions of bacteria.

This defence is much more unspecific and slower than the usual one by antibodies.

Any BCG vaccine stimulates this humoral defence only but never prevents an infection; it may keep it on a low scale maybe. There is no other vaccine available and there most probably will never be another one.

No matter how many millions more DEFRA invests ( I hear of some 30 so far for the Vaccine only ) this is nature - which cannot be forced by politics.
Dr. Ueli Zellweger

More on Defra's badger vaccine scoping project, it's progress and time scale here.

Update.
We have added the following link to an email sent to www.warmwell.com by virologist Dr. Ruth Watkins who explains how BCG works when injected and also points out:

BCG is not effective if given after infection with M bovis or M tuberculosis.

All those queueing up to 'vaccinate' badgers endemically infected with TB, please note....

Sideline?

For anyone with a thorough knowledge of bTB and the required tea-and-sympathy skills, the NFU are offering three EU funded posts in the SW.

Salary: £27,410 - £33,806
Location: Exeter
Job Type: Contract - 4 years
Source: The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development Europe investing in rural areas. South West bTB Farm Advisory Service (based from the NFU Regional headquarters, Exeter)

The NFU, supported by all farming and related industry organisations, has recently secured funding through the Rural Development Programme England for a four year farm advisory programmes to provide cattle farmers with bespoke Bovine Tuberculosis advice and training in the South West Region.

Being delivered for the industry, by the industry, this initiative will provide practical and technical support, advice and training for trade, supply chain and animal health solutions to all cattle farmers across the South West region affected directly or indirectly by bovine TB. If you want to really help cattle farmers in a 'hands on' and practical way this could be the job for you.

Under the direction of the programme Manager, the service will be delivered by three Advisers who will have a good understanding of Agriculture, Animal Health and the Rural Environment, and be able to "demonstrate an understanding of bTB".

Yup. We understand only too well. Cattle are tested and culled if they react to exposure of m.bovis. Tabular valuation is rubbish if you have spent a lifetime breeding high quality genetics, or if you've purchased expensive bloodlines and they are condemned. There is no appeal. You can't trade, except to approved finishing units, will probably have to shoot calves which you can't sell, and any movements at all have to be licensed by your local AHO - who may, or may not agree to them. Direct slaughter is your only outlet. Your bank may, or may not be sympathetic.

Up to 90 percent of TB breakdowns, both new and ongoing in the SW are down to badgers say AHO risk assessments, but the only 'advice' which can be given to affected farms is 'touch them not'. And possibly a reminder that hidden in the folds of the new Animal Health Bill, are penalties for not keeping 'bio-secure' - whatever that might mean in this context. Hermetically sealed boxes for cows? Shrink wrapped grass?

Update: We understand that key people in various farming organisations have pushed for this initiative, as their telephone lines are busy with farmers asking the same questions. But we are also mindful that our current Minister for (some) Animal's Health, is hell bent on saving cash. Our cash. Compensation cash, (the figure for which in Defra's convoluted accounting system, includes haulage, abattoir costs, valuers and incineration of reactors, but is net of carcase salvage). So while we welcome any support for farmers under herd restrictions, we are very much aware that what may be possible and planned for today, could be completely different tomorrow. And that someones idea of 'bio-security' may have a profound effect on any compensation monies due, however unproven, ineffective, impractical or costly such measures may be. We are also reminded of the words spoken at least twice in our hearing, by the former chief at Woodchester Park's Badger Heaven, Dr. Chris Cheeseman. When asked how to keep badgers and cattle apart, his reply was an unequivocal "You can't. You get rid of your cattle".

We understand that positions will be available in the Midlands and the North as well.

The closing date for the Exeter applications is Monday 15th February 2010 at 4pm, should you feel you have the right skills.

bTB in Badgers.

While the debate rages about cattle / badgers and now alpacas and other companion animals and their involvement and exposure to the bacterium known as m.bovis, Dr. Zellweger has looked at the effect of the disease on badgers. In a short communication "What Happens In A Badger Sett With Bovine Tuberculosis? " he describes the effect and spread of the disease:

It is not unusual that badger setts are several hundred years old. They consist out of various dens and chambers, well connected and spread out over some 20 to 50 yards 1 to 10 feet underground. Badgers are night active creatures and during wintertime they spend most time sleeping or dosing socially cuddled up in their dormitories ( see BBC Autumn or Spring Watch ). In the open the family of a sett normally has a territory of up to 1 or even 2 square miles which is well defined and regularly marked by urine and latrines. In the dens and chambers the climate being obscure with sticky air and steady temperatures of some 10 - 20 degrees is ideal for numerous bacteria and other germs.

Successive tweaks to the Protection of Badgers Act, have awarded this delightful animal cult status and its home a Grade 1 listing - with an inevitable knock-on effect transferred to Animal Health veterinarians' methods of control under section 10 of the Act. And the badger population, when assessed by members of the Mammal Society increased by 77 per cent over the decade 1987- 97, as Dr. Zellweger points out:

The Badger Act protects "brock" since 1992 hence the population is growing steadily. As data show this goes along with a continuously increasing of bovine Tuberculosis in cattle, alpacas, other domestic species and "brocks" of course.

Any average sett is occupied by a bigger family with a very well organised pecking order. There is one boss and a dominant sow: the total size of the group may be up to a dozen or more. When youngsters move away they have to look out for their own habitat and territory. If they intrude occupied territories they sooner or later are expelled - sometimes after fierce rows. Where do they go to? And where does a diseased animal go to? There are farmyards with muckheaps, sheds and haystacks with mice and troughs with rests of grains or cereals offering shelter and easy food. In summer cattle drink from water troughs in the fields - in any dry summer spell an easy supply for badgers. What when such a weakened or diseased brock - or a dead one - is detected by Pink Panther Toby cat or one of the pack of sheepdogs on the farm?

