Governmental Responsibilities

While government is spending £1 billion to 'no good effect' and do not have a policy to eradicate let alone control bovine TB, as Lord Rooker explained to EFRAcom in December 2007, their statutory responsibilities are more clearly defined.

This paper is miles long so we will compress it for posting. Apologies that the posting is still extended. The document is a working paper issued late 2006, and clarifies protocol for the eradication of bTB within the member states of the European community. It's purpose is to review general principles of testing cattle, to propose short term measures in order to accelerate the progress of eradication programmes, to draw conclusions on perspectives on eradication and to stimulate discussion on future strategy.

The paper states that the "proposed measures must be explored and assessed based on the individual situation in each Member State (MS) running an eradication programme for bovine tuberculosis". It begins with the legal framework:

1.1. Definition
For the purpose of this document, the definition of bovine tuberculosis (TB) is: “Infection in cattle with any of the disease-causing mycobacterial species within the M. tuberculosis complex”.

1.2. Legal framework

The Community legal framework on TB is formed by legislation on trade of bovine animals:

(Directive 64/432/EEC), legislation on animal products for human consumption (Directive 64/433/EEC, Directive 92/46/EEC and Regulation No. 2004/853/EC) and legislation regarding Community co-financing of eradication programmes (Directive 77/391/EEC and Decision 90/424/EEC).

Background to these directives is given thus:

The first legal initiatives on TB at Community level were aimed at facilitating intracommunity trade among the EEC Member States by establishing comparable health requirements. Council Directive 64/432/EEC defined specific requirements for the trade of cattle in relation to TB and defined the officially tuberculosis-free (TBOF) status of bovine animals and herds. An important further step was Council Directive 77/391/EEC which introduced Community measures for the eradication of brucellosis, tuberculosis and leucosis in cattle. Member States were obliged to draft eradication programmes in order to accelerate, intensify or carry through the eradication of TB.

The paper then goes on to remind Member States, as have we on numerous occasions, that eradication of this most serious of zoonses is not negotiable. It is a statutory duty. And should any Member state ignore its statutory responsibilities the Commission has reserved the right to implement trade bans on its products. In these eradication protocols, after meetings held in 2002, the paper explains that "the Commission works closely to incorporate new methods and to align more with the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) health standards".

Experts attending the Tb eradication workshops held during the 4th International Conference on Mycobacterium bovis provide well focused recommendations:

1. Epidemiological data analysis and monitoring of the progress of most programmes should improve. For this purpose more refined indicators to measure the level of infection and progress of the programme are required.

2. The tuberculin test performs well at the herd level but has limitations when used at the level of the individual animal. Its performance can be improved by increasing the extent of coverage of the total cattle population and the intensity at which the test is applied. Compliance with 64/432/EEC (trading rule) requirements alone does not provide for an optimal testing regime in order to eradicate the disease because of the diversity of situations in different MSs and regions in which it is used.

3. Extended use of IFN γ test on a strategic basis to supplement the tuberculin skin test.

4. Improve the efficiency of slaughterhouse surveillance by focussed training, improved supervision and ensuring effective communication between the meat inspection services and animal health services.

5. The reservoir of infection within wildlife populations should be effectively addressed.

.
The involvement of all sources of bTB is stressed again here:

d) Improvement of the management of infected herds, ensuring that all sources of infection have been removed (e.g. anergic and other non-reactors to tuberculin, including cattle identified on epidemiological grounds, and infected wildlife ) and that measures to avoid reintroduction are in place (wildlife-proof fences), by ensuring proper epidemiological investigation of outbreaks to identify the source of infection and the implementation of a well focussed action plan aimed at stamping out infection in these cases.

e) Improved management of wildlife by strategic removal of infected wild animals.

A system of "rewards and penalties" is floated to encourage stakeholders to take their responsibilities seriously. Fine, as far as it goes, but does that apply equally to governmental responsibilities? From this administration we have seen much of the latter and precious few of the former .... thus far.

Slaughterhouse surveillance is classed as 'vital' particularly in areas not undergoing regularly testing. The paper also recommends many measures which GB is already implementing:

- Use of severe interpretation of the tuberculin test in infected herds and herds at special risk

- Strategic use of the IFN-γ assay

- Increased frequency of herd testing

- Implementation of the pre-movement test in areas and regions of high prevalence

- Definition and application of the epidemiological unit of concern

- More extensive use of epidemiological data analysis: indicators

- Stamping out in infected herds: criteria, application and assessment

- Wildlife removal/alternatives.

- Re-appraisal of compensation schemes

- Re-define and strengthen restrictions on animal movements

The authors stress the efficacy of the intradermal skin test: "The tuberculin test in its various forms is the sole test prescribed in Community legislation. While the tuberculin test has been an effective tool when applied at herd level, a lack of sensitivity at the individual animal level is recognised to be a major limitation of the tuberculin test." They discuss severe interpretation, which is already applied in GB when TB is confirmed either by lesions or culture.

They flirt with the new toy, Gamma interferon assay, pointing out that its parallel use would increase faster removal of reactors over a shorter time scale. Defra parrot this line while ignoring the caveat offered:

However, if concomitant diseases (e.g. paratuberculosis) are present in the herd or cohort under test, this may affect the accuracy and reliability of either or both of these diagnostic tools. Accordingly, this factor should be taken into account.

and:

"Some drawbacks are the additional direct and indirect laboratory-related costs to perform the IFN-γ assay and also the logistic requirements linked to the collection of blood samples, their delivery to the laboratory within a specified period and the conditions of incubation of the samples with appropriate reagents which the assay requires represent a constraint in more remote areas."

... and given the carnage created by Defra's over injudicious interpretation of its new toy, the following may be of interest;

The IFN-γ assay should not be considered for use as a routine screening test in areas or regions where the herd prevalence is low. On the contrary, its use in parallel with the tuberculin test in highly infected areas is recommended as an effective means of attaining a higher Se for the diagnostic regime. Furthermore, in herds already deemed TB-positive, the IFN-γ assay should be considered for use at the first retest in parallel with the tuberculin test on such herds, after the index test, so as to remove the infection with the maximum Se.

We have no problem with that, once the wildlife reservoir has been addressed. But once that has happened, is there any need for the blood test, if testing is regular?
Pre-movement testing is discussed within the context of cost-benefit and/or cost-effectiveness ratio basis, which is recommended.

On whole herd slaughter, or 'stamping out' as the document quaintly sanitises the procedure, attracts the following criteria:

The decision whether to use stamping out or not should be based on a consideration of certain essential criteria that should be defined in advance. The prevalence in the area, the intra-herd prevalence, the persistence of an infected wildlife reservoir, contact with other cattle or susceptible species, the persistence of mycobacteria in the environment under local conditions, the interval before restocking, herd size, enterprise type and the type of husbandry, prevailing bio-security measures, farm security in relation to contiguous holdings (fences) and the ability and willingness of the herdowner(s) to conform with conditions pertaining to the stamping out protocol. Also, account should be taken of additional criteria assessed by the local veterinary services in relation to the decision to proceed with stamping out.

The bottom line to that little gem is contained below, in a phrase which describes the potential 'success' of the programme. The paper predicts:

.... effective eradication of TB provided other sources of infection, such as an infected wildlife reservoir, do not pose a major risk.

....... and if they do? The final decision would be made after consultation "in detail by local or regional veterinary officers when considering whether or not to
apply this option". So that's all right then.

And now to the core of GB's problems, and an elephant in the room which Defra seem unable to get to grips with. The paper describes any source of infection which

"enters into contact with cattle is a major obstacle to the eradication of TB. This obstacle should be addressed in tandem with the measures implemented in relation to the cattle population.

That's 'obstacle' as in badger or Badger Trust, and 'tandem', as in together, at the same time, concurrently and simultaneously. The paper continues that as [wildlife] vaccination is still a while away:

... in order to address the role of infected wildlife in the persistence of TB [measures] should be implemented without any delay so as to allow the progress of the eradication programmes. Removal of wildlife, either proactively or reactively following outbreaks, has proven to be an effective ancillary, and in certain situations necessary, measure to control and eradicate TB.

and:

The elimination or reduction of the risk posed by an infected wildlife reservoir enables the other measures contained in the programme to yield the expected results, whereas the persistence of TB in these wildlife populations impedes the effective elimination of the disease.

Major socio-political resistance (lobbyism) against any measure involving the removal of infected wildlife or interventions affecting the environment are to be expected. The additional costs associated with these actions are not likely to be negligible.

The costs of not removing an infected wildlife reservoir are infinitely greater, both in straight monetary terms or the long term transmission opportunities afforded to its spillover victims. The paper points out that if eradication of this disease is to be achieved then:

Control of infected wildlife species that is based on the strategic removal of members of a selected species in certain areas is nevertheless a necessary and probably unavoidable measure if eradication of TB is to be achieved.

The paper stresses again the use parallel cattle measures. But not one after the other in either direction. GB has the bulk of the cattle measures in place..

Now this next bit is interesting in that the commission paper seeks to 'modify farmer's behaviour' to encourage / discourage transmission opportunities. Interesting concept, and one which, if reference to removing 'obstacles' has snuck under Defra's radar, tweaking compensation will not have.

2.3.9. Re-appraisal of compensation schemes

The re-appraisal of compensation schemes and their alignment with the level of the
herdowner’s cooperation with the eradication programme is necessary. Once adequate compensation is approved, then its payment should be swift. Adequate compensation implies that the compensation does not, in any way, pose an obstacle for the progress and success of the programme.

