Sideline?

For anyone with a thorough knowledge of bTB and the required tea-and-sympathy skills, the NFU are offering three EU funded posts in the SW.

Salary: £27,410 - £33,806
Location: Exeter
Job Type: Contract - 4 years
Source: The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development Europe investing in rural areas. South West bTB Farm Advisory Service (based from the NFU Regional headquarters, Exeter)

The NFU, supported by all farming and related industry organisations, has recently secured funding through the Rural Development Programme England for a four year farm advisory programmes to provide cattle farmers with bespoke Bovine Tuberculosis advice and training in the South West Region.

Being delivered for the industry, by the industry, this initiative will provide practical and technical support, advice and training for trade, supply chain and animal health solutions to all cattle farmers across the South West region affected directly or indirectly by bovine TB. If you want to really help cattle farmers in a 'hands on' and practical way this could be the job for you.

Under the direction of the programme Manager, the service will be delivered by three Advisers who will have a good understanding of Agriculture, Animal Health and the Rural Environment, and be able to "demonstrate an understanding of bTB".

Yup. We understand only too well. Cattle are tested and culled if they react to exposure of m.bovis. Tabular valuation is rubbish if you have spent a lifetime breeding high quality genetics, or if you've purchased expensive bloodlines and they are condemned. There is no appeal. You can't trade, except to approved finishing units, will probably have to shoot calves which you can't sell, and any movements at all have to be licensed by your local AHO - who may, or may not agree to them. Direct slaughter is your only outlet. Your bank may, or may not be sympathetic.

Up to 90 percent of TB breakdowns, both new and ongoing in the SW are down to badgers say AHO risk assessments, but the only 'advice' which can be given to affected farms is 'touch them not'. And possibly a reminder that hidden in the folds of the new Animal Health Bill, are penalties for not keeping 'bio-secure' - whatever that might mean in this context. Hermetically sealed boxes for cows? Shrink wrapped grass?

Update: We understand that key people in various farming organisations have pushed for this initiative, as their telephone lines are busy with farmers asking the same questions. But we are also mindful that our current Minister for (some) Animal's Health, is hell bent on saving cash. Our cash. Compensation cash, (the figure for which in Defra's convoluted accounting system, includes haulage, abattoir costs, valuers and incineration of reactors, but is net of carcase salvage). So while we welcome any support for farmers under herd restrictions, we are very much aware that what may be possible and planned for today, could be completely different tomorrow. And that someones idea of 'bio-security' may have a profound effect on any compensation monies due, however unproven, ineffective, impractical or costly such measures may be. We are also reminded of the words spoken at least twice in our hearing, by the former chief at Woodchester Park's Badger Heaven, Dr. Chris Cheeseman. When asked how to keep badgers and cattle apart, his reply was an unequivocal "You can't. You get rid of your cattle".

We understand that positions will be available in the Midlands and the North as well.

The closing date for the Exeter applications is Monday 15th February 2010 at 4pm, should you feel you have the right skills.

bTB in Badgers.

While the debate rages about cattle / badgers and now alpacas and other companion animals and their involvement and exposure to the bacterium known as m.bovis, Dr. Zellweger has looked at the effect of the disease on badgers. In a short communication "What Happens In A Badger Sett With Bovine Tuberculosis? " he describes the effect and spread of the disease:

It is not unusual that badger setts are several hundred years old. They consist out of various dens and chambers, well connected and spread out over some 20 to 50 yards 1 to 10 feet underground. Badgers are night active creatures and during wintertime they spend most time sleeping or dosing socially cuddled up in their dormitories ( see BBC Autumn or Spring Watch ). In the open the family of a sett normally has a territory of up to 1 or even 2 square miles which is well defined and regularly marked by urine and latrines. In the dens and chambers the climate being obscure with sticky air and steady temperatures of some 10 - 20 degrees is ideal for numerous bacteria and other germs.

Successive tweaks to the Protection of Badgers Act, have awarded this delightful animal cult status and its home a Grade 1 listing - with an inevitable knock-on effect transferred to Animal Health veterinarians' methods of control under section 10 of the Act. And the badger population, when assessed by members of the Mammal Society increased by 77 per cent over the decade 1987- 97, as Dr. Zellweger points out:

The Badger Act protects "brock" since 1992 hence the population is growing steadily. As data show this goes along with a continuously increasing of bovine Tuberculosis in cattle, alpacas, other domestic species and "brocks" of course.

Any average sett is occupied by a bigger family with a very well organised pecking order. There is one boss and a dominant sow: the total size of the group may be up to a dozen or more. When youngsters move away they have to look out for their own habitat and territory. If they intrude occupied territories they sooner or later are expelled - sometimes after fierce rows. Where do they go to? And where does a diseased animal go to? There are farmyards with muckheaps, sheds and haystacks with mice and troughs with rests of grains or cereals offering shelter and easy food. In summer cattle drink from water troughs in the fields - in any dry summer spell an easy supply for badgers. What when such a weakened or diseased brock - or a dead one - is detected by Pink Panther Toby cat or one of the pack of sheepdogs on the farm?