A description of the effects of this disease, and opportunities for its spread:

Bovine TB ( bTB ) as we know is a very chronic disease affecting various mammal species including people. The most common spreading is by exhaling including coughing for the lungs are "hosting" so called tubercles, which consist out of masses of bacteria either alive ( and therefore well infectious ) or digested by macrophages as defence of the immune system. Every tubercle is a focus of infection and can be an abscess of up to an inch size full of typical crumbly pus. When bacteria are swept via blood or lymph flow systems, they may land in other organs like the kidneys, liver, intestine, saliva glands or skin, where identically after weeks pus can result. Therefore we speak of pulmonary, renal, liver, intestinal or skin TB. Urine of a badger with renal TB can contain 300’000 bacteria per ml. A badger may urinate 4 - 6 times a day some 30 - 80 ml each time. My calculator shows this rises to shedding per day of some 10 times the amount RBS topmanager Stephen Hester gets as bonus for last year earned with public cash ( 90 million germs ). A bit crazy maybe? For a new infection with bTB it would need some 100 - 500 bacteria only.
When badgers fight the risk of scratches and wounds is very high. In a healthy badger these heal out in due time. When bTB is involved it is different. The very slow multiplying bacteria will sooner or later cause smelly excretions, wild flesh and pus which might be infectious - permanently or temporarily. Wounds may be licked every now and then by the very badger or by his mates even. New infection is around the corner, but this time in the intestine.

If a sow with bTB has cubs - or any other sibling of the same sett has got TB - these youngsters may get infected in their very first weeks of life by her own mother. bTB causes a very slow death after suffering over months or even more than a year. Hell - or perhaps worse? What a life prospectus!

And on the 'treatment' of bTB in animals?

Animals with bTB should never be treated hence the slaughtering of some 40,000 head of cattle per year. Even vaccination ( with unreliable BCG ) cannot prevent that further bTB spreading occurs. Antibiotics are not practical for they would have to be applied in adequate daily individual dosage for several months, nota bene causing resistance of other germs in grand style. Contraceptives for various reasons are no option either.
People with bTB are treated with high doses of a combination of 3 different antibiotics over 6 or more months with full success never guaranteed….

Worldwide TB causes millions of victims every year; the main part of those are caused by the human strain Mycobacterium tuberculosis, but bTB ( Mycobacterium bovis ) is equally infectious and dangerous for people.

Dr. Zellweger ends this piece warning "England beware!"

Stats? stuck

At the Oxford Farming Conference during the first week of January, The Minister of State for (some) Animal's Health, the Right Honourable Hilary Benn MP., responding to criticism of his non-policy on bTB, hinted that unofficial Defra figures are showing that disease levels fell during 2009.

He is being his usual economic-with-the-truth self or as has been said of his ilk, "if their lips are moving, they're lying".

When there is just a single source of infectious disease, then tracking either New Breakdowns or New Confirmed Breakdowns is a good measure of how control measures are working - or not. But with only sentinel tested cattle under any semblance of Defra control, and a maintenance reservoir of TB encouraged by statute to let rip, in this instance it may not be the most accurate. Defra statistics have several lines of monthly statistics - or they do if they are updated [more on that later] - each giving different information, or the same information in different format..

There is a column showing the number of herds registered on the VetNet system, another showing how many of these are under restriction because of a 'TB incident'; then further totals, including how many of these are 'New Breakdowns', or even 'New Confirmed Breakdowns'. And it is latter which the Minister was clutching when he spoke last week. And it is this heavily sanitised figure which he presents to his European masters.

In the year to August, (which appears to have the Defra statisticians stuck in groove at the moment) the figure of New TB breakdowns is lower than that recorded in the same period during 2008. But, the rest of us, languishing under herd movement restrictions 'because of a TB incident' is up 10.5 per cent on 2008, and almost double the figure of 2006. Cattle slaughtered is about the same. But by mid January, Defra have usually produced the TB stats for November, not August. Gardening leave? Changing the data collection methods? Rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic? No idea. But if the news was good, you can bet it would have been published.

The figure for New Confirmed TB Breakdowns equates to around 3.7 per cent of the national herd, and this is the figure Benn is clutching in his Ministerial briefcase. But the number of herds under TB restriction annually is approaching 10 per cent, and to August 2009 - remember August? buckets and spades etc.,? The total was 8.2 per cent of the cattle herds in GB.

This duplicitous hubris also extends to Defra's 'other species' tables, with numbers of alpacas stuck at a comforting 18 on Defra's tables, while a quick round robin telephone call to distraught owners extracted a figure of over 200 animals dead from TB - ten times the 'official' one. Further questioning drew a reluctant 'possibly VLA samples?' as an explanation for the difference.

Polite note to Defra. Bacteria do not respond to bullying, lines on maps or rearranged, delayed or selected statistics of their progress. They just spread.

" DEFRA policy is essentially doing nothing."

Following our posting summarising the opinions of Dr. Ueli Zellweger on the current one sided bTB non-policy operated with such devastating results by Defra, warmwell.com has received an email from Dr Paul Gillett, M.B, Ch.B, MRCP, FRCPath., which we have permission to post.

Dr. Gillett is a hospital medical consultant with 35 years experience specialising in microbial diseases and infection control, and he supports the remarks made by Dr. Zellweger, a Swiss vet with over 30 years experience.