The compensation scheme should be aimed at modifying the behaviour of the farmers in a way that they do their best to avoid the reintroduction of the disease in their herds. Consequently, a level of compensation that is perceived by the farmers not to be sufficient to allow them to adjust to their new circumstances following the loss of their stock and the imposition of animal restrictions, along with concern associated with the possible reintroduction of the infection, jeopardizes the progress of the programme by engendering an attitude of non-cooperation.

and furthermore - and this is the bit Defra will have picked up on:

Accordingly, it is extremely important to ensure that the level of compensation is the appropriate and serves to encourage farmers to respond to their situation in an appropriate manner that will prevent or considerably reduce future risk of infection. There is also a case to be made that the compensation is conditional on the herdowner’s compliance with stated conditions relating to the prevention of a further outbreak on the holding within a reasonable period. Otherwise, compensation may not be approved, or if approved, would be at a lower rate. Furthermore, compensation should always be at a level below (to a reasonable or, sometimes, significant extent) that of the current market price of comparable healthy animals.

Compensation depending on biosecurity? Against badgers which need a concrete fence sunk 15 feet into the ground at Weybridge to keep them IN?

The conclusions of the paper:

•

Eradication of TB is the target at EU level as laid down in Community legislation.
Eradication should be feasible in the long term despite the fact that different
epidemiological situations in the EU pose certain difficulties that should nevertheless be addressed through specific reinforced measures.

• Requirements of Community legislation are to be considered in the context of the
eradication programmes as the absolute minimum level of measures to be implemented.
Effective eradication programmes should include additional measures aimed at addressing the different constraints to eradication in each epidemiological situation.

• Full involvement of all stakeholders and optimum use of the abattoir as a surveillance resource that is more fully integrated in the eradication programme should be considered as necessary issues to be specifically dealt with in the context of eradication programmes.

• A set of ten specific short-term measures aimed at strengthening current programmes
have been identified. The implementation of some (if not all) of these measures in regions with high prevalence and in which little or no progress has been made in recent years should be addressed. In principle non-implementation of any of these short term measures in areas of high prevalence would require an epidemiologically sound reason, if such a position is to be accepted..

An announcement is expected very soon from Hilary Benn. We confidently expect this to duck the elephant in the room, and concentrate on more severe cattle measures. Equally, as his predecessors have found, and this paper confirms, such measures in isolation from controlling tuberculosis in wildlife, will comprehensively fail and at huge expense to the taxpayer and the industry.

Patience......

Tuberculosis testing of cattle may not show the results either of exposure to m.bovis, or the removal of its source, for several months. So after the RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial staggered to a halt, the full results would be not seen until the next routine test of the cattle herds which were within the triplet areas.

John Bourne was keen to stress that his 'edge effect' (that is the peturbation of shattered social groups of badgers caused by his hit-and-run eight night trapping forays) was a very good reason not to do anything at all with the wildlife reservoir of bTb in this country. But while Bourne is concerned about his 'edges', others have rechecked the data from the trial and found that over time:

Beneficial effects inside culling areas increased in magnitude and detrimental effects were no longer observed on neighbouring lands,

This study of the longer term effects of the ISG's trial was seen as fresh evidence that a cull of badgers in in high-risk areas can be successful at reducing disease incidence in cattle. This is the conclusion of a report from the International Society of Infectious Diseases, which found that the beneficial effect of badger culling on cattle herds lasted for in excess of twelve months, while the 'perturbation effect' so beloved of the ISG, faded rapidly.

Farm Business has the story. Sorry, no direct links (yet).

UPDATE

We have now had sight of the paper and can offer a few more quotes.
Elsevier - a subscription site - has it on web link and state they publish on behalf of the International Society for Infectious Diseases. The paper was received March 20th 2008, received in revised form 3rd. April 2008 and accepted for publication 9th. April 2008 in the society journal, the International Journal of Infectious Diseases.

The lead author is to be cited as 'Jenkins, HE et al. The et al being Rosie Woodroffe and Christl Donnelly - late of ISG fame. The title "The effects of annual widespread badger culls on cattle tuberculosis following the cessation of culling.

The paper looked at the trial data for each of the years in which it tried to cull badgers, and then ran the TB incidence in cattle data onwards for each of a further two years at Defra's request and taxpayer's cost.

The estimated effects on cattle TB of culling badgers within the cull areas during the trial increased over the time frame from a modest 3.6 percent in its first year, to 31.8 percent from the 4th to final year. But two years later that effect had increased to 60.8 per cent.

Conversley the 'edge' effect, unique to the ISG 8 night cage trap fiasco, caused 43.9percent increase in breakdowns up to 2 km outside the triplet zone in the first year of culling, falling to 17.3 percent in the 4th - final year's scrape up.
But within two years, that negative effect had somersualted to a (minus) -30.1 percent incidence outside the proactive zones.

The summary results:

"During the post trial period, cattle TB inside culled areas was reduced,[] to an extent significantly greater than during culling. In neighbouring areas, elevated risks observed during culling were not observed post trial [].

And concludes:

Although to-date the overall benefits of culling remain modest, they were greater than was apparent during the culling period alone. Continued monitoring will demonstrate how long beneficial effects last, indicating the overall capacity of such culling to to reduce cattle TB incidence.

Update (2) The paper's author and a link to her work - an extension of the ISG results - can be seen here

The number of cattle slaughtered in GB increased from just 638 in 1986 to 3,760 in 1997 during the so called 'Interim Strategy' while government were making up their minds who was pulling their strings. Then a £1 million bung from the Political Animal Lobby brought a moratorium on badger culling in response to outbreaks of confirmed bTb, which has remained - hidden under the skirts of the RBCT.

During the following decade, cattle slaughterings rocketed to a staggering 28,175 in 2007. And 2008 is on course for another 20 per cent increase.

The NFU is using the ISID report to re-issue a call for the Government to finally make up its mind and allow selective culling to target TB hotspots in England and Wales. GB's 'patience' is running out....

Heil Hilary?

In a positively bizarre stroke, this week it has come to our attention that the 'Thought Police' have descended on our very own Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). A circular instruction has been issued to all staff, which will filter from DVMs right down to local vets holding LVI status that regardless what the announcement from on high is, they must 'support it'. Unconditionally, unquestioningly and wholeheartedly.

We understand that the instruction is quite explicit in that all Animal Health staff who come into contact with 'customers' either by phone or in person, will not be expected to offer any disagreement with Defras's yet-to-announced-position, at any stage of the communication process.

So farmers are now relabelled 'customers'? Supermarkets have 'customers', and 'customers' have a choice. They can go next door if they don't like the product. This is a Government Department with responsibilities it prefers to shirk, but more importantly no alternative source for its 'customers'. But we digress. Just what is the impending anouncement about which the staff of Animal Health must not speak, think unpositive thoughts or utter anything other than unconditional support for?

The future Governemnt strategy for TB control, and the roll - if any - of badger culling of course.

A strategy of any sort would be an improvement on the last twenty years. During that time MAFF, now rebranded Defra, have twisted every which way to avoid their statutory responsibility, which is to have a positive eradication policy for bovine tuberculosis. Culling ever more cattle just doesn't cut it, while infected badgers are awarded cult status and their ancestral home, a Grade 1 listing.

Aghast at the return to the type of jackboot mentality which crushed rational thought and behaviour in the last century, Farmers Guardian has the story.

May one assume that the 400 LVI vets who signed a letter to the Chief Veterinary Officer in 2005, expressing deep concern about lack of government policy on BTb are equally willing to obey 'his masters voice' - whatever that may say?

Their letter ended with the scathing observation that forty years ago, a government feeling its way into a policy on bTb was "understandable". But given the accumulated knowledge acquired over decades, which they outlined in the letter they describe it now as "incomprehensible".

And Defra would appear to intend it stays that way. Heil, mein Fuhrer. Heil Hilary...

The 'Early detection' potential of gammaIFN

Following our postings below on Defra's newly discovered love affair with gammaIFN, and its subsequent carnage , the twitterings spirited defence of the test from London continues to concentrate on its ability to facilitate 'early detection' of Tb. In written parliamentary questions - the answering incorrectly of which is a hanging offence - an epidemiological roadmap of bTb has emerged, which has proved most useful.

Dec 2003: Column 218W

Mr. Paterson: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs what plans she has to replace the TB skin test used on cattle as a preliminary diagnostic aid with a more accurate and sensitive test. [141969]

Mr. Bradshaw: Improved diagnosis of TB in cattle is a major objective of Defra's wide-ranging research programme. The current most promising candidate is the gamma interferon test, a laboratory-based blood test that measures the immune response to M. bovis (the causative agent for bovine TB) of T-cells in cattle blood.

This test was officially recognised by the EU in July 2002, but only for use as a supplement to the Single Intradermal Comparative Cervical Test (SICCT) in TB affected herds. The test is considered more sensitive than the SICCT, but less specific, meaning that it results in a higher probability of false positives. For this reason, the gamma interferon test cannot be used on its own as a screening test for TB for the time being.

So, a supplementary test with a higher probability of delivering false positives, but are Defra correct in informing their ministers and the public that gammaIFN will detect Tb at an 'earlier stage'. No. From answers to written parliamentary questions, they are not.

23rd March 2004: Column 689W
Mr. Paterson: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs how long after exposure to an infective dose of M.Bovis bacilli a bovine animal becomes infectious, and what the typical duration of infectivity is [159074]

Mr. Bradshaw: Published figures for the time from exposure to being infectious include 87 - 226 days after natural exposure in a United Kingdom study.[ ] The typical duration of infectivity is not known.

Now we are sure you don't need reminding that Tony Yewdall's cattle waited in limbo for at least six months before slaughter, as did those of the Somerset based Burrough Farm Partnership. And we have discussed before the latency of the skin test as being a published 30 - 50days from exposure to flagging up an immune response to a bovine tuberculin antigen jab. (Gamma has a latency of approx 28 days) The maximum exposure window for these cattle, could have been that length of time before the previous skin test which may have been at 60 days, six months, a year or several years, depending on herd and parish disease status.

Only 7 of 177 cattle slaughtered after gamma bloods had visible signs of Tb. And those were not necessarily at an infectious stage. How long had they been waiting? The thick end of eight months - or 240 days from the latest possible exposure. And how long did PQs tell us was the maximum time of an animal becoming infectious after natural exposure? Yup, you read it correctly. A range " 87 - 226 days ".