A description of the effects of this disease, and opportunities for its spread:

Bovine TB ( bTB ) as we know is a very chronic disease affecting various mammal species including people. The most common spreading is by exhaling including coughing for the lungs are "hosting" so called tubercles, which consist out of masses of bacteria either alive ( and therefore well infectious ) or digested by macrophages as defence of the immune system. Every tubercle is a focus of infection and can be an abscess of up to an inch size full of typical crumbly pus. When bacteria are swept via blood or lymph flow systems, they may land in other organs like the kidneys, liver, intestine, saliva glands or skin, where identically after weeks pus can result. Therefore we speak of pulmonary, renal, liver, intestinal or skin TB. Urine of a badger with renal TB can contain 300’000 bacteria per ml. A badger may urinate 4 - 6 times a day some 30 - 80 ml each time. My calculator shows this rises to shedding per day of some 10 times the amount RBS topmanager Stephen Hester gets as bonus for last year earned with public cash ( 90 million germs ). A bit crazy maybe? For a new infection with bTB it would need some 100 - 500 bacteria only.
When badgers fight the risk of scratches and wounds is very high. In a healthy badger these heal out in due time. When bTB is involved it is different. The very slow multiplying bacteria will sooner or later cause smelly excretions, wild flesh and pus which might be infectious - permanently or temporarily. Wounds may be licked every now and then by the very badger or by his mates even. New infection is around the corner, but this time in the intestine.

If a sow with bTB has cubs - or any other sibling of the same sett has got TB - these youngsters may get infected in their very first weeks of life by her own mother. bTB causes a very slow death after suffering over months or even more than a year. Hell - or perhaps worse? What a life prospectus!

And on the 'treatment' of bTB in animals?

Animals with bTB should never be treated hence the slaughtering of some 40,000 head of cattle per year. Even vaccination ( with unreliable BCG ) cannot prevent that further bTB spreading occurs. Antibiotics are not practical for they would have to be applied in adequate daily individual dosage for several months, nota bene causing resistance of other germs in grand style. Contraceptives for various reasons are no option either.
People with bTB are treated with high doses of a combination of 3 different antibiotics over 6 or more months with full success never guaranteed….

Worldwide TB causes millions of victims every year; the main part of those are caused by the human strain Mycobacterium tuberculosis, but bTB ( Mycobacterium bovis ) is equally infectious and dangerous for people.

Dr. Zellweger ends this piece warning "England beware!"

Stats? stuck

At the Oxford Farming Conference during the first week of January, The Minister of State for (some) Animal's Health, the Right Honourable Hilary Benn MP., responding to criticism of his non-policy on bTB, hinted that unofficial Defra figures are showing that disease levels fell during 2009.

He is being his usual economic-with-the-truth self or as has been said of his ilk, "if their lips are moving, they're lying".

When there is just a single source of infectious disease, then tracking either New Breakdowns or New Confirmed Breakdowns is a good measure of how control measures are working - or not. But with only sentinel tested cattle under any semblance of Defra control, and a maintenance reservoir of TB encouraged by statute to let rip, in this instance it may not be the most accurate. Defra statistics have several lines of monthly statistics - or they do if they are updated [more on that later] - each giving different information, or the same information in different format..

There is a column showing the number of herds registered on the VetNet system, another showing how many of these are under restriction because of a 'TB incident'; then further totals, including how many of these are 'New Breakdowns', or even 'New Confirmed Breakdowns'. And it is latter which the Minister was clutching when he spoke last week. And it is this heavily sanitised figure which he presents to his European masters.

In the year to August, (which appears to have the Defra statisticians stuck in groove at the moment) the figure of New TB breakdowns is lower than that recorded in the same period during 2008. But, the rest of us, languishing under herd movement restrictions 'because of a TB incident' is up 10.5 per cent on 2008, and almost double the figure of 2006. Cattle slaughtered is about the same. But by mid January, Defra have usually produced the TB stats for November, not August. Gardening leave? Changing the data collection methods? Rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic? No idea. But if the news was good, you can bet it would have been published.

The figure for New Confirmed TB Breakdowns equates to around 3.7 per cent of the national herd, and this is the figure Benn is clutching in his Ministerial briefcase. But the number of herds under TB restriction annually is approaching 10 per cent, and to August 2009 - remember August? buckets and spades etc.,? The total was 8.2 per cent of the cattle herds in GB.

This duplicitous hubris also extends to Defra's 'other species' tables, with numbers of alpacas stuck at a comforting 18 on Defra's tables, while a quick round robin telephone call to distraught owners extracted a figure of over 200 animals dead from TB - ten times the 'official' one. Further questioning drew a reluctant 'possibly VLA samples?' as an explanation for the difference.