Dr. Gillett explains that

The decline of tuberculosis in humans in this country owes more to improvements in living conditions, better nutrition, less overcrowding and the pasteurisation of milk than it does to the introduction of BCG.

Studies on BCG vaccination in man show an efficacy of between 0% and 70% and appear to depend on country, nutrition and the prevalence of other mycobacterial infections in the population immunised. Thus a policy to control bovine tuberculosis based almost entirely on the use of currently available vaccines is unlikely to be successful even if one could achieve 100% uptake. Trials on new vaccines will take several years to complete given the chronic nature of the disease in both man and animals, and the outcome far from certain. In the short, and probably medium term this means the DEFRA policy is essentially do[ing] nothing.

(We assume here that Dr Gillett is talking about Defra's Badger BCG vaccination project, rather than a mass BCG vaccination programme across the country to mitigate spillover from TB infected badgers into humans, alpacas, cats, dogs free-range pigs, sheep, goats and cattle.)

Dr. Gillett continues: "It has to be understood that the current policy of testing and slaughtering infected cattle is aimed at preventing the acquisition of bovine TB by humans not cattle. As Dr Zellweger indicates in his letter, to control bTB in cattle, one should be looking to prevent the transmission between and to animals in the herd. This would involve detecting and eliminating sources that pose a threat to cattle and unfortunately the badger is the most important wildlife reservoir that has close contact."

I find it inconceivable that two species of animal that are susceptible to the disease and have proven close contact are not transmitting the disease to each other. Introducing proper control measures is therefore to the benefit of cattle, badger, farmer and the exchequer.
Why then are such measures not instituted?

He continues with the observation that "Some would advocate the mass culling of badgers and one must suspect that it is fear of the political implications of public reaction to such a policy which bolsters DEFRA’s inactivity."
( One may also consider that it suits Defra to keep a wedge driven between those farmers and vets who want a cohesive policy to eradicate bTB from wherever it may be found, and the beneficiaries of the current polemic, in whose interest it remains to keep the gravy-train cash rolling. And 'eradication' of badgers rather than 'eradication' of bTB within their population, is just the word to do it with every trick in the book used to achieve this. - ed)

Dr. Gillett appears to have caught up with the targeted 'management' strategy for wildlife which we mentioned here, and he comments:

There is an intermediate and more appropriate strategy. I am reliably informed by countrymen that it is possible to detect diseased badger sets by inspection of the runs and other signs. Thus it is possible to avoid mass culling - which may actually be counter-productive - in favour of selective elimination of diseased animals. A measure which is to the benefit of the badger population as a whole and the cattle. A group of concerned West Country farmers and vets have recently produced a DVD outlining the present problems and the potential for training others in the recognition of diseased sets. It is to be hoped that a coherent policy may be formulated about such an approach.

Dr. Gillett concludes, "Should an effective vaccine and delivery system become available in due course, then it would be (as in humans) an adjunct to rather than a replacement for effective infection control measures."

(Note: More of this discussion on www.warmwell.com and 'Bovine TB – A Way Forward', the film by Chris Chapman, which describes a management policy, will be released at the end of January. For details go to the homepage www.chrischapmanphotography.co.uk and click on FILM )

Farmers can't wait ...

.... says Shadow minister Jim Paice, MP speaking to the Western Morning News at the Oxford Farming Conference this week.

Cattle farmers in the Westcountry just don't have the time to wait for a vaccine for bovine tuberculosis, according to shadow farms minister Jim Paice.
The ongoing spread of the disease, which caused the destruction of 40,000 cattle last year, would have to be tackled by dealing with diseased badgers, he insisted.

Mr Paice was speaking at the Oxford Farming Conference and told the WMN that an oral vaccine for badgers would not be available until 2014 – and that was far too long to wait, given the havoc wrought by the disease in beef and dairy farms in hot spots such as the South West.

"We have waited far too long for a conclusion to this dreadful problem and wasted far too much taxpayers' money and got nowhere," he said.

Well he got that bit right.

So how is this little exercise in futility, for which the 'farmers can't wait' coming along?

It was launched in a fanfare which gave the impression that most of the badgers in TB hotspots would be vaccinated against bTB, and that would be that. And £20 million of course, but let that pass.
But that is not strictly true. For a start, the Vaccine Scoping Study is being rolled out in stages. Very slow stages.



In November last year, a PQ submitted by the David Drew, MP received this answer on the progress of our Minister for (some) Animal's Health latest daft idea prevarication project.

From what we can see from that answer, of the six 75,000 acre (300 sq km) blocks of land where it is proposed that badgers endemically infected with bTB, are vaccinated against, er ... bTB, only about 33 percent of the land may be available? And of that 25,000 acres (that's 100 sq km )only about a quarter of landowners have signed up, leaving 75 per cent having declined FERA's invitation to this particular party ? (as at November 10th anyway)

You get the gist of where we're going with this?
Now, cage traps and the use of injectible vaccines are proposed until 2014, when an oral version of vaccine, may become available. So having compressed the land areas into much less than was proposed, further reduced by non-participation, how much further can numbers of endemically infected badgers be squeezed within such a trapping programme? And what is the effect on a 'programme' of vaccination that we are told as farmers needs at least 80 per cent coverage to be effective?

We understand that the hope is for contractors to catch between 60-80% of badgers in each target area to vaccinate. So if no other landowners agree to participate, that will mean 15-20% of badgers being vaccinated in the 100 sq kms plot, which itself has already shrunk from the headline 300 sq km or 75,000 acres.