So we repeat - as does our big sister site, what an appalling, absolutely avoidable waste.

Bring on the clowns...

Periodically, Defra produce a Departmental Report which sets out PSAs (Public Service Agreements) which are then presented to parliament.
The 2008 report gives an overview of Defra's activities 2007-08 and looks ahead to what they hope to achieve in 2008-09.

The report highlights Defra's target for bTb thus:

A reduction in the spread of Bovine tuberculous (TB) to new parishes to below the incremental trend of 17.5 confirmed new incidents per annum by the end of 2008.

A singularly modest aim, in which they award an overall self assessment described as 'On Course'. But while a great deal of back slapping and self congratulation may take place in the corridors of Noble House, or wherever they hang their hats presently, out here in the sticks things are far from rosy.

On a different part of Defra's labyrinthine website are the figures for Tb reactors tabulated over nine years. And they certainly do not give the impression of being 'on course' for anything at all except total annhilation of the UK cattle industry. Official figures show a staggering increase in cattle slaughtered, especially in new areas.

In 1998 GB recorded 6191 animals culled as reactors, IRs or DCs. But in 2007 that figure had increased to 28,200 - and increase of 355 per cent.

The West region suffered worst losses, with 4339 cattle slaughtered in the year after the moratorium of badger culling, while the 2007 figure had jumped to 16,492. But despite Defra's warm assurances, areas not particularly affected by TB in 1997 showed much bigger increases, with Wales jumping from 1046 cattle slaughtered nine years ago to 7913 last year. And in the Eastern region of the UK, from just 81 cattle slaughtered in 1997, a staggering 1162 per cent increase took that figure to 1022 last year.

And the TB figures for March are not in any way 'on course' for a decrease with GB recording an extra 579 herds under restriction due to a 'Tb incident' in the first three months of the year. Cattle slaughtered jumped by 24.5 per cent, from 7816 to 9732 and that on less herds and less cattle tested.

So 'On Course' we feel is a comfort blanket too many. For sure 1400 staff have had the push, so that's saved on wage bills, but with a disease increase of the magnitude we have outlined and its associated costs, 'on course' depends aspirations, expectations and on high one puts the bar.

And from where we sit, that is barely off the ground.

More comment on this story fromFarmers Guardian

Carnage

... or death by one thousand cuts. Today, over 80 of Tony Yewdall's newly calved pedigree guernsey cattle were slaughtered. We covered the story of this farm's Tb problems here in 2004, but last November two further reactors were identified by the skin test. Defra moved in to blood test the cattle. Why, when the herd had ongoing Tb problems, a history of Johnnes disease and hundreds of badgers, is for them to comment on. Not the brightest idea, one would have thought. The result was a far cry from a couple of reactors identified by the primary skin test. A devastating 89 cattle failed the blood test.

This led to the appeal in the High Court last month, on behalf of several farmers including Mr. Yewdall, who requested a judicial review into the use of this test. Meanwhile the cattle have been in isolation and on regular Defra watch pending the outcome which we covered in this posting.

The farcical failure of this appeal for Common law over disputed statute, is one of life's mysteries. And today, Tony Yewdall's cattlepaid the price.

South west newspaper, Western Morning News carried the story:

Today, the Yewdalls are debating whether to remain in the business amid the double blow of losing a third of their valuable dairy herd and the fear many of them may be perfectly healthy. Mr Yewdall, who successfully resisted having his herd culled during the foot and mouth crisis, said today's blow could be the last straw. "It's a difficult decision, but getting out of farming is certainly an option," he said. "We will have to see what happens with TB in the future. The really hard thing is that we question how many of these animals actually have TB, and that won't be answered until tests are carried out once they are dead.It's a dreadful situation for us."

His son, Jonnie Yewdall, estimated the episode would cost the family about £100,000 -particularly as Defra is paying the [tabular] compensation value for each cow based on November's prices, which were lower than today's.

He said the family had offered to pay for a retest privately, but Defra had refused to grant the necessary authority to do so. "Why would they refuse if they are confident in their results?" he asked.

"Nobody's doing anything to stop badgers spreading TB to cattle. If we carry on in farming, it's as if we're sentencing our cows to a premature death. It's like banging your head against a wall."

A Defra spokeswoman defended the differences between the skin test and the blood test, known as the gamma interferon test. She said:

"Research shows the two tests identify different populations of infected cattle. The gamma interferon test can identify infected animals at an earlier stage in the disease as well as infected cattle that simply fail to react to the skin test. In herds with confirmed infection, the use of both tests in parallel offers the best prospect of detecting all infected at the earliest opportunity."

Well she would say that wouldn't she? Sheesh - that 'earliest opportunity' is just 12 days. The difference between the latency of the skin test (picking up exposure to m.bovis) at 30 - 50 days post exposure, and gamma at 28 days average. Of course it also, as that shambles of a Pilot study found, picks up a whole shed load of other contaminants and relabels them 'm.bovis'.

And joining in the clamour to use this bluntest of blunt instruments, is none other than our old friend, Trevor. Yup, Mr. Lawson loves it, arguing that gamma interferon

"... provides a very rapid and very reliable test for bovine
TB.It only requires one visit from the vet and the results can be ready in 48 hours. Furthermore, the cut-off point for the test can be adjusted, so that a 'false positive' diagnosis can be virtually eliminated. Although this does mean that some infected animals could be missed, it is still far better than the skin test, which misses around one third of infected cattle. If a positive diagnosis were in doubt, it could then be verified by a more specific gamma interferon test to minimise the risk of slaughtering a healthy animal."

Although we are delighted that our Trevor has concerns about slaughtering healthy cattle, his spin interpretation of the test sounds to good to be true. And of course it is. We are not sure which planet - or should that be sett? - Trevor Lawson inhabits but not the same one as the rest of us. Flexibility? Not on this watch. And not at all in Tony Yewdall's case. Cut-off point adjusted? Nope. It's set at 0.1 and not adjusted for farm circumstance, contaminant circumstance or any other goddamn circumstance. False positives virtually eliminated? Well, we'll see. Skin test reactors show about half +/- 50 percent to have confirmed disease, compared with 18.6 percent 'reactors' to gamma. As Mr. Yewdall said, only postmortems will tell the whole story. These cattle failed the blood test in November. Six months ago. They were slaughtered today. And if Defra are right, every last one should have developed full blown disease, defined by Visible Lesions or cultured samples. And of course that will be the end of Mr. Yewdall's Tb problems won't it? The blood test having hoovered up all the cattle the skin test failed to find? Not necessarily. In fact highly unlikely. And that 'thirty percent of cattle' that the skin allegedly misses ? Selective spin. For goodness sake man. Get a grip. Or better still read this

But we are not alone in wishing that a blood test would sort the problem out - the problem of 50 per cent of skin test reactors proving negative to tuberculosis on postmortem would be a good start. (94 per cent of ours) But it won't. In fact the rigid cut off may actually target cattle which have acquired a degree of resistance to TB infection, so it could actually be counter-productive. There will still be infected animals on Tony Yewdall's farm - but they won't be the cattle...

An MRCVS veterinary surgeon described his experience of the gamma test thus;

All my clients who were ‘conned’ into having the blood test - one twice -lost many times (10/20? times) more cattle than would have been expected and therefore necessary. All of them still have a TB problem in their herds. None would “go down that route again”.
One client with a long standing, ongoing problem, had had tuberculin tests virtually every 60 days for the previous 4 years. A tuberculin test with 2 reactors, was followed 21 days later with a blood test with 23 more ‘reactors’. 41 days later, I found 27 more reactors of which 13 had lesions. There was a lot of badger activity.

Until the infected badgers are culled there is no place for the blood test. When they have been culled there will be no need for the blood test!

We will add more links from other publications on this story, as we get them.

UPDATE
The postmortem results on Mr. Yewdall's cattle are now to hand. After 6 months in isolation, just 2 cattle had Visible Lesions and a further 3 were found to have the very beginnings of small closed granulomas. Over 80 cattle were slaughtered in this carnage - as 'reactors' to the secondary, ancillary gamma interferon blood test. They had survived under an injunction for the best part of eight months in which the opportunity was there to produce full blown disease and prove Defra's point.

What a splendid result for our beloved Defra.
What a total waste of £200,000 for the UK taxpayer.
What a devastating and irreplaceable waste for the Yewdall family.

And a similar result has come from the Burrow Farm Organic Partnership, whose case for a Judicial Review of the secondary, ancillary blood test after some more spectacular results failed last month.

88 cattle went for slaughter this week. Just two had visible lesions consistent with confirmed tuberculosis. These cattle, as with the Yewdall's herd, had been in isolation for several months, pending the court decision. Defra's defence of this brutal of blunt instruments as 'flagging up early detection' of Tb, is looking decidedly thin.
See also comment below from a farmer who kept a gamma postive cow for twelve months, arguing for a skin retest. The animal was negative on both VL and culture but at postmortem was found to have harmless epidermal granulomas known as 'skin tb'.

We did entitle this posting 'carnage'....

More on this story from Christopher Booker's Notebook
in the Sunday Telegraph.

Top of the pile

Farmers Guardian this week carries an exclusive report into a prize winning dairy herd near Cardigan in SW Wales. In last year's National Milk Records competitions for Pembrokeshire, the Vaughan family's 'Cilast' herd swept the board, winning five classes, including the overall large herds section, and being placed second or third in eight others, based both on inspection and production criteria.
But the Vaughan family are now among the top contenders for another title – one that no-one wants to hold. Since a bTb breakdown in 2001, a total of 521 of their prize winning cattle have been slaughtered, with 366 going since last August - when the cattle were judged for the NMR competitions.

The farms lie near the Pembrokeshire border with Carmarthenshire, which is at the heart of Wales' 'hot-spot' areas, and after this latest devastating clearout, the sheer numbers of cattle affected probably ranks the herd as one of, if not the worst, of Britain's cattle herds devastated by bTb, which of course remains unchecked in its maintenance reservoir.