Polite note to Defra. Bacteria do not respond to bullying, lines on maps or rearranged, delayed or selected statistics of their progress. They just spread.

" DEFRA policy is essentially doing nothing."

Following our posting summarising the opinions of Dr. Ueli Zellweger on the current one sided bTB non-policy operated with such devastating results by Defra, warmwell.com has received an email from Dr Paul Gillett, M.B, Ch.B, MRCP, FRCPath., which we have permission to post.

Dr. Gillett is a hospital medical consultant with 35 years experience specialising in microbial diseases and infection control, and he supports the remarks made by Dr. Zellweger, a Swiss vet with over 30 years experience.

Dr. Gillett explains that

The decline of tuberculosis in humans in this country owes more to improvements in living conditions, better nutrition, less overcrowding and the pasteurisation of milk than it does to the introduction of BCG.

Studies on BCG vaccination in man show an efficacy of between 0% and 70% and appear to depend on country, nutrition and the prevalence of other mycobacterial infections in the population immunised. Thus a policy to control bovine tuberculosis based almost entirely on the use of currently available vaccines is unlikely to be successful even if one could achieve 100% uptake. Trials on new vaccines will take several years to complete given the chronic nature of the disease in both man and animals, and the outcome far from certain. In the short, and probably medium term this means the DEFRA policy is essentially do[ing] nothing.

(We assume here that Dr Gillett is talking about Defra's Badger BCG vaccination project, rather than a mass BCG vaccination programme across the country to mitigate spillover from TB infected badgers into humans, alpacas, cats, dogs free-range pigs, sheep, goats and cattle.)

Dr. Gillett continues: "It has to be understood that the current policy of testing and slaughtering infected cattle is aimed at preventing the acquisition of bovine TB by humans not cattle. As Dr Zellweger indicates in his letter, to control bTB in cattle, one should be looking to prevent the transmission between and to animals in the herd. This would involve detecting and eliminating sources that pose a threat to cattle and unfortunately the badger is the most important wildlife reservoir that has close contact."

I find it inconceivable that two species of animal that are susceptible to the disease and have proven close contact are not transmitting the disease to each other. Introducing proper control measures is therefore to the benefit of cattle, badger, farmer and the exchequer.
Why then are such measures not instituted?

He continues with the observation that "Some would advocate the mass culling of badgers and one must suspect that it is fear of the political implications of public reaction to such a policy which bolsters DEFRA’s inactivity."
( One may also consider that it suits Defra to keep a wedge driven between those farmers and vets who want a cohesive policy to eradicate bTB from wherever it may be found, and the beneficiaries of the current polemic, in whose interest it remains to keep the gravy-train cash rolling. And 'eradication' of badgers rather than 'eradication' of bTB within their population, is just the word to do it with every trick in the book used to achieve this. - ed)

Dr. Gillett appears to have caught up with the targeted 'management' strategy for wildlife which we mentioned here, and he comments:

There is an intermediate and more appropriate strategy. I am reliably informed by countrymen that it is possible to detect diseased badger sets by inspection of the runs and other signs. Thus it is possible to avoid mass culling - which may actually be counter-productive - in favour of selective elimination of diseased animals. A measure which is to the benefit of the badger population as a whole and the cattle. A group of concerned West Country farmers and vets have recently produced a DVD outlining the present problems and the potential for training others in the recognition of diseased sets. It is to be hoped that a coherent policy may be formulated about such an approach.

Dr. Gillett concludes, "Should an effective vaccine and delivery system become available in due course, then it would be (as in humans) an adjunct to rather than a replacement for effective infection control measures."

(Note: More of this discussion on www.warmwell.com and 'Bovine TB – A Way Forward', the film by Chris Chapman, which describes a management policy, will be released at the end of January. For details go to the homepage www.chrischapmanphotography.co.uk and click on FILM )

Farmers can't wait ...

.... says Shadow minister Jim Paice, MP speaking to the Western Morning News at the Oxford Farming Conference this week.

Cattle farmers in the Westcountry just don't have the time to wait for a vaccine for bovine tuberculosis, according to shadow farms minister Jim Paice.
The ongoing spread of the disease, which caused the destruction of 40,000 cattle last year, would have to be tackled by dealing with diseased badgers, he insisted.

Mr Paice was speaking at the Oxford Farming Conference and told the WMN that an oral vaccine for badgers would not be available until 2014 – and that was far too long to wait, given the havoc wrought by the disease in beef and dairy farms in hot spots such as the South West.

"We have waited far too long for a conclusion to this dreadful problem and wasted far too much taxpayers' money and got nowhere," he said.

Well he got that bit right.

So how is this little exercise in futility, for which the 'farmers can't wait' coming along?

It was launched in a fanfare which gave the impression that most of the badgers in TB hotspots would be vaccinated against bTB, and that would be that. And £20 million of course, but let that pass.
But that is not strictly true. For a start, the Vaccine Scoping Study is being rolled out in stages. Very slow stages.