Contractors are now being asked to tender for this work. But from what we can see, it is a complete dogs breakfast and a way apart from the initial headline grabbing figures offered for public consumption. When "badgers will be vaccinated over six 75,000 acre plots", actually equates to "we may get to vaccinate 5 - 7 % of the badgers in that area" someone, somewhere is taking spin to the extreme. And Jim Paice is quite correct to say 'the farmers can't wait'. Neither can the taxpayers.

But from a contractor's point of view as well, that 'someone' is also on a different planet. These people are being asked to tender to trap and vaccinate 'x' number of badgers in an area of land, not yet decided ? And the badger surveying, we understand, will not be in the hands of the contractors tendering for the job, but 'someone else'. Someone who may assess numbers correctly, but may not. And if they do not, then tough.

Both vaccines and cages are to be the responsibility of the contractor, and their purchase, storage and maintenance, together with assessed labour and area to be covered will be the basis of the quotation offered. This is so vague as to be like catching smoke. Especially as by the date tenders have to be submitted, the majority (80 per cent)of surveying will not have been completed.

Security clearance, public liability and insurance for working with a grade 3 pathogen are also to be the responsibility of the contractor, for what is described as a 'one year contract'.

Walking blindfold on this week's ice and snow would be easier. And much safer.

Update:
An update to the Fera (Food and Environment Research Agency) badger vaccine project arrived this morning, giving us a little more meat on its skeletal bones.

Today (8th January) was the closing date for the consultation process, on amendments to legislation which will allow lay vaccination of badgers, using BCG.

And a little more detail is given on Fera's timetable for this project.

"During year one (2010) Fera staff will survey and vaccinate up to 100 sq km of the first Glos. zone at Stroud. They will also begin to survey and vaccinate about half (50 sq km) of the second Glos. area, north of Cheltenham. It is on these two areas that contractors will be trained.
Up to 20 sq km of the other four patches, Staffs, Hereford/Worcs and the two in east Devon will also have received visits.
During the second winter, from November to April, Fera will survey the remaining 80 sq km areas of these four blocks, and the remaining 50 sq km of the zone north of Cheltenham. By the end of 2011, all areas will have been surveyed"

So in 24 months time, at the end of 2011, all the six areas will have been surveyed? And of the original much headlined 1800 sq km, (of which 600 sq km they hope might be signed up), "up to 230 sq km" may have been actioned?

No particular urgency then?

"Eliminate the Cause"

As another miserable and expensive year of Minister’s non-policy on ‘bovine’ TB has drawn to a close, we have received a sobering overview of the situation from Dr. Ueli Zellweger, a veterinary practitioner of some 30 years experience both in this country and Europe.

Dr. Zellweger explains that after so much experience of treating cattle diseases, testing for TB and the experience in other countries in the eradication of this disease and trading implications surrounding TB, he feels ‘entitled to comment’.

“ When a veterinary surgeon is called out to treat a cow or a whole herd of cattle it is vital that he finds the real cause of the trouble. This may be an infection by either a species of bacteria, virus,a mycosis, possibly interaction with parasites or environmental influences. It is the skill and experience of a successful vet, to discover the real diagnosis and to treat and eliminate the very cause”.

He explains that infections with bacteria are normally treated with antibiotics and disinfectants and subsequent preventative care; and that if an infection is treated soon after starting success is most of times quick and guaranteed. But not so easy to treat are chronic infections.

"Bovine Tuberculosis ( bTB ) in 99% of all cases is a very chronic disease, mainly because of the extremely slow multiplying of these bacteria. Death quite often occurs after suffering over months or even years only. Apart of bTB there are quite a number of other strains causing Tuberculosis; e.g. the human strain ( M. Tuberculosis ), the strain causing leprosy, the avian strains including M. Avium paratuberculosis ( Johne’s disease in cattle and rabbits ) and others which may be even harmless.”

Dr. Zellweger then goes on to explore vaccines, saying that there a lot of vaccines against all kind of infections on the market which normally give quite reliable results if administered correctly in healthy animals and humans.

For Tuberculosis the common vaccine is the BCG which was discovered some 80 years ago and has been used to vaccinate healthy babies mainly. But unlike all other vaccines, Dr. Zellweger explains:

“ BCG does not prevent an infection; it just keeps it from becoming generalized, thus reducing the risk that the bacteria are swept into various other organs followed by massive excretion and transmission of disease ( coughing, urine,milk etc ). There is scientific evidence that the efficiency of BCG is not more than 50% and in a lot of countries it is therefore not in use any longer.”

( Here, we would point out that the ability to excrete large numbers of bacteria varies tremendously between species. In cattle, regularly tested with reactors removed for slaughter, half of the kill will show no lesions at all and no bacteria can be traced even in culture as culture forming units ( CFU ). Of those with lesions, AHOs tell us that they ‘can look for half an hour and still cannot find any bacteria’ on a slide with material from cattle lesions. Conversely the smears from even microscopic lesions found in badgers may contain huge amounts of bacteria, and we make no apology for repeating the answers to our PQs which gave a figure of “up to 300’000 bacteria per ml” which may be found in the urine of a badger with TB in his kidneys. Other questions dragged out the nugget that 30 ml urine can be splattered indiscriminately ( across grassland ) at each incontinent void, and that exposure to just 70 or so bacteria are needed to provoke a positive skin test reaction and possibly onward disease in a cow. Alpacas too seem unlucky enough to develop open lesions very quickly, which may contain large quantities of bacteria, facilitating fast spread within the whole herd. But we digress…)

Dr. Zellweger continues:

" Any animal, group or herd of, with bTB is a focus and as long as a focus is not eliminated it is a high risk for further infections. It is outrageous that these aspects are widely ignored by DEFRA for years now with apparently no end in sight. In 2008 over 40’000 head of cattle reacting to bTB ( skin test ) were slaughtered ( with DEFRA predicting a 10 – 20 % increase annual increase, should the ‘dynamics’ of their non-policy not change – ed ). Nobody knows how many 10’000s of badgers and their setts are infected. Thus the infection within this most relevant wildlife reservoir is permanently spreading, including all its risks of infecting further cattle, other farm animals, pets and humans.”