Farming as Cilast, the family’s 550-acre, two-farm dairying operation based at Boncath, not far from where Pembrokeshire borders on both Ceredigion and Carmarthenshire, lies at the heart of one of the country’s top ‘hotspot’ areas for the disease.

The Vaughans have no doubt either that infected wildlife is the most likely cause of their prolonged misery. Evidence of badger activity has been seen on the land and the farm has 50 acres of woodland.

Such reasoning is backed, too, by the fact that ever since Mr and Mrs Vaughan first began keeping pedigree black and whites 40 years ago – based on Hunday breeding – the emphasis has been on maintaining a closed herd. That was certainly the case in the run-up to the first case of TB being diagnosed back in 2001, when four animals were taken out.

After that initial breakdown, in a herd with no bought in cattle, the relentless round of 60 day testing clanked into action. And doing exactly what it says on the tin, the skin test picked up a further 15 animals with exposure to Tb. In 2003, 35 were lost and 15 in 2004. It was then that the number of cases started to explode.

In 2005 the figure jumped to 44 and in 2006 a further 26 failed the testing. Last year eight went in February, another eight in May, 74 in August, and 65 in October – before hitting three figures in December when 106 cattle went for slaughter. Another 106 failed in January this year, 10 in February and five in March.
Of the 366 slaughtered since last August, 250 have been milkers – 47 classified as Excellent, 103 VG and 36 VG two-year olds.

By any standards these were superb cattle. And after six years exposure to an increasing burden of Tb infection in the wildlife sharing their habitat, they are dead. Three quarters of this long established and home bred herd have gone - on the altar of prevarication and political expediency. Farmers Guardian continues:

The consequence is that the heart has been ripped out of a herd proud of its pedigree status and riding high as a result of the selective breeding that has gone into moulding such a high-flying herd with an average yield consistently topping the 9,700 litre mark. Such decimation means that two-thirds of the unit’s fully-modernised cubicle housing is now lying empty, more than £300,000 has been lost in milk sales in the past six months alone and there is no longer enough work for an employee.

Having been in the same position - but on a smaller scale - as the Vaughan family, we understand their feelings and utter frustration. Barry Alston's full report and pictures can be read here

His master's voice - GammaIFN

We have deliberately not posted much about the gamma interferon blood test, pending the result of a court ruling. The case sought a Judicial Review into some quite extraordinary results of its use experienced by some farms, unlucky enough to have it inflicted on their cattle herds.

One such was the Somerset based Higher Burrow Organic Farmering Partnership, where over 430 animals were tested late last year. Of those, 14 had a positive skin test result. But in accordance with Defra policy of using the newly approved blood test as a herd test in such cases, the cattle underwent parallel GammaIFN testing. The results showed that 86 were positive, while eight results were indeterminate.

Concerned farmers in several herds so affected, requested the primary skin test as backup, as the disparity between the blood test results and intradermal skin test was so great. Defra said no and ordered slaughter. So for months several farms have been snarled up with hundreds of cattle awaiting the results of last week's request to the High Court for a Judicial Review into that apparent disparity.

Newspaper reports which covered the story quote:

Hugh Mercer QC, for High Burrow, who said the two sets of tests showed "a massive disparity". Slaughter without re-testing would be "unlawful, irrational and disproportionate".

The case has been adjourned once already, so that reams of "evidence" could be cogitated and digested, but in one fell swoop, last week, sitting judge, Mr. Justice Mittings dismissed the request saying "the policy is lawful".

He said: "The policy is lawful. The outcome – unhappy and potentially disastrous though it may be – flows from it."

So what of this policy? Where did it have its roots and how was it trialled in the UK?

Defra will say that the blood test was "developed in Australia in the 1980's", but what they are not so keen to explore is that Australia achieved Tb free status ahead of its licensing, using the intradermal skin test - and a clearance of feral cattle and water buffalo, acting as a maintenance reservoir of tuberculosis. Australia also has a hugely different environment from the UK, with many less contaminants to affect the test results.

But in 2006, Defra began a pilot study known as SB4021. They snuck under the radar of 24 farms in 3/4 year testing areas, using bloods from other testing regimes, and tested for bovine Tb. In these areas they would not have expected to find anything at all, but they did. In fact seven percent of samples proved positive. As this test was not a recognised diagnostic test at the time, they could not confirm their findings with slaughter. Specificity and sensitivety of any diagnostic test are interlinked values, but the authors of the report had a much better idea. Chuck out omit any results which didn't fit the expected result. These included cattle from areas of high Tb incidence which may have encountered a sniff of m.bovis , and also postives - up to 25 per cent in a few herds - to another micobacterium which was subsequently identified as M. kansassii (5.4).

The pilot study indicated vastly differing results for length of time in transit of bloods, possible co contamination with recent skin tests, and several other known contaminants including skin granulomas, the precence of antibodies or vaccinates to Johnnes disease (M. avium paratuberculosis) and certain mosses - as well as M. kansassii.

No post mortems were carried out to confirm their results, but Defra presented this ragbag of selectively culled information to the the Standing Veterinary Committee of the EU for approval as a secondary diagnostic test for bTb.

As a secondary test, a gamma negative animal still requires a primary intradermal skin test to regain its status, yet in the bizarre world inhabited by Defra, a postive result means the chop. And this is at the root of what the farmers challenging official Defra policy last week in the High Court were asking for. Parity for both animals, particularly as the bloods had shown such, err - disparity, of results.

Mr. Justice Mittings described Defra's decision to slaughter the animals as

"not only lawful but mandatory".

Mandatory under EU law, based on a small "pilot study" which excluded or ignored results which it did not expect? Rock solid science then.

The blood test was sold to an unsuspecting industry as "flexible in interpretation", but we see little sign of that, with a fixed cut off point now applied and no allowances made for other known contaminants. It was also described as picking up "very early cases". But that too turns out to be somewhat of an exaggeration. The difference between the latency of the intradermal skin test and gammaIFN is about two weeks, with the skin test averaging 42 days and gamma 28 in experimentally infected animals.

But a delicious twist has given one farmer in the queue for a re-test using the primary intradermal skin test, exactly what he wanted. While the cattle at Higher Burrow await their fate, 31 cattle at Tom Maidment's farm in Wiltshire have been retested. Mr. Maidment and his vets had engaged in long correspondence with Defra (London) and Defra (Veterinary Laboratories Agency) but not the clerks at the local AHO who, very obligingly, when the 60 day re-test was due, ordered Mr. Maidment to - err, retest his cattle.

Only too keen to oblige, Mr. Maidment's cattle were skin tested and the results interpreted under severe interpretation. All were clear. All passed. No lumps. Anywhere. Not one.

Which makes Mr. Justice Mittings' statement:

there was no evidence that those blood tests might, if retaken, prove negative...

rather timely. (Or had the learned judge not realised that the last thing the farmers were asking for was another blood test, but the primary skin test?)

And which is probably why, when assessing the relative accuracy of the gammaIFN blood test, Defra are not so keen to reveal that while about half (48 - 51 percent)skin test reactors slaughtered show VL (visible lesions) from the cattle's exposure to M. bovis, at post mortem, 81.4 percent of cattle slaughtered as gamma reactors show no sign of disease whatsoever.

Devil in the detail?

We mentioned that phrase in relation to our posting below, on the Welsh Assembly's announcement this week of a pilot cull of badgers in an as yet undefined ' hotspot', and a more thorough examination of the full announcement has churned out a couple of 'devils'.

We believe that the most effective measure to address both sources of infection and cross-infection, subject to strict regulation and meeting a number of requirements, would be a targeted cull of badgers in TB high incidence areas. To take this forward we will prioritise the establishment of an intensive action pilot in an area which has been identified as a TB hotspot. No final decision has yet been made about a location capable of satisfying these criteria but I anticipate it would be in a defined high incidence area for the disease and subject to strict conditions. Additional areas will not be considered until the implementation and robust review and a proper evaluation of the cull and the other measures in the intensive action pilot area has been undertaken.

'Strict regulation and meeting of requirements' sounds suspiciously like a number of bureaucratic boxes must be ticked conditions must be met prior to any action on a wildlife reservoir on tuberculosis. And if, after the pilot cull takes place, these conditions cannot be met in other areas? What then?
The paper continues:

Action by government alone will not eradicate bovine TB. I want to reform the compensation regime to encourage herd owners to follow best practice. By the end of 2008 plans will be published to amend the current system to ensure compensation arrangements encourage herd owners to comply with legal and best practice requirements. I will also take action to further address the concerns about the abuse to the TB compensation system as highlighted by the report of the National Audit Office in 2003.

That sounds like tabular valuations are on the way, and any compulsory purchase monies will be dependent upon an assessor's opinion of a farm's biosecurity. But the really big 'devil' is in the final sentence of this next paragraph.

We will also be taking forward other measures such as the development and promotion of improved husbandry and biosecurity practices to make sure that cattle owners know what to do to reduce the risk of the introduction of the disease onto their farms, or to manage existing disease. This will include from 2009 the publication of infected farms and the compensation paid.

So, publication of the farms under Tb restriction. A death knell to a pedigree breeder selling bulls or top notch breeding females? So, it looks to us like the Welsh Assembly have used a very big stick of possibly reduced compulsory purchase monies which will be totally dependent upon increased biosecurity and the threat of the publicity of both, should infected stripeys break through the cordon.

Like our own beloved Defra, the Welsh Assembly speak of 'partnership' but are more than willing to use any means possible to beat the industry into submission, in this instance over a situation not of their making, nor under their control. Defra used the tabular valuation paperwork in England to obtain a farmer's signature prior to slaughter of a reactor and knowledge of amount of compulsory purchase monies paid, and it looks very much as if the Assembly will follow suit. Even to the extent of 'no signature means no payment at all, and if you sign it will be published'. A very unequal partnership we think, and at a time when many farmers are pushed to the brink of emotional overload by the restrictions imposed by a Tb breakdown.