In November last year, a PQ submitted by the David Drew, MP received this answer on the progress of our Minister for (some) Animal's Health latest daft idea prevarication project.

From what we can see from that answer, of the six 75,000 acre (300 sq km) blocks of land where it is proposed that badgers endemically infected with bTB, are vaccinated against, er ... bTB, only about 33 percent of the land may be available? And of that 25,000 acres (that's 100 sq km )only about a quarter of landowners have signed up, leaving 75 per cent having declined FERA's invitation to this particular party ? (as at November 10th anyway)

You get the gist of where we're going with this?
Now, cage traps and the use of injectible vaccines are proposed until 2014, when an oral version of vaccine, may become available. So having compressed the land areas into much less than was proposed, further reduced by non-participation, how much further can numbers of endemically infected badgers be squeezed within such a trapping programme? And what is the effect on a 'programme' of vaccination that we are told as farmers needs at least 80 per cent coverage to be effective?

We understand that the hope is for contractors to catch between 60-80% of badgers in each target area to vaccinate. So if no other landowners agree to participate, that will mean 15-20% of badgers being vaccinated in the 100 sq kms plot, which itself has already shrunk from the headline 300 sq km or 75,000 acres.

Contractors are now being asked to tender for this work. But from what we can see, it is a complete dogs breakfast and a way apart from the initial headline grabbing figures offered for public consumption. When "badgers will be vaccinated over six 75,000 acre plots", actually equates to "we may get to vaccinate 5 - 7 % of the badgers in that area" someone, somewhere is taking spin to the extreme. And Jim Paice is quite correct to say 'the farmers can't wait'. Neither can the taxpayers.

But from a contractor's point of view as well, that 'someone' is also on a different planet. These people are being asked to tender to trap and vaccinate 'x' number of badgers in an area of land, not yet decided ? And the badger surveying, we understand, will not be in the hands of the contractors tendering for the job, but 'someone else'. Someone who may assess numbers correctly, but may not. And if they do not, then tough.

Both vaccines and cages are to be the responsibility of the contractor, and their purchase, storage and maintenance, together with assessed labour and area to be covered will be the basis of the quotation offered. This is so vague as to be like catching smoke. Especially as by the date tenders have to be submitted, the majority (80 per cent)of surveying will not have been completed.

Security clearance, public liability and insurance for working with a grade 3 pathogen are also to be the responsibility of the contractor, for what is described as a 'one year contract'.

Walking blindfold on this week's ice and snow would be easier. And much safer.

Update:
An update to the Fera (Food and Environment Research Agency) badger vaccine project arrived this morning, giving us a little more meat on its skeletal bones.

Today (8th January) was the closing date for the consultation process, on amendments to legislation which will allow lay vaccination of badgers, using BCG.

And a little more detail is given on Fera's timetable for this project.

"During year one (2010) Fera staff will survey and vaccinate up to 100 sq km of the first Glos. zone at Stroud. They will also begin to survey and vaccinate about half (50 sq km) of the second Glos. area, north of Cheltenham. It is on these two areas that contractors will be trained.
Up to 20 sq km of the other four patches, Staffs, Hereford/Worcs and the two in east Devon will also have received visits.
During the second winter, from November to April, Fera will survey the remaining 80 sq km areas of these four blocks, and the remaining 50 sq km of the zone north of Cheltenham. By the end of 2011, all areas will have been surveyed"

So in 24 months time, at the end of 2011, all the six areas will have been surveyed? And of the original much headlined 1800 sq km, (of which 600 sq km they hope might be signed up), "up to 230 sq km" may have been actioned?

No particular urgency then?

"Eliminate the Cause"

As another miserable and expensive year of Minister’s non-policy on ‘bovine’ TB has drawn to a close, we have received a sobering overview of the situation from Dr. Ueli Zellweger, a veterinary practitioner of some 30 years experience both in this country and Europe.

Dr. Zellweger explains that after so much experience of treating cattle diseases, testing for TB and the experience in other countries in the eradication of this disease and trading implications surrounding TB, he feels ‘entitled to comment’.

“ When a veterinary surgeon is called out to treat a cow or a whole herd of cattle it is vital that he finds the real cause of the trouble. This may be an infection by either a species of bacteria, virus,a mycosis, possibly interaction with parasites or environmental influences. It is the skill and experience of a successful vet, to discover the real diagnosis and to treat and eliminate the very cause”.

He explains that infections with bacteria are normally treated with antibiotics and disinfectants and subsequent preventative care; and that if an infection is treated soon after starting success is most of times quick and guaranteed. But not so easy to treat are chronic infections.