And on vaccination, as Dr. Zellweger has pointed out many times before:

“Vaccinating badgers cannot be the solution for there are locally far too many badgers and setts which are infected." And in his view, “vaccinating cattle with BCG is absolutely contra-indicated, for the only way of diagnosing bTB in cattle will be seriously compromised.”

( The skin test may react in vaccinated animals, and given the ‘damping down’ effect of BCG previously referred to, animals may still be ‘infected’ but not ‘infectious’ - ed). So, Dr. Zellweger explores another beneficial opportunity:

“ DEFRA thinks to manage to develop a DIVA test thus being able to differentiate between a skin reaction caused by bTB and the one by BCG. It is unclear if such a test will ever reach permission or European wide approbation; however there is a high risk that at some stage various countries will decide , that they are not interested in any English beef products any longer when it cannot be guaranteed that there is no bTB.”

And he points out that “the skin test appears to produce many inconclusive or even false negative results ".( But we are aware that it is testing for exposure to the bacteria which causes disease and not the disease itself – ed ) “And that the Gamma Interferon blood test – apart from being expensive – is quite often hampered by some other influences. There is – (Dr. Zellweger says) – definitely no need of another uncertainty in this whole issue.”

So as the New Year begins, with several hundred head of reactor cattle on the bTB killing lines of abattoirs this week, numerous new breakdowns involving many alpacas which have not yet made it to DEFRAs data sheets and not a few pet cats and dogs, Dr. Zellweger concludes that:

“It is horror for me to see how things are going the wrong way and every month some hundred more Farms are starting suffering dramatically. It is not 5 minutes before noon to rethink this whole
approach by DEFRA – politically steered as it is – NO it is half past noon and even with a quick and total U turn the future of battling bTB looks very bleak. Eradicating bTB in Southwest England will take some 10 years at least, with or without this actual Government and its TB Eradication Group, but with enormous costs, efforts and many more tragedies.”

It is 'a horror' to us as well. And an expensive, futile, bitterly divisive waste of resources. But the gleeful chortle of a young inspector lining up over 200 TB reactors in a Midlands abattoir last week, put it all in perspective. "Another load of cattle who won't be polluting the planet" said she cheerfully. So how many ROC global-warming credits can Defra attach to each reactor's tail?

A Happy New Year.

Badgers v. cattle. Relative contributions to disease transmission.

After our posting on the relative infectivety of bTB lesions in cattle, badgers and other mammals, a comment alerted us to work done outside the ISG box, which sought to match the attributed cause of a TB breakdown to either cattle or wildlife. The model used for this exercise found that just 16% of bTb breakdowns in 2004 were directly attributable to cattle movements.

The following is part of the abstract from the paper "Estimates for Local and Movement-based Transmission of Bovine Tuberculosis in British cattle" (Green et al) which was published in 2008.

"Both badgers and livestock movements have been implicated in contributing to the ongoing epidemic of bovine tuberculosis (BTB) in British cattle. However, the relative contributions of these and other causes are not well quantified. We used cattle movement data to construct an individual (premises)-based model of BTB spread within Great Britain, accounting for spread due to recorded cattle movements and other causes.

Outbreak data for 2004 were best explained by a model attributing 16% of herd infections directly to cattle movements, and a further 9% unexplained, potentially including spread from unrecorded movements.

The best-fit model assumed low levels of cattle-to-cattle transmission.

The remaining 75% of infection was attributed to local effects within specific high-risk areas."

We love the pseudonym 'local effect' - excellent.
And this analysis ties in quite nicely with that of actual herd breakdowns in the SW of England, described in our posting here and illustrated with charts of actual bTB breakdowns in Devon, over the same period.


We are already hearing of breaches both north and south in Defra's bTB 'maginot' line. This was an area crayonned in red, which sought to isolate TB to the west of a line on a map, with a 2 km buffer zone on its eastern edge. Pity no one told the 'local effects not to cross it.

The full paper from which the abstract was taken, can be viewed on this link. (Ed- the link may need a second click as it opens, and a further 'OK' to ignore hieroglyphics.)

Wildlife Assessments

We have mentioned the veterinary / farmer wildlife assessment initiative several times but a comment which has come in today reminded us of another option.

"My friend in Cornwall, an Alpaca owner who has already lost many of her Alpacas to TB, has taken the bull by the horns and had a private company, owned and run by former Defra wildlife employees, to survey her farm and recommend what needs to be done to minimise the impact of TB and how to reduce badger access to her farm."

This visit was most successful and, says our commentator, possibly a service that others may wish to adopt.

The company was founded by ex WLU manager Paul Caruana and other colleagues, all of whom have a wealth of knowledge of wildlife, particularly badgers. It trades as Field Services South West. We have previously posted some of Paul's comments from when he was a field manager taking orders from the diminutive John Bourne, and trying to catch badgers (fairly unseccessfully, it would seem) - in the manner which ISG instructed demanded, during their RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial.

FSSW can contacted via their website: www.fieldservicessouthwest.co.uk or mail them at fsswadmn@aol.com

The comment continues:

Having had a relative employed in the Wildlife Unit, I know that many of them have the skills to be able to usefully & practically advise farmers & alpaca owners on the risks they face and the actions they can take to avoid getting this diseases into their herds.