It would seem to us that the various sides (and there should be only one) in this debate are posturing through the motions. The Badger Trust rocking their pram and throwing out unsubstantiated, emotional rubbish at a gullible public, and the farming unions playing along with what may turn out to be an unworkable political mishmash in the hope of implanting a backbone into the wavering frame of our own Hilary Benn.

A link to the Welsh Assembly full statement (pdf) is here.

From 669 to 7905 in ten years.

Those figures are for cattle slaughtered in Wales as reactors to the Tb test. A corresponding rise in the expense associated with the disease is reflected by the compulsory purchase figures: up from £1.3 million in 1999/2000 to a staggering £15.2 million in 2007. As the bandwagon of testing, slaughter, transport, postmortems, sampling, culturing samples, paperwork and tracing trundles on, the final tally of the disease to the Welsh Assembly is approaching a figure which is unsustainable. And today, they have called a halt.

The Rural Affairs Minister, Elin Jones, announced a pilot badger cull in the worst affected areas BBC Wales reports.

Commenting that tackling the disease has become extremely contentious, the minister also announced a 'one off' test of all Welsh cattle herds "to assess the extent of infection."

After that, a pilot badger cull would be carried out within 'hard' natural or man made boundaries - as yet undefined.

Commenting on the present situation at a press briefing today, the Chief Veterinary Officer for Wales Christianne Glossop said:

... bovine TB was out of control and the current policy was not working.
Incidents had increased dramatically over the last decade. Compensation payments to farmers have risen from £1.3m in 1999-2000 to £15.2m in 2007-2008, and last year 7,905 cattle were slaughtered in Wales, up from 669 in 1997.

We have not posted the Tb figures for 2007, but inevitably with a non-policy of an annual cull of sentinel cattle masquerading as 'eradication' of a disease housed comfortably in a wildlife maintenance reservoir, they are up. England had a total of 8.5 percent of its cattle herds under restriction 'due to a Tb incident' at some time during 2007, while Wales posted 10.8 percent.

In both regions, certain areas bore the brunt of the cattle carnage and movement restrictions. The West region of England recorded 18.6 percent of its herds affected with Gloucestershire and Hereford / Worcs. recording 27.5 percent and 26.4 percent respectively. Devon and Cornwall at 23 and 19.5 percent followed.

The Welsh problems are worse in the far West, with Dyfyd having 15.4 percent of its herds affected last year: North Wales recorded 3.7 percent having a restriction due to a Tb incident. Gwent and South Powys are also high and all areas are rising.

One wonders what description Elin Jones and CVO Christianne Glossop would award to the English figures, particularly the area around the river Severn, so spectacularly flooded last summer? Glos and Hereford / Worcs record up to 27 per cent of herds affected. The worst area of Wales is 15.4 percent and considered 'out of control' ... but we digress, our Minister is considering the situation and our CVO has yet to comment.

As well as a blanket sweep of cattle testing across Wales to ascertain the scale of the problem, the Welsh Assembly also announced:

a reform of the compulsory purchase regime for farmers whose infected cows were slaughtered to "encourage herd owners to comply with legal and best practice requirements".

Not sure exactly what that means. Wales is not on tabular valuation, and still operates a valuer system. Time will tell, and devil may be in the detail.

Ms. Jones pointed out that bTb in Wales would cost more than £30m by 2012 if it grew at the present "unsustainable" rate. The coalition deal between Labour and Plaid Cymru in the Welsh Assembly Government has led to a commitment to attempt to eradicate TB in cattle, with £27m being allocated over the next three years for this purpose.

The comments attributed to this announcement were predictable, with NFU Cymru and the Farmers Union of Wales welcoming plans for a proactive approach, while 'conservationists' - of Tb infested wildlife? Sheesh, what's to conserve in an animal riddled with tuberculosis? - and of course the Badger Trust, threw teddies out of their respective prams, describing their chosen species as 'victims of modern intensive farming'.

More on this story from The Times

Critics argue that culling trials have shown that the approach simply prompts badgers to move to new areas, spreading the disease. The RSPCA also condemned the decision and said it flew in the face of sound scientific judgment. Rob Atkinson, its head of wildlife science, said: “We are not a bunch of badger-huggers. Our opposition to a badger cull is based on solid science, not sentiment.”

That would be the 'solid science' which led to the RSPCA being censured by the Advertising Standards Authority in 2006 and the Charity Commission in 2007 for publishing misleading information its Back Off Badgers campaign? And certainly the RBCT Badger Dispersal Exercise showed us all how NOT to deal with infected badger communities. Eight nights hit-and-run visits using cage traps, repeated very occasionally, if at all, was the sole reason for the predictable chaos and the spread of disease. The Times article continues with the view of the Welsh CVO:

But Christianne Glossop, Chief Veterinary Officer for Wales, who announced the decision with Elin Jones, Welsh Rural Affairs Minister, said that “doing nothing was not an option. We know there’s a link between infection in cattle and infection in badgers. It’s true in Great Britain and it’s true in Ireland,” she said. “The aim is healthy cattle, healthy badgers and healthy people.”

Amen to that.

VAWM's reply to EFRAcom.

We are grateful for sight of the press release from VAWM (Veterinary Association for Wildlife Management) in reply to the long awaited EFRA committee report into bTb.

Given the conflicting conclusions on how to tackle bovine TB in this country from the Independent Scientific Group and the former Chief Scientist, Sir David King it is perhaps hardly surprising that a committee of MPs has recently produced a comprehensive, 67 page report that encompasses all the options for tackling the disease (Fourth report of the Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2007-08). However at least it brings the most important option into play – the necessity of tackling the huge reservoir of infection in the badger population. But it is a pity that it has been fogged by all the other options such as more and more cattle testing, biosecurity and vaccination, two of which together, cattle testing and biosecurity, have been shown to be wholly inadequate in tackling the disease to date. And there are good reasons set out in our last statement why vaccination of cattle is unlikely ever to be a realistic option.

We would remind readers just how "inadequate" waste-of-money-useless
and all-been-done before cattle measures in isolation from action on the maintenance reservoir of bTb actually is. But VAWM takes no prisoners, describing bTb as "not a complex disease".

In spite of what some, including EFRACom, would have one believe, bovine TB is not a complex disease. It is caused by a single organism Mycobacterium bovis and the major wildlife reservoir of infection in this country is the badger. It was almost eradicated in the mid 80s by a sustained policy of cattle testing using the intradermal skin test and slaughter of reactors, accompanied by a policy of culling infected badger populations. And there is no reason why the same approach cannot succeed two decades later in spite of the hugely increased scale of the problem that has been allowed to develop. As the Irish have shown where there’s a will there’s a way.

They continue:

We have already given our support to the 7 point plan recently set out by the NFU and other farming interests but it is now hard to envisage how this has much chance of success given all the constraints recommended by EFRACom on any badger culling and the knowledge, revealed in the report, that the Government has abdicated all responsibility for logistical support – hardly the commitment by Government to fight the disease, declared elsewhere in the report.

VAWM conclude with a point that has puzzled and astonished us in equal measure. EFRAcom has interviewed the so-called 'sides' of this debate to distraction. The Badger Trust have been wheeled out to spar with the NFU and the ISG to educate the politicians as to the difference between 'science' and 'political science'. The RSPCA make regular visits - as do representatives of numerous universities, all of whom benefit from the taxpayer's largesse. But to our knowledge, no-one with hands on experience of bTb in the field has appeared to give evidence. In fact disappointingly, EFRAcom turned down an offer from two leading scientists / epidemiologists with a wealth of experience some weeks ago seemingly preferring to listen to desk jockeys with electronic abacuses to play with.

Finally we are astonished to note that the committee does not appear to have consulted any veterinary organisation outside of DEFRA and the VLA. Instead they have sought the opinions of two non veterinary, single issue organisations the Badger Trust and RSPCA, who have no apparent concern for the insidious disease that is endemic in parts of the badger population, one of which, the RSPCA, was censured by the Advertising Standards Authority in 2006 and the Charity Commission in 2007 for publishing misleading information on the transmission of bovine TB.

For further information see: www.vet-wildlifemanagement.org.uk

A superb overview we think. 'Conflicting' science, 'fogged' by more dead cattle and a both-hands-tied approach to controlling bTb in badgers, leading to 'constraints' designed to prolong the status quo.. And all brought about by trying to placate the people least affected by the disease and kick government responsibility for a notifiable zoonosis firmly into the long grass.

Defra must 'Spend to Save'

The main message from the EFRAcom final report was that government must not shirk its responsibility with regard to the control of bTb. They must, said chairman Michael Jack MP, 'spend to save'.

"Defra currently faces budgetary pressures. However, simply saying that more money cannot be found for spending on measures to control cattle Tb is not a solution. The measures we have recommended will require an increase in financial support from Defra. However, this is necessary if governemnt wants to avoid ever increasing expenditure forecast in future years, which could total £1 billion between now and 2013."

.
A VLA (Veterinary Laboratories Agency) forecast quoted in the report, suggests 9 million cattle tests may be carried out by 2010 (just two years hence) with the number of reactor animals rising to 66,000.

The ISG's final report into its ten year RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial, after pumping data comprising 2 parts cattle to 1 part badger through a mathematical model, announced with great confidence that the problem could be attributed to - errr 40 per cent badgers and 60 per cent cattle. Furthermore, with more draconian cattle measures, the incidence of bTb could be reduced by 15 percent.

For those who may have missed the ISG proposals, we list them again - as does the EFRA report.

* High and low risk zones could be created and the movement of cattle from high risk to low risk areas should be prohibited. The ISG acknowledged that this would protect low risk areas, but could exacebate the incidence of disease in high risk areas.

* As a variation on the above, individual farms could be categorised as high or low risk (eg. disease free for three or four years and at low risk of a cattle breakdown) and movement controlled between the two categories. Thus, disease free farms in high risk areas (i.e Tb hotspots) would not be prevented from trading with farms in low risk areas.