"Bovine Tuberculosis ( bTB ) in 99% of all cases is a very chronic disease, mainly because of the extremely slow multiplying of these bacteria. Death quite often occurs after suffering over months or even years only. Apart of bTB there are quite a number of other strains causing Tuberculosis; e.g. the human strain ( M. Tuberculosis ), the strain causing leprosy, the avian strains including M. Avium paratuberculosis ( Johne’s disease in cattle and rabbits ) and others which may be even harmless.”

Dr. Zellweger then goes on to explore vaccines, saying that there a lot of vaccines against all kind of infections on the market which normally give quite reliable results if administered correctly in healthy animals and humans.

For Tuberculosis the common vaccine is the BCG which was discovered some 80 years ago and has been used to vaccinate healthy babies mainly. But unlike all other vaccines, Dr. Zellweger explains:

“ BCG does not prevent an infection; it just keeps it from becoming generalized, thus reducing the risk that the bacteria are swept into various other organs followed by massive excretion and transmission of disease ( coughing, urine,milk etc ). There is scientific evidence that the efficiency of BCG is not more than 50% and in a lot of countries it is therefore not in use any longer.”

( Here, we would point out that the ability to excrete large numbers of bacteria varies tremendously between species. In cattle, regularly tested with reactors removed for slaughter, half of the kill will show no lesions at all and no bacteria can be traced even in culture as culture forming units ( CFU ). Of those with lesions, AHOs tell us that they ‘can look for half an hour and still cannot find any bacteria’ on a slide with material from cattle lesions. Conversely the smears from even microscopic lesions found in badgers may contain huge amounts of bacteria, and we make no apology for repeating the answers to our PQs which gave a figure of “up to 300’000 bacteria per ml” which may be found in the urine of a badger with TB in his kidneys. Other questions dragged out the nugget that 30 ml urine can be splattered indiscriminately ( across grassland ) at each incontinent void, and that exposure to just 70 or so bacteria are needed to provoke a positive skin test reaction and possibly onward disease in a cow. Alpacas too seem unlucky enough to develop open lesions very quickly, which may contain large quantities of bacteria, facilitating fast spread within the whole herd. But we digress…)

Dr. Zellweger continues:

" Any animal, group or herd of, with bTB is a focus and as long as a focus is not eliminated it is a high risk for further infections. It is outrageous that these aspects are widely ignored by DEFRA for years now with apparently no end in sight. In 2008 over 40’000 head of cattle reacting to bTB ( skin test ) were slaughtered ( with DEFRA predicting a 10 – 20 % increase annual increase, should the ‘dynamics’ of their non-policy not change – ed ). Nobody knows how many 10’000s of badgers and their setts are infected. Thus the infection within this most relevant wildlife reservoir is permanently spreading, including all its risks of infecting further cattle, other farm animals, pets and humans.”

And on vaccination, as Dr. Zellweger has pointed out many times before:

“Vaccinating badgers cannot be the solution for there are locally far too many badgers and setts which are infected." And in his view, “vaccinating cattle with BCG is absolutely contra-indicated, for the only way of diagnosing bTB in cattle will be seriously compromised.”

( The skin test may react in vaccinated animals, and given the ‘damping down’ effect of BCG previously referred to, animals may still be ‘infected’ but not ‘infectious’ - ed). So, Dr. Zellweger explores another beneficial opportunity:

“ DEFRA thinks to manage to develop a DIVA test thus being able to differentiate between a skin reaction caused by bTB and the one by BCG. It is unclear if such a test will ever reach permission or European wide approbation; however there is a high risk that at some stage various countries will decide , that they are not interested in any English beef products any longer when it cannot be guaranteed that there is no bTB.”

And he points out that “the skin test appears to produce many inconclusive or even false negative results ".( But we are aware that it is testing for exposure to the bacteria which causes disease and not the disease itself – ed ) “And that the Gamma Interferon blood test – apart from being expensive – is quite often hampered by some other influences. There is – (Dr. Zellweger says) – definitely no need of another uncertainty in this whole issue.”

So as the New Year begins, with several hundred head of reactor cattle on the bTB killing lines of abattoirs this week, numerous new breakdowns involving many alpacas which have not yet made it to DEFRAs data sheets and not a few pet cats and dogs, Dr. Zellweger concludes that:

“It is horror for me to see how things are going the wrong way and every month some hundred more Farms are starting suffering dramatically. It is not 5 minutes before noon to rethink this whole
approach by DEFRA – politically steered as it is – NO it is half past noon and even with a quick and total U turn the future of battling bTB looks very bleak. Eradicating bTB in Southwest England will take some 10 years at least, with or without this actual Government and its TB Eradication Group, but with enormous costs, efforts and many more tragedies.”

It is 'a horror' to us as well. And an expensive, futile, bitterly divisive waste of resources. But the gleeful chortle of a young inspector lining up over 200 TB reactors in a Midlands abattoir last week, put it all in perspective. "Another load of cattle who won't be polluting the planet" said she cheerfully. So how many ROC global-warming credits can Defra attach to each reactor's tail?