And concludes that the excercise "sounded most useful" and asked if we could put a name to this service, which we are happy to do.

Alpacas - TB Awareness meetings.

In response to the increasing number of alpaca herds (puntas) affected by the inappropriately mis-named 'bovine' TB, the BAS (British Alpaca Society) is hosting a series of meetings during January and February 2010, entitled 'TB Awareness'.
These will be presented by BVCS vet Gina Bromage, M.A.,VetM.B.,D.V.M.,M.R.C.V.S , with an introduction from the chairman of the BAS, Mike Birch.

The meetings are open to all and there is no pre-booking or entry fee. Veterinary attendees would be most welcome, as would cattle farmers and anyone else interested in bTB transmission.

Venue are across the country, with details here.

The owners of alpacas in the two cases which we linked to in this post, have between them lost over 40 animals to confirmed bTb. A handful of other herds can account for well over 100 animals, all clinically confirmed during 2009, but not necessarily voluntarily slaughtered as the result of either a skin or blood test and thus accompanied by 'compensation'. Neither have all these TB casualties been culture sampled, as once bTB is 'confirmed' in a herd, to keep lobbing samples to VLA for confirmation of visible disease is deemed a waste of resources. They have been postmortemed by vets, whose findings should have been passed up the line to AHOs.

Thus the figure quoted on the Defra website of '38' alpacas and '2' llamas 'screened' during the period January - September 2009, with '18' infected alpacas and '0' infected llamas proving positive for bTB, would seem to us to be a considerable underestimate - or as it's Christmas and we are being generous, both vets and local AHO offices ane dragging their collective heels over reporting their area bTB positive camelid findings.

Defra's explanatory notes, once one has located the obligatory magnifying glass with which to read them, point out that the collated data, only refers to 'notified suspect and clinical postmortem' cases of bTB during the reporting period, thus passing the buck back to the aforementioned vets and AHOs..

At the moment we'll give Defra's statisticians the benefit of the doubt and hope 'pending' cases will catch up; but we sincerely hope that this published data is not case of managing statistics, rather than managing the problem.

(Update: Thanks to eagle eyed blog watchers for amendments to screened figures. Even with a magnifying glass - we got the lines muddled. The post is now correct to Defra's miniscule data - if not to dead alpacas. )

Definition - 'Maintenance'.

It has become apparent over recent months that a great many misconceptions - some originating in the top echelons of Defra - have been dribbled out to a gullible audience, unchallenged. The description 'maintenance' reservoir for instance, appears to have been atttached umbilically both to badgers as a source of bTB - and also cattle in equal measure. This is not so.

A dictionary definition of the word is 'capable of maintaining', 'cause to continue', 'retain in being' and 'preserve intact'. You get the picture? Badgers (unfortunately for them) tick all the boxes which allow this very accurate description to be applied.

Research over many years has found that they can maintain body weight, bear and rear young, in fact survive quite happily, while intermittantly shedding bTB. In the latter stages of the disease, the body is overwhelmed by disease and they are excluded from their groups, ranging further, scrapping and fighting for territory, and hiding up in shallow, single hole setts, often close to farm buildings and an easy food supply.

At this stage and possibly before, depending on the site of lesions, their ability to transmit disease is phenomenal, with up to 300,000 units of bacteria available in just 1ml of urine. 30 ml is dribbled at each void or used for scent marking, and just 70 units is needed to infect any cow who sniffs it. And while cattle will usually avoid faecal contamination, there is less chance for them to avoid urine. Pus dropping from open abcesses (see pic.) is also an opportunity for disease transmission. The amount of bacteria in badger lesions is huge.(All this is archived in the PQs which form the base of this site.)

So what of cattle? If they are left untested, and fulminating disease, then of course any TB would spread. And in the 1930s and 40s it did. But after the TB eradication process in the 1950s and 60s, using test and slaughter, this country - like many others - had all but eradicated TB. Numbers of reactors dropped to a very low level, with just an isolated animal expected to turn up at slaughter with aged, walled up lesions. The exceptions were two 'hotspots'. One in Glos and the other in SW Cornwall where test / slaughter failed to clear the problem - even with whole herd slaughter, cohort slaughter and all the rest of the cattle-only-tools. We explained this in our posting here - a posting which was compiled for us, by Divisional Veterinary Managers who had overseen this eradication process.

Cattle lesions are not particularly laden with bacteria, in fact scientists have explained to us that they "could look for half an hour" before finding a single bacteria on culture slides. Conversely the pink stained badger excretions "were jumping off the slide" and visible without the need of a microscope. Thus in the field, cattle to cattle transmission is difficult and happens over a long time scale. A fact born out by the Pathman project which found no samples taken from salami sliced reactor cattle over a long time frame, to be capable of onwards transmission.

So we go back to our Parliamentary Questions - and more particularly their Answers, where on 30th January 2004, Col 540W [150492] baby-Ben Bradshaw replied:

"All countries that have either eradicated or have a programme to control, bovine tuberculosis use one or more forms of the skin test"

of which the 'comparable intradermal' version is used in the UK, and its efficacy?:

28th January 2004 Col 382W [150495] "... on standard interpretation, provides sensitivety between in the range 68 to 95 per cent and specificity in the range 96 - 99 per cent."

Thus on regularly tested herds (and ours has had 60 day tests for way too long) - the top end of 90 per cent is as good as it gets. The junior Minister also mentioned that "In the abscence of a wild life reservoir ", all countries operating this test and slaughter policy had eradicated or were a way down the road to eradicating bTB completely. How would that be possible, if cattle were indeed a 'maintenance reservoir' of this disease? Or is our UK bTB bacteria different from anywhere else in the world? (We are aware it has acquired a 'political' DNA appendage - but let that pass....)