* Pre-movement testing in high risk areas, or areas with a recent history of cattle TB, should involve the combined use of tuberculin skin testing and the gamma interferon test.

* Post movement testing should be introduced in some situations using both the tuberculin test and gamma interferon test.

* Additional measures such as the introduction of whole herd slaughter should be considered for multiple reactor herds in low risk areas.

* Surveillance testing in low risk areas should be more frequent than it is is now, with testing intervals at a maximum of three years, or even annually should no additional movement controls be introduced.

* Annual testing applied to all herds in high risk areas.

* In high risk areas, gamma interferon testing should be used in herds with one or two reactors and no previous history of breakdowns, in order to identify all infected cattle.

Efra's report concludes from that shopping list that "current cattle-based measures are strengthened if we are to stop the spread of cattle TB into low risk areas." They go on to recommend post movement testing to alleviate this - a point with which we agree. However it may be timely to point out (again) that cattle measures such as suggested by the ISG, although a seductively and persuasively easy solution, have been tried before and simply do not work.

Neither is the concept of cattle doing handstands around the country and spreading bTb, borne out by the painstaking data analysis carried out at VLA, of 30 years of spoligotyping m.bovis type strains from badgers and cattle.

So where exactly is Defra being advised to 'spend' taxpayer's cash? More gamma interferon. Why? Until infected badgers are culled there is no place for the blood test. When they have been culled there will be no need for the blood test. Efra's report quite rightly reminds Government of its responsibilities, while arguing for the greater use of a test with low specificity, of marginally less latency than the intradermal skin test and a disputed cut off point. "The wider use of gamma interferon testing is likely to increase the number of cattle slaughtered as previously undetected infected cattle are identified. We acknowledge that this will be challenging for the farming industry and for Defra."

Bourne promised a 15 percent reduction in cattle Tb with these measures - which included gamma interferon. With increased cattle slaughterings referred to by the Efra report, he may achieve his prediction - with a 15 percent reduction in cattle.

"Defra have no policy", said "Lord Rooker to the Efra committee in his last session of giving evidence, "and have spent £1 billion to no good effect in the last decade".

It would be most careless of the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to repeat that most expensive mistake again.

"Further procrastination is unsustainable..."

The influential EFRA (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) select committee has produced a report into the ISG's ten year Badger Culling Dispersal trial, and concluded that an annual cull of sentinel cattle is not working to reduce and eradicate bTb. In a report published today, they recommend "A multi-faceted approach to tackling cattle Tb", which includes culling badgers.

"The Government's current method of controlling cattle TB, that of surveillance, testing and slaughter, is not working effectively Government must now make a decision on what its strategic objectives are. The impact of this disease has reached a stage where further procrastination is unsustainable".

Their report points out that bTB is one of the most serious animal health problems in Great Britain today, with the number of infected cattle doubling every four and a half years. Projected to 2013, this figure could reach £1 billion, and involve 66,000cattle slaughtered. The consequential growing cost of the disease to the taxpayer and to the farming industry, they say, is unsustainable. And it is a Governmental responsibility.

"A reduction in funding at the risk of the disease spiralling out of control and eventually affecting England's export market is not justified. The rapid increase in this zoonotic disease continues to warrant Government involvement and financial support with the aim of reducing incidence."

The Committee called this approach "budgeting to save" and called on Government to "show commitment to finding a way to ease the grip" which bTb had on the cattle industry. They are very much aware of the stress and misery caused to farmers by a herd breakdown, and subsequent movement restrictions and inability to trade.

In "hot spot" areas where the prevalence of the disease is highest, the farming industry has reached a breaking point as the disruption to business in both human and economic terms has become unacceptable. The final straw for many farmers has proved to be the introduction of a new system of valuations for their slaughtered cattle which has proved inequitable in many cases.

The committee recommend that Governemnt overhaul the tabular valuation system for slaughtered cattle and other animals. They conclude that the system

"... is unfair to farmers of pedigree animals. Compulsory slaughter is a measure to protect the wider industry and society as a whole and it is iniquitable for those unfortunate enough to be hit by the disease effectively to subsidise others by receiving artificially low values for their animals."

The Committee's conclusion is that there is no simple solution that will control cattle TB. The Government must adopt a multi-faceted approach to tackling the disease, using all methods available. The Government's strategy for cattle TB should include:

• more frequent cattle testing, with more frequent and targeted combined use of the tuberculin skin test and the gamma interferon test;
• the evaluation of post-movement cattle testing;
• greater communication with farmers on the benefits of biosecurity measures;
• the deployment of badger and cattle vaccines when they become available in the future; and
• continued work on the epidemiology of the disease.

(We are delighted to see that post movement testing has made a belated entry to the toolbox, but urge caution on the gamma interferon, as its specificity - or lack of it - is well documented, not least by this committee.)
On controlling the disease within the wildlife reservoir, the committee has this to say:

The Committee recognises that under certain well-defined circumstances it is possible that [badger] culling could make a contribution towards the reduction in incidence of cattle TB in hot spot areas. However, as there is a significant risk that any patchy, disorganised or short-term culling could make matters worse, the Committee could only recommend the licensed culling of badgers under section 10 of the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 if the applicants can demonstrate that culling would be carried out in accordance with the conditions agreed between the ISG and Sir David King, which indicated that there might be an overall beneficial effect. These were that culling should:

• be done competently and efficiently;
• be coordinated;
• cover as large an area as possible (265km² or more is the minimum needed to be 95% confident of an overall beneficial effect);
• be sustained for at least four years; and
• be in areas which have "hard" or "soft" boundaries where possible.

We recommend that no application for a licence should be approved by Natural England, which already has statutory responsibility for the granting of culling licences, without scrutiny to ensure that it complies with the conditions set by the ISG and Sir David King. It is important that were such a cull approved, other control measures should also be applied. Any cull must also be properly monitored by Defra. It is unlikely that such culling would be sanctionable in more than a limited number of areas. We recognise that culling alone will never provide a universal solution to the problem.

So any badger cull should be along the lines of recommendations of the ISG and Sir. David King? Both agree that badgers give Tb to cattle - and the ISG showed us how not to deal with it. But agreement? We live in interesting times.

EFRAcom refer to the 7 point Industry plan, which we covered in the posting below, which calls for an organised licensed cull by farmers, or their contractors. The NFU believe it would fulfil the conditions agreed by the ISG and Sir David King.

If the NFU is able to meet the licensing requirements laid down by Defra, can satisfy Natural England both that it would conduct any cull in accordance with its animal welfare requirements and would satisfy the conditions agreed by the ISG and Sir David King, we accept that a licence for such a cull could be granted.

Commenting on the report, the Chairman of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee the Rt Hon Michael Jack MP, said:

"This is a complex issue and there is no simple solution. But I am pleased that the Report represents the unanimous view of the Committee."

The report of this inquiry can be found at the EFRA committee page of www.parliament.uk

Industry 7 point plan

In the absence of any sign of such an elusive animal from Defra, the NFU has spearheaded an industry 'plan' to 'contain and eradicate' bovine tuberculosis from the wildlife and cattle herds and thus prevent its spillover into other mammalian species. It's framework covers a short but effective culling regime, followed by vaccination to protect incoming badgers, working in tandem with cattle testing and surveillance.

The Plan.

1. We are committed to doing everything possible to contain and eradicate bovine TB.

2. Industry participation in a badger culling programme can only be in the context of a genuine partnership with Government, involving their providing overt facilitation, mapping, monitoring, carcase disposal and other support.

3. In order to apply that principle in practice, we would recommend that TB Control Strategy Groups should be set up, aligned with DVM areas, involving farmers, vets, Animal Health and other stakeholders to determine overall strategy for their area, to advise on the delineation of control areas and facilitate the creation of local TB management groups.

4. Culling to be carried out by farmers and trained personnel engaged by TB management groups using all legally approved methods.

5. Culling to be authorised by licence issued by Natural England in accordance with guidelines set out by Defra on the basis of the findings of the ISG and related scientific advice. Timescale for the issue of licences should not be unreasonably protracted.

6. The industry and Government to work together to develop a “clear and protect” two stage strategy, that will move from area-based badger culling to reduce disease levels, followed, when available, by vaccination to protect re-populating badgers. This must work in parallel with appropriate cattle-based measures, based on sound economic principles and scientific evidence and advances, including consideration of the use of cattle vaccination accompanied by a reliable DIVA test on condition that export markets are not prejudiced.

7. We are committed to encouraging our respective members to co-operate in a culling strategy as outlined above, and in a programme of public information focused on the vital importance of controlling the disease.

The Statement was agreed by the NFU England and Wales, CLA, Central Association of Agricultural Valuers, Holstein UK, RICS, NFU Cymru, Tenant Farmers Association, Livestock Auctioneeers Association, National Young Farmers Clubs, National Beef Association, Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers and veterinary scientist, Dr. John Gallagher. Members of the British Veterinary Association and British Cattle Veterinary Association were present and approved the statement, but formal agreement by their organisations would have to be ratified by their Councils.

The Veterinary Association for Wildlife Management (VAWM) also support the proposal in principle, and have offered the following statement:

" The recent seven point plan put forward to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hilary Benn by the NFU and other interested parties is to be welcomed as a realistic framework for tackling the epidemic of bovine tuberculosis that is now affecting cattle and wildlife in large areas of south west England, the west Midlands and Wales.

The detail of how the plan is implemented will of course determine its success but we believe the concept of TB Control Strategy Groups that would devolve responsibility on the ground to local TB management groups represents a workable management plan. And we entirely agree with point 2 of the plan that “Industry participation in a badger culling programme can only be in the context of a genuine partnership with Government, involving their providing overt facilitation, mapping, monitoring, carcase disposal and other support.” We assume that this would include paying for the cost of the programme.

The methods of culling are not specified under point 4 but we would urge that daytime gassing underground is potentially the most effective method since it takes advantage of the ecological behaviour of the badger. It also obviates the problem of carcass disposal. Shooting at dusk with a silenced rifle also represents an effective and humane method of culling. We caution against live trapping and snaring both on humane and practical grounds.