A Happy New Year.

Badgers v. cattle. Relative contributions to disease transmission.

After our posting on the relative infectivety of bTB lesions in cattle, badgers and other mammals, a comment alerted us to work done outside the ISG box, which sought to match the attributed cause of a TB breakdown to either cattle or wildlife. The model used for this exercise found that just 16% of bTb breakdowns in 2004 were directly attributable to cattle movements.

The following is part of the abstract from the paper "Estimates for Local and Movement-based Transmission of Bovine Tuberculosis in British cattle" (Green et al) which was published in 2008.

"Both badgers and livestock movements have been implicated in contributing to the ongoing epidemic of bovine tuberculosis (BTB) in British cattle. However, the relative contributions of these and other causes are not well quantified. We used cattle movement data to construct an individual (premises)-based model of BTB spread within Great Britain, accounting for spread due to recorded cattle movements and other causes.

Outbreak data for 2004 were best explained by a model attributing 16% of herd infections directly to cattle movements, and a further 9% unexplained, potentially including spread from unrecorded movements.

The best-fit model assumed low levels of cattle-to-cattle transmission.

The remaining 75% of infection was attributed to local effects within specific high-risk areas."

We love the pseudonym 'local effect' - excellent.
And this analysis ties in quite nicely with that of actual herd breakdowns in the SW of England, described in our posting here and illustrated with charts of actual bTB breakdowns in Devon, over the same period.


We are already hearing of breaches both north and south in Defra's bTB 'maginot' line. This was an area crayonned in red, which sought to isolate TB to the west of a line on a map, with a 2 km buffer zone on its eastern edge. Pity no one told the 'local effects not to cross it.

The full paper from which the abstract was taken, can be viewed on this link. (Ed- the link may need a second click as it opens, and a further 'OK' to ignore hieroglyphics.)

Wildlife Assessments

We have mentioned the veterinary / farmer wildlife assessment initiative several times but a comment which has come in today reminded us of another option.

"My friend in Cornwall, an Alpaca owner who has already lost many of her Alpacas to TB, has taken the bull by the horns and had a private company, owned and run by former Defra wildlife employees, to survey her farm and recommend what needs to be done to minimise the impact of TB and how to reduce badger access to her farm."

This visit was most successful and, says our commentator, possibly a service that others may wish to adopt.

The company was founded by ex WLU manager Paul Caruana and other colleagues, all of whom have a wealth of knowledge of wildlife, particularly badgers. It trades as Field Services South West. We have previously posted some of Paul's comments from when he was a field manager taking orders from the diminutive John Bourne, and trying to catch badgers (fairly unseccessfully, it would seem) - in the manner which ISG instructed demanded, during their RBCT Badger Dispersal Trial.

FSSW can contacted via their website: www.fieldservicessouthwest.co.uk or mail them at fsswadmn@aol.com

The comment continues:

Having had a relative employed in the Wildlife Unit, I know that many of them have the skills to be able to usefully & practically advise farmers & alpaca owners on the risks they face and the actions they can take to avoid getting this diseases into their herds.

And concludes that the excercise "sounded most useful" and asked if we could put a name to this service, which we are happy to do.

Alpacas - TB Awareness meetings.

In response to the increasing number of alpaca herds (puntas) affected by the inappropriately mis-named 'bovine' TB, the BAS (British Alpaca Society) is hosting a series of meetings during January and February 2010, entitled 'TB Awareness'.
These will be presented by BVCS vet Gina Bromage, M.A.,VetM.B.,D.V.M.,M.R.C.V.S , with an introduction from the chairman of the BAS, Mike Birch.

The meetings are open to all and there is no pre-booking or entry fee. Veterinary attendees would be most welcome, as would cattle farmers and anyone else interested in bTB transmission.

Venue are across the country, with details here.

The owners of alpacas in the two cases which we linked to in this post, have between them lost over 40 animals to confirmed bTb. A handful of other herds can account for well over 100 animals, all clinically confirmed during 2009, but not necessarily voluntarily slaughtered as the result of either a skin or blood test and thus accompanied by 'compensation'. Neither have all these TB casualties been culture sampled, as once bTB is 'confirmed' in a herd, to keep lobbing samples to VLA for confirmation of visible disease is deemed a waste of resources. They have been postmortemed by vets, whose findings should have been passed up the line to AHOs.

Thus the figure quoted on the Defra website of '38' alpacas and '2' llamas 'screened' during the period January - September 2009, with '18' infected alpacas and '0' infected llamas proving positive for bTB, would seem to us to be a considerable underestimate - or as it's Christmas and we are being generous, both vets and local AHO offices ane dragging their collective heels over reporting their area bTB positive camelid findings.

Defra's explanatory notes, once one has located the obligatory magnifying glass with which to read them, point out that the collated data, only refers to 'notified suspect and clinical postmortem' cases of bTB during the reporting period, thus passing the buck back to the aforementioned vets and AHOs..