The Minister also told us that after the badger clearance at Thornbury, and smaller trials in Steeple Lees, Hartland and East Offaly, cattle TB had reduced significantly or in the case of Thornbury - disappeared altogther for at least ten years, with 'no other contemporaneous action' involved, other a clearance of infected badgers. How could that be, if cattle were 'maintaining the disease?

In a regularly tested cattle population, with reactors removed promptly, cattle do not 'maintain' TB. And when the unfettered, free ranging 'maintenance' reservoir of infection is controlled or removed, TB disappears from cattle populations completely. Once again we are grateful, for permission to reproduce the chart below, painstakingly compiled by AHOs in the SW, showing their professional risk assessments for cattle breakdowns. And as you can see - cattle are not the problem. The vast majority of cattle breakdowns were attributed to badgers.


The description 'maintenance' when applied to cattle TB, is not born out by past experiences both in this country or more especially in others where no wildlife reservoir exists, (or if it does present problems, it is controlled in parallel).

Thus, in our opinion, it is at best misleading and at worst duplicitous to describe cattle as a 'maintenance reservoir' of bTB - unless of course that description refers to the largesse associated with pensions and employment generated by its continued and increasing presence.

One man's story .....

Today, we share the diary of one small alpaca herd, hit by bTB earlier this year.

The owner will remain anonymous - for the time being - but his location is within a midlands bTB hotspot, where over half (55 per cent) of badgers captured during BROs in the decade prior to 1997, proved positive for bTB.

The property has massive badger activity and was once home to over 50 alpacas. The herd (punta) comprised mainly females and 10 males with nothing purchased in for over a year, but animals sold. bTB was confirmed in September this year, but three months prior to this the owner had treated a male with Orchiditis. This animal failed to respond to treatment, and died. The carcass was collected by the local hunt. No samples were taken. (This male is not included in figures of losses from the herd)

September 2009
During routine husbandry, a female was found to be underweight. Veterinary advice was sought, and this female and another were treated with antibiotics, and had blood screens for various other disease - all of which proved negative. One female died and a PM carried was out on farm. The vet recognised TB lesions and took the carcass to VLA Luddington for further investigation.
TB confirmed on PM. This female had a 5 week old cria.

The herd was put under official TB restriction by AH and the owner informed the British Alpaca society (BAS) of confirmed bTB.

October 2009
The cria from the first female loss is now 7 weeks old and very ill. She had died by the time the vet arrived to euthanize: vet euthanized another female, which was showing slight weight loss but was frothing at the mouth. Postmortems showed lung and liver abscesses respectively. The adult female suffered a ruptured lung abscess. Samples sent for culture.

Oct 5th 2009. First skin test on herd.
Oct 7th 2009 One female aborted.
Oct 8th 2009 Skin test results read: one positive Female. All other animals clear.

Although showing no symptoms, the skin test positive female was culled and was positive on postmortem. She has a 4 month old male cria.

October 14th. Vet called to examine two females which were negative on the skin test reading the previous week. This AHO told the owner that in her opinion these two alpaca were reactors as there is a swelling on the bovine injection site 6 days after the 'official ' 72 hour reading. ( This was not the same AHO who read the skin test on Oct 9th : protocol for alpaca skin tests indicates the reading should be at 'severe interpretation'; i.e a 2mm rise only for camelids.)

Oct 16th 2009
A male alpaca was suddenly taken very ill. He was unable to get up and appeared in pain. He had no weight loss, and at the time of death (euthansed) weighed 92 kg. He was put down by AHO and taken to VLA Luddington.

October 21st.
AHO suggest euthanasia for the two females seen on 14th October, and recommend 'monitoring' the herd, by weighing them on a regular basis and reporting any weight loss to AHO. The owner notices another female is coughing and reports this to AHO.

October 27th. Rapid Stat Pak blood test carried out on four animals. The owner has agreed (verbally) to slaughter if they are positive. No paperwork issued. All the bloods are positive.

November 2009
AHO culled the four blood test positives. All had TB confirmed on postmortem.
As TB has been confirmed in all the animals euthanized by local AHO, the owner is now offered a blood test on his entire herd - or what remains of it..

November 17th /18th 2009. Remaining 44 alpacas blood tested with Rapid Stat Pak and Gamma Interferon IG .

12 females failed both blood tests.(inc one 4 month cria)

14 fell into what the AH Officer called a 'Grey area' - in other words failed one blood test but passed the other.
Owner advised to isolate these animals, and watch for symptoms.

14 Tested negative on both tests

4 animals failed to give a sample suitable for gammaIFN screen..

Nov 25th: All 12 animals which were positive to both tests, plus one other showing symptoms were culled.(2 were taken to VLA Luddington the other 11 were PMd at a slaughter house by vets.) All showed lesions of TB.

LOSSES TO DATE : 22 alpacas. Spoligotype is confirmed as VLA 17, which is the strain of TB indigenous to the area. It is found in badgers and tested, slaughtered reactor cattle. AHO visits to discuss the 14 animals which fell into ‘grey’ areas of the blood tests, and the 4 which had given samples not suitable for screening.

To date, the owner has had no contact from the Health Protection Agencies, to offer screening for human contacts of these animals and is advised by AHO to contact her GP.

November 28th: HPA visit and are arranging for X Rays.

December 2009
AHO suggested they take the 'grey area' animals in pairs, starting with those who are either showing signs of illness, or have failed the Gamma IFN blood test.