The “clear and protect” two stage strategy (point 6), that will involve area-based badger culling followed by vaccination to protect re-populating badgers is an ambitious and potentially complex strategy. It will clearly depend on availability of both an effective vaccine and the means of delivery. But at the very least it should serve to reassure the public that farmers and vets seek not to eradicate the badger population but rather to achieve a healthy population and to bring numbers down to sustainable levels compatible with wildlife biodiversity.

Finally we do not believe that cattle vaccination should be seriously contemplated in the seven point plan. Even supposing an effective cattle vaccine became available, vaccination in the face of the huge weight of infection in the badger population would be against all the best principles of disease control. Furthermore if cattle vaccination was undertaken at some future date the industry would then become hooked into routine vaccination of the national herd with all the difficulties that this would bring for future testing and trade."

The only word of caution we would add, is that on past experience Government are rather good at fudging decisions, especially unpalatable ones they would rather not make. And the word 'contain' is what worries us. Contain TB? How?

But just this week we have seen snuck into Defra's February 'Farming Link' pamphlet, a gem of a problem in the making. And probably the first of many.

"Farmers are reminded that cattle subject to one or two yearly TB testing must be pre-movement tested when moving to and from both grass keep and linked holdings".

PreMT for linked holdings which happen to be several counties apart we can support, but grass lets? Testing cattle in the middle of a field? And what happens if they give an adverse reaction? Stuck there? Moved under license? Short tenancy land still under restriction for - how long? A can of worms.

And with the shopping list of cattle measures proposed by Professor Bourne, there's plenty more to go at.

Veggie-Benn at the NFU conference

Addressing the NFU conference yesterday, the BBC report that Defra Minister Hillary Wedgwood-Benn announced he would make no decision on Britain's appalling Tb situation "until the EFRA Committee delivered its report".

As GB's bTB figures last year rocketed towards 8 percent of herds under movement restriction and with some areas having a quarter of their herds affected, the Minister said that he had to make his decision on "science, impact of proposed measures, practicality and public acceptibility".

On the first point, he ignored the Chief Scientist's side swipe overview-which-came-to-a-different-conclusion, and plumped for the ISG's work. You remember, the ten year 'trial', whose chairman openly boasted had been steered from the beginning knowing that there was one conclusion it was not allowed to reach?

Benn also seemed unaware of the work from Stirling University, released last week, paid for, one assumes, by his Department of Food, Environment and Rural Affairs? which laid the root cause of 75 per cent of outbreaks of bTb in GB at the striped paws of - badgers. Not any badger of course, but grossly and endemically infected with tuberculosis badgers - as described in Parliamentary Questions by his predecessor in the hot seat, Ben Bradshaw.

A BBC report of the speech, is headed "Farmers heckle Benn over Tb plans"

What plans? He doesn't appear to have one - apart from an annual cull of sentinel tested cattle that is. The same old chestnut of 'public acceptability" was waved, to avoid making a decision on the control of a disease that is 100 per cent a governmental responsibility. And a disease whose spillover will increasingly and inevitably impact on 'the public' who, like his predecessors he is content to use as his ministerial shield.

Environment Secretary Hilary Benn has been heckled by farmers after he suggested culling badgers may not be the answer to preventing TB in cattle. Mr Benn was told to "stop waffling" as he pledged to take a decision based on science, its impact and practicality".

National Farmers' Union President Peter Kendall urged Mr Benn to make the "right decision" on culling badgers and to show political leadership in explaining to the public the "absolutely devastating" effect of the disease. (Forget cattle Peter - explain about the cats, dogs, free range pigs, llamas and children - all susceptible to tuberculosis, and more 'valuable' as vote fodder) He urged Mr Benn not to adopt a "nimtoo" approach - "not in my term of office".

Mr Benn said the call would be made "on my watch", based on the science, impact of proposed measures, the practicalities and its "public acceptability". and it was the latter comment which roused his audience....

To boos from the audience he said: "Many of you don't think that's a factor governments should take into account but I have to take it into account alongside the other three tests."

The BBC comments "While cattle farmers (and the Treasury??) may support a cull, a government consultation of more than 47,000 people suggested that more than 95% of people opposed it". Aah yes. That would be the consultation in which the RSPCA was later found found by Advertising Standards Authority to have offered misleading and incorrect' information? Yup, that'd be the one. The BBC nailed its colours to the mast this week with a David Attenborough TV special on the Secret Lives of Badgers. Repeated to allow for the sunday afternoon consumption. They didn't show one dying of Tb though.

One angry farmer shouted that the government had done nothing to tackle bovine TB in 10 years, adding: "Stop waffling." Answering his heckler, Mr Benn said: "I'm not waffling. I'm going to take a decision and we're going to have to find a way forward."

And that won't involve culling the wildlife reservoir of bovine tuberculosis. The Minister then announced that he was awaiting instructions. He was:

...awaiting a report by the Environment Food and Rural Affairs select committee, due within weeks, before making a decision.

NFU Chairman, Peter Kendall said it was "disappointing" Mr Benn referred only to the ISG report rather than one by former chief scientist Sir David King, which drew different conclusions.

No doubt Mr. Benn will also be awaiting the result of his department's 'Inquiry into the Inquiry', which went to tender last month

Anytime in the next ten years will do Minister.

Another Llama farmer 'devastated'.

Bovine tuberculosis has hit a llama herd in West Wales, killing half the animals. Western Telegraph reports that Wales' second largest herd of llamas has been decimated by an outbreak of bTb.

Although cattle are routinely tested for the disease, llamas and other camelids are not. Neither are their breeders compensated for their full market value. The absence of a test meant that bovine TB was not picked up in Liz Ford's herd of 25 llama at Bower Farm before the onset of clinical symptoms. Half are now dead.

"They succumbed very quickly. They became weak and ill and developed a severe cough. If a compulsory test had been in place, the disease would have been picked up sooner and some could have been saved. It is very difficult when animals are sick, and there are no rules on how to deal with it," said Mrs. Ford.

Livestock farmers in Wales who lose animals to bovine Tb are compensated for their replacement value, and for cattle in England the infamous 'tabular system' operates - or not, depending on ones' point of view - but no such payment structure exists for llamas. And, as is the case for cattle farmers in areas of endemic Tb, insurance is not obtainable, companies only offering such umbrellas when there is minimal disease risk.

The Western Telegraph reports that Mrs. Ford has received what was termed an 'ex gratia' payment, which was equivalent to just one third of what each animal was worth. She says that the Welsh Assembly only agreed to test the herd, after she had signed a document accepting this level of payment.

Many llama farms are run as breeding enterprises, with animals sold all over the country where they become fashion - statement lawnmowers. Only when breeding stock are exported or during the sale of surplus culls into the food chain, is any form of Tb disease check carried out. In the case of exports, that involves a skin test and for meat a post mortem carcass inspection.

From comments on a previous post, we understand that llamas are notoriously difficult to skin test.

Veterinary officials from the Welsh Assembly are now testing the herd but, unlike the 60-day gap between tests in cattle, these tests will only be done every 90 days. Mrs Ford says this is too long and has caused huge management problems. The Welsh Assembly admits there is currently no legislation for testing llama for bovine TB.

We covered a similar story in November . Members of the EFRA committee left their corridors of power and visited a llama farm in Devon, whose owners were equally 'devastated' when bTb hit their farm near Crediton.

BTEC in Australia - pest destruction Oz style

Some countries around the world have wildlife reservoirs of bTb - but how they deal with them, is very much dependent on their government's attitude to agriculture, food production and / or exports and of course public health.

Much is made of the fact that GammaIFN was developed in Australia in the mid 1980's. The implication being that the blood test was used to eradicate Tb. Not so. Australia's Tb free trading status was attained using the just the intradermal skin test - and clearing out its wildlife reservoir of disease - ahead of the licensing of GammaIFN.

Known as the "BTEC" , or Brucelosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign, the feral cattle and water buffalo thought to be maintaining disease amonst the country's herds were rounded up and destroyed. Radio transmitters were attached to the necks of what were known as 'Judas' cows, who were then set free to join up with a herd of wild cattle, marking their position.

We are assured that Richard (Lord) Attenborough was not tracking their movements - but we digress. The herds were rounded up with helicopters, then coralled and the marked cow, sent off again. And again. And again, until all the feral cattle in the area were rounded up. About 13,000 went to the meat factories in 1986. And in the absense of a wildlife resrvoir, and using just the skin test, Australia became officially bTb free. A message from Oz tells us

" After we caught all we could the paddocks were shot out from the air without fear or favour. Some stud Brahman cattle got into the wrong paddock & were shot as well .... there were no exceptions.
It worked"

With 13,000 wild buffalo and feral scrub cattle rounded up with helicopters for slaughter, this was pest destruction on a big scale.

Re-examining the situation..

In a new report, scientists from the University of Stirling have re-examined data on cattle movements - which have been the subject of some wild accusations regarding the spread of bovine Tb.

Although not backed up by spoligotype data, much was made of a couple of lightweight studies which examined cattle movement data from 2002 and 2003, immediately after Foot and Mouth restocks - data which carried a health warning for the rest of us 'Do Not Use' - and concluded cattle were responsible for spreading Tb.

If a cow has Tb when she steps onto a cattle lorry, she is unlikely to have a miraculous recovery during the journey. The question of course should be, has she been the cause of onwards transmission of bTb? And if cattle are not the cause of an outbreak of this infectious disease, what is? New work by the team at Stirling, based on 2004 data, concludes that in around 75 % - yup that's right, SEVENTY FIVE PERCENT of cases - the cause of bTb outbreaks is not cattle movements, neither local nor national.

In an abstract now published, a piece entitled:
"Estimates for local and movement-based transmission of bovine tuberculosis in British cattle" concludes that 75% of bTb outbreaks were caused by what is quaintly described as 'local effects'. A new word for badgers perhaps?