At the moment we'll give Defra's statisticians the benefit of the doubt and hope 'pending' cases will catch up; but we sincerely hope that this published data is not case of managing statistics, rather than managing the problem.

(Update: Thanks to eagle eyed blog watchers for amendments to screened figures. Even with a magnifying glass - we got the lines muddled. The post is now correct to Defra's miniscule data - if not to dead alpacas. )

Definition - 'Maintenance'.

It has become apparent over recent months that a great many misconceptions - some originating in the top echelons of Defra - have been dribbled out to a gullible audience, unchallenged. The description 'maintenance' reservoir for instance, appears to have been atttached umbilically both to badgers as a source of bTB - and also cattle in equal measure. This is not so.

A dictionary definition of the word is 'capable of maintaining', 'cause to continue', 'retain in being' and 'preserve intact'. You get the picture? Badgers (unfortunately for them) tick all the boxes which allow this very accurate description to be applied.

Research over many years has found that they can maintain body weight, bear and rear young, in fact survive quite happily, while intermittantly shedding bTB. In the latter stages of the disease, the body is overwhelmed by disease and they are excluded from their groups, ranging further, scrapping and fighting for territory, and hiding up in shallow, single hole setts, often close to farm buildings and an easy food supply.

At this stage and possibly before, depending on the site of lesions, their ability to transmit disease is phenomenal, with up to 300,000 units of bacteria available in just 1ml of urine. 30 ml is dribbled at each void or used for scent marking, and just 70 units is needed to infect any cow who sniffs it. And while cattle will usually avoid faecal contamination, there is less chance for them to avoid urine. Pus dropping from open abcesses (see pic.) is also an opportunity for disease transmission. The amount of bacteria in badger lesions is huge.(All this is archived in the PQs which form the base of this site.)

So what of cattle? If they are left untested, and fulminating disease, then of course any TB would spread. And in the 1930s and 40s it did. But after the TB eradication process in the 1950s and 60s, using test and slaughter, this country - like many others - had all but eradicated TB. Numbers of reactors dropped to a very low level, with just an isolated animal expected to turn up at slaughter with aged, walled up lesions. The exceptions were two 'hotspots'. One in Glos and the other in SW Cornwall where test / slaughter failed to clear the problem - even with whole herd slaughter, cohort slaughter and all the rest of the cattle-only-tools. We explained this in our posting here - a posting which was compiled for us, by Divisional Veterinary Managers who had overseen this eradication process.

Cattle lesions are not particularly laden with bacteria, in fact scientists have explained to us that they "could look for half an hour" before finding a single bacteria on culture slides. Conversely the pink stained badger excretions "were jumping off the slide" and visible without the need of a microscope. Thus in the field, cattle to cattle transmission is difficult and happens over a long time scale. A fact born out by the Pathman project which found no samples taken from salami sliced reactor cattle over a long time frame, to be capable of onwards transmission.

So we go back to our Parliamentary Questions - and more particularly their Answers, where on 30th January 2004, Col 540W [150492] baby-Ben Bradshaw replied:

"All countries that have either eradicated or have a programme to control, bovine tuberculosis use one or more forms of the skin test"

of which the 'comparable intradermal' version is used in the UK, and its efficacy?:

28th January 2004 Col 382W [150495] "... on standard interpretation, provides sensitivety between in the range 68 to 95 per cent and specificity in the range 96 - 99 per cent."

Thus on regularly tested herds (and ours has had 60 day tests for way too long) - the top end of 90 per cent is as good as it gets. The junior Minister also mentioned that "In the abscence of a wild life reservoir ", all countries operating this test and slaughter policy had eradicated or were a way down the road to eradicating bTB completely. How would that be possible, if cattle were indeed a 'maintenance reservoir' of this disease? Or is our UK bTB bacteria different from anywhere else in the world? (We are aware it has acquired a 'political' DNA appendage - but let that pass....)

The Minister also told us that after the badger clearance at Thornbury, and smaller trials in Steeple Lees, Hartland and East Offaly, cattle TB had reduced significantly or in the case of Thornbury - disappeared altogther for at least ten years, with 'no other contemporaneous action' involved, other a clearance of infected badgers. How could that be, if cattle were 'maintaining the disease?

In a regularly tested cattle population, with reactors removed promptly, cattle do not 'maintain' TB. And when the unfettered, free ranging 'maintenance' reservoir of infection is controlled or removed, TB disappears from cattle populations completely. Once again we are grateful, for permission to reproduce the chart below, painstakingly compiled by AHOs in the SW, showing their professional risk assessments for cattle breakdowns. And as you can see - cattle are not the problem. The vast majority of cattle breakdowns were attributed to badgers.


The description 'maintenance' when applied to cattle TB, is not born out by past experiences both in this country or more especially in others where no wildlife reservoir exists, (or if it does present problems, it is controlled in parallel).