They begin with 8 animals who had failed the GammaIFN test. All were positive for Tb on PM.

Losses to date 30 - all confirmed TB.
AHO ask to take the entire herd as owner has now lost over half the animals.

This small herd has 22 alpaca left out of 52 animals.
All but one had passed the intradermal skin test in early October.

A male sold from the farm in July has died and PM has confirmed TB. Despite the owner and BAS providing AH with contacts in October – a trace on this sale had not been followed up.

Dec 6th Owner has agreed to let AH take another 5 animals.

The remaining animals testing negative on both blood tests, will be monitired by AHO at 2, 4 and 6 monthly intervals.
The 4 alpaca which gave samples not capable of screen, will be retested.

Losses to date: 30, with 5 booked to go.
To be continued.

We failed ....

All summer, several contributers to this site have been trying valiantly to collate the figures for the cost to the taxpayer, of testing and removal of bTB positives to the skin test and other assorted toys. While numbers of animals slaughtered are available on the Defra website, (and our trend graphs show just where cattle numbers are likely to be by 2014) other associated costs are not so transparent. So after a lonely trawl, a few Parliamentary Questions were lobbed in the general direction of Hilary Benn, Minister of State for (some) Animal's Health - and his henchmen.


The reason for this is simple. After worshipping the moneylenders, UK plc is broke. And in 2006 a short term fixing tape in the form of tabular valuation was introduced to reduce 'farmers' share of the TB largesse. But within three years, sheer numbers of reactors had outstripped any fiscal advantage. So in the absence of any change of policy, and to go with our trend line graph of the numbers of cattle Defra can expect to cope with, we had intended producing a graph illustrating the sheer bloody waste of money, cost of all this prevarication to the long suffering taxpayer, already reeling under the laxative of 'quantitative easing' to protect the financial sector.

And therein lies is a problem. Answers to our pointed questions, repeated when we really did not believe what we were reading, explained - patiently it has to be said - that 'Compensation' included many other expenses other than monies paid to farmers for reactor cattle. Aye?? That was a surprise - and it takes a lot to surprise us. Such cynicism comes with years of practise, but we digress..

The less-than-transparent figure for 'Compensation' also includes species other than cattle - and there have been a few of those with numbers climbing: "Payments for non-bovine species are included in the total compensation figure for England." Then the writer explained that they were:

" ... unable to pull out an exact figure as our records are not kept in that way. Prior to 2006/07 minimal compensation was paid for other species. Over 2006/07 and 2007/08 a more substantial amount of money was paid out (though under £1million) for camelids."

So the llama and alpaca casualties of 2007, were funded at 'less than £1million? That's like a supermarket offering goods at £99.99 and saying they were 'under £100'. And as the numbers were quite modest, they were expensive lawnmowers then?

As 'other species' are included in the total sum, a straight simple division into the amount paid as 'compensation' by the number of cattle reactors, would not be in any way correct. But it gets worse.

Although veterinary testing costs are collated separately (and in the last couple of years have outstripped 'compensation') we had not realised that the 'accounting' system which Defra operate also bundles all costs of removing the reactor from the farm, getting it through the abattoir and its eventual disposal into that one misleading total.

The minister of State was asked for the costs of:

(a) compensation paid directly to farmers for removal of animals, (b) veterinary tuberculin testing, (c) haulage for removal of animals, (d) abattoir and official veterinary surgeon services in respect of slaughter, (e) on-farm slaughter, (f) disposal and incineration and (g) valuation fees was in respect of the implementation of statutory testing and slaughter under bovine tuberculosis regulations of (i) cattle classed as bovine tuberculosis reactors, inconclusives or dangerous contact animals and (ii) all other mammals (A) between 1986 and 1996 and (B) since 1997. [293860]

Jim Fitzpatrick answered and confirmed an answer which we had already gleaned: that the figure euphemistically labelled 'Compensation' and which is generally accepted as being lobbbed into cattle farmer's pockets, included haulage, valuers fees, disposal of parts not wanted in the food chain - but was net of 'salvage'. Further questions elicited the following reply as to the cost of slaughter v. sales of meat:

Jim Fitzpatrick: No such estimate has been made. For most cattle compulsorily slaughtered on TB control grounds, DEFRA has received a net payment from abattoirs rather than incurred a cost. Meat Hygiene Service officials inspect carcasses of such cattle when slaughtered in licensed abattoirs, a small proportion of TB affected cattle are condemned as unfit for human consumption e.g. if TB lesions are identified in more than one part of the carcase. In such cases DEFRA does makes a payment to the abattoir to cover its disposal costs. It is not possible to provide details of slaughter costs in the form requested: typically an abattoir will receive batches of cattle being slaughtered on disease control grounds rather than single animals—if one (or more) of these animals is condemned, the cost to DEFRA will be offset by the total salvage value received from those passed as fit for human consumption.

So there we have it. A less than transparent method of calculating costs, the general public (and farmers themselves) assuming, quite wrongly, that the published figures for 'Compensation' relate to farmers, when in fact they include many other costs as well. And from abattoirs, no separate credit / debit balances, merely a net figure which was £4.3m last year, for the difference between what they charge Defra for putting cattle through the slaughter line, and the monies obtained for the carcasses. We would say Defra's cost control is as lacking as any effort to stem the tide of infection from a name they dare not speak..

A very rough guide to TB costs, is on the Defra website.
And to really confuse, figures for 'cattle slaughtered' are on a calandar basis (January - December), while associated costs relate to a 'financial year' (March - April)

You really couldn't make it up.