The authors point out that "Both badgers and livestock movements have been implicated in contributing to the ongoing epidemic of bovine tuberculosis (BTB) in British cattle. However, the relative contributions of these and other causes are not well quantified".

We used cattle movement data to construct an individual (premises)-based model of BTB spread within Great Britain, accounting for spread due to recorded cattle movements and other causes. Outbreak data for 2004 were best explained by a model attributing 16% of herd infections directly to cattle movements, and a further 9% unexplained, potentially including spread from unrecorded movements.

So, using 2004 data on actual bTb outbreaks and matching that to cattle movements on to the farm, both local and national (should there have been any) the team found that just 16% could be attributed to such 'On' movements, with a further 9% unexplained. They explain that the model which best matched the actual circumstances on farm assumed low levels of cattle-to-cattle transmission and continue:

The remaining 75% of infection was attributed to local effects within specific high-risk areas.

Pointing out that "Annual and biennial testing is mandatory for herds deemed at high risk of infection, as is pre-movement testing from such herds", the Stirling team confirm that

"herds identified as high risk in 2004 by our model are in broad agreement with those officially designated as such at that time".

In other words, what was actually happening on the ground, was predicted by the modeling exercise which they used.

And of these outbreaks, three quarters were attributed neither to local cattle movements nor national. But to 'local effects'. And a name they dare not speak.

Lose the paperwork

Defra's infamous table valuations alledgedly constructed to "deliver value to the taxpayer" - if not to the livestock farmer on the receiving end - have had a bizarre effect on the pedigree dairy sector during the last few weeks for cattle slaughtered as bTb reactors. If you remember these were part of a package, agreed by the industry and offered to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs as a package in late 2005. The ministers very cleverly grabbed the goody bag of cattle measures - as expected - but offered merely a 'consultation' instead of the targeted measures against a wildlife reservoir, whose name they dare not speak.

Their 'valuation' figures are a mish mash of auction ring sales of various categories of stock over previous weeks, but therein lies the problem.

Prices for livestock dipped sharply in the latter part of the summer, due to restrictions of the bluetongue zones. But in the late summer, a shortage of decent quality dairy cattle, pushed up prices. Considerably. And Defra's tables are not constructed on a like for like basis - nothing so simple. Non-pedigree animals have a one month bracket of calculation, while pedigree values are tabulated from prices over the previous six months.

5 . The values in the table of categories above have been derived from sales information obtained from store markets, prime markets, rearing calf sales, breeding sales and dispersal sales in Great Britain between 18 December 2007 and 20 January 2008 for non-pedigree animals, and between 21 July 2007 and 20 January 2008 for pedigree animals.

The system is clanking through with only calved dairy animals showing this disparity of £70 / head for February 'valuations'- but prices in January were more pronounced at over £200 differential.

Defra insist that to be classed as 'pedigree', an animal has to have all its paperwork which show its parentage and ownership details. But this tilt in values has meant much of this may should have been 'lost' over the past weeks.

" Defra have no policy...

... and have spent £1 billion to no good effect in the last decade".

So said Lord Rooker, 1 hour and nine minutes into a slippery session with the EFRA (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) committee on December 10th. This was a long and tortuous attempt to drag from a minister, who although fashionably 'recycled', has been in the Defra seat for a decade, just what government policy on bTb would be.

But Lord Rooker was not forthcoming. The chairman remarked that he was not getting any degree of clarity, and that after ten years in the job, Lord Rooker was coming over as "don't have a clue".

But some of what he did say was unequivocal and we will summarise.

* That he wouldn't argue with the projection of a £300,000,000 annual cost of bTb in 2012 / 2013, predicted in the Defra strategy document of 2004.

* At £100,000,000 the cost of bTb annually was consuming 40 per cent of Defra's Animal Health budget - that rose to 70 - 80 percent in some areas.

* Much of the cost was on antiquated trace and paper based systems. "The vets and AHOs never get mentioned, but they operate a cumbersome paper trail". The computer screens are black and white.

* Defra has to formulate a comprehensive strategy. "The issue is bTb. We have a reservoir in the wildlife and disease in a food producing animal. And it is growing".

* "We are in real trouble. AHOs and VLA tell me that the disease is virtually impossible to eradicate in cattle while there is a reservoir in wildlife".

* "In the hot spot areas, AHOs tell me that 70 percent of the cattle breakdowns are badger related. They are on the front line".

* Cattle movements geographically are important, but "both VLA and AHOs tell me that the molecular structure [of the bacteria] is unique to areas. If the issue was cattle moving Tb around, then this molecular spread would be obvious".

* Scientists not arguing about the science of culling [ badgers], but how to do it.

* "The present situation is unsustainable. Whatever policy government come up with, they will not pay for it. This is the end of the line for taxpayer's money".

* "Culling as done by the RBCT does not work. The implication is you don't do it that way".

* The rest of mainland Europe is fine with test and slaughter - they don't have a wildlife reservoir of disease.

* "Government cannot reasonably withold licenses from applicants under section 10 (9) of the Badger Protection Act"; the Act was to protect the badger before it became known that the animal was a reservoir for bTb. Moratorium 'may have been illegal', but was never challenged.

* Zoning and cattle cordon sanitaires would destroy the industry. "The cost to the farming industry [of bTb] is horrendous, both financially and emotionally. It is very frustrating for farmers and the industry".

* The spread of bTb in "Midlands and SW hotspots has grown, but not as a result of trade".

* "bTb is the most serious disease that Defra face in terms of costs and resources. This cannot carry on".

So, an hour into the discussion, Lord Rooker was asked about the formulation of a policy to reduce costs and control bTb. And it soon became evident that his eminent lordship had one, he was not going to share it with the honourable members of the EFRA committee. When asked what the first issue on the menu of any policy would be, Lord Rooker replied:

We aren't paying for it.

And contradicting his earlier mention of farmer licenses, with Defra administrating any cull, he said Defra would :

".. not be paying for operational mapping or surveillance, even if we do sanction a cull

It is also far from clear who would issue any licenses, Defra or Natural England - although the indication was of an abdication of ministerial responsibility. Lord Rooker said repeatedly that there was abundant knowledge that if we do not deal with bTb in wildlife, we can't get rid of it in cattle. But he didn't know the cost of any clearance of wildlife reservoirs, because Defra hadn't done its sums.

Money is the key, he said. It dictates policy. Mmmm. The cynical may remind his lordship of the £1 million donation from the Political Animal Lobby which stopped all badger culling in response to outbreaks of Tb in its tracks. Was that value for money? We think not. But we digress...

Lord Rooker slammed the use of gamma interferon on the grounds of cost.

It would cost £1 million before compensation [for reactors]. We're not going down that route.

Doesn't say much for his faith in its efficacy either, does it?

And although pressing ahead with vaccination research, Lord Rooker was not too enthusiastic about either cattle vaccines (illegal under EU law, and would be catastrophic for international trade) or badger vaccines (who's going to pay for it?)

He said decisions needed clarity at the top. It wasn't there. Zuchermann, Dunnett, Krebs and the ISG and still no clarity. And they didn't understand the transmission routes of the disease. Whaaaaaaaaaaaat!! 'They' may not. We do. Sheesh.

Lord Rooker asked the committee not to "fall for another enquiry" (would that be like the like the RBCT?) and he intimated a decision early in 2008. He said that the disease had to be dealt with in the round, showing respect for a valuable industry and respect for wildlife. Chairman, Michael Jack, MP concluded the proceedings with a comment that they had a unanimity of agreement; that a practical decision and a plan has to be made. And quickly.

It was pointed out that GB may be othe only country in Europe to abdicate responsibility for a statutorily notifiable zoonosis. But Lord Rooker was having none of it.

"We shall issue the license".

he said.

If you don't like the answer.....

... ask the question again.

One of our northern contributers wrote to national newspapers at the beginning of the RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial, asking just how many 'trials' government wanted. And he answered his own question with the ascerbic comment, 'as many as it takes to get the answer they desire'.

That was ten years ago, and much water has flowed under government bridges since then. Much cash too, with the incidence of bTb being one of the few things to fulfill governmental predictions. Lord Rooker confirmed in oral evidence to the EFRA committee on the 10th December that the Tb budget was on target for £300,000,000 by 2012. It was, he said, consuming 40 per cent of Defra's Animal Health budget.

But the diminutive prof. who chaired the dispersal trial, Professor John Bourne, was keen to point out that his 'trial' had had a political steer from the start. In fact he appeared to relish explaining to stunned MPs the difference between 'science' and his own brand of 'political science'.

He heard his master's voice in 1997, and delivered. But in ten years things have changed. And everything we, and other far more learned people than us mere farmers predicted, has come home to roost.

Lord Rooker listed many of these Tb 'chickens' in his addrees to the EFRA committee, and when we've listened to it - all 2 hours and a few minutes - we'll post a resume. Will we say 'we told you so'? You bet.

So, what are government going to do? They've wasted spent £millions on the prevarication of the Badger Dispersal trial, which at its inception was, according to its pilot, set up to deliver the obfuscation of cattle 2 v badgers 1.

7.24 ... The infection rate concerns all sources of infection for cattle, local infection for example across farm boundaries, infection from animals bought in particular(ly) but not only, from high incidence areas, and infection from wildlife, especially badgers. All these are important, but their relative importance and that of cattle-to-badger tranmission, cannot be estimated directly. In the following calculations we assume all three sources to be roughly equally important."

But times, as we said, change. And the answer government demanded then (and received) is not necessarily the answer demanded now. So, to paraphrase our contributer from Staffordshire, another session of number crunching is up for grabs 'until they get the answer they desire'.

Defra have invited tenders for 'Further Analyses of the RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial databases This work is abbreviated to AHW-TB RRD 2008 - 2009 and tenders must be submitted by 18th January 2008.

Pity no one told Prof. Bourne that the goal posts had moved during his 'trial'.

One could almost feel sorry for the man. Almost, but not quite.