Thus, in our opinion, it is at best misleading and at worst duplicitous to describe cattle as a 'maintenance reservoir' of bTB - unless of course that description refers to the largesse associated with pensions and employment generated by its continued and increasing presence.

One man's story .....

Today, we share the diary of one small alpaca herd, hit by bTB earlier this year.

The owner will remain anonymous - for the time being - but his location is within a midlands bTB hotspot, where over half (55 per cent) of badgers captured during BROs in the decade prior to 1997, proved positive for bTB.

The property has massive badger activity and was once home to over 50 alpacas. The herd (punta) comprised mainly females and 10 males with nothing purchased in for over a year, but animals sold. bTB was confirmed in September this year, but three months prior to this the owner had treated a male with Orchiditis. This animal failed to respond to treatment, and died. The carcass was collected by the local hunt. No samples were taken. (This male is not included in figures of losses from the herd)

September 2009
During routine husbandry, a female was found to be underweight. Veterinary advice was sought, and this female and another were treated with antibiotics, and had blood screens for various other disease - all of which proved negative. One female died and a PM carried was out on farm. The vet recognised TB lesions and took the carcass to VLA Luddington for further investigation.
TB confirmed on PM. This female had a 5 week old cria.

The herd was put under official TB restriction by AH and the owner informed the British Alpaca society (BAS) of confirmed bTB.

October 2009
The cria from the first female loss is now 7 weeks old and very ill. She had died by the time the vet arrived to euthanize: vet euthanized another female, which was showing slight weight loss but was frothing at the mouth. Postmortems showed lung and liver abscesses respectively. The adult female suffered a ruptured lung abscess. Samples sent for culture.

Oct 5th 2009. First skin test on herd.
Oct 7th 2009 One female aborted.
Oct 8th 2009 Skin test results read: one positive Female. All other animals clear.

Although showing no symptoms, the skin test positive female was culled and was positive on postmortem. She has a 4 month old male cria.

October 14th. Vet called to examine two females which were negative on the skin test reading the previous week. This AHO told the owner that in her opinion these two alpaca were reactors as there is a swelling on the bovine injection site 6 days after the 'official ' 72 hour reading. ( This was not the same AHO who read the skin test on Oct 9th : protocol for alpaca skin tests indicates the reading should be at 'severe interpretation'; i.e a 2mm rise only for camelids.)

Oct 16th 2009
A male alpaca was suddenly taken very ill. He was unable to get up and appeared in pain. He had no weight loss, and at the time of death (euthansed) weighed 92 kg. He was put down by AHO and taken to VLA Luddington.

October 21st.
AHO suggest euthanasia for the two females seen on 14th October, and recommend 'monitoring' the herd, by weighing them on a regular basis and reporting any weight loss to AHO. The owner notices another female is coughing and reports this to AHO.

October 27th. Rapid Stat Pak blood test carried out on four animals. The owner has agreed (verbally) to slaughter if they are positive. No paperwork issued. All the bloods are positive.

November 2009
AHO culled the four blood test positives. All had TB confirmed on postmortem.
As TB has been confirmed in all the animals euthanized by local AHO, the owner is now offered a blood test on his entire herd - or what remains of it..

November 17th /18th 2009. Remaining 44 alpacas blood tested with Rapid Stat Pak and Gamma Interferon IG .

12 females failed both blood tests.(inc one 4 month cria)

14 fell into what the AH Officer called a 'Grey area' - in other words failed one blood test but passed the other.
Owner advised to isolate these animals, and watch for symptoms.

14 Tested negative on both tests

4 animals failed to give a sample suitable for gammaIFN screen..

Nov 25th: All 12 animals which were positive to both tests, plus one other showing symptoms were culled.(2 were taken to VLA Luddington the other 11 were PMd at a slaughter house by vets.) All showed lesions of TB.

LOSSES TO DATE : 22 alpacas. Spoligotype is confirmed as VLA 17, which is the strain of TB indigenous to the area. It is found in badgers and tested, slaughtered reactor cattle. AHO visits to discuss the 14 animals which fell into ‘grey’ areas of the blood tests, and the 4 which had given samples not suitable for screening.

To date, the owner has had no contact from the Health Protection Agencies, to offer screening for human contacts of these animals and is advised by AHO to contact her GP.

November 28th: HPA visit and are arranging for X Rays.

December 2009
AHO suggested they take the 'grey area' animals in pairs, starting with those who are either showing signs of illness, or have failed the Gamma IFN blood test.

They begin with 8 animals who had failed the GammaIFN test. All were positive for Tb on PM.

Losses to date 30 - all confirmed TB.
AHO ask to take the entire herd as owner has now lost over half the animals.

This small herd has 22 alpaca left out of 52 animals.
All but one had passed the intradermal skin test in early October.

A male sold from the farm in July has died and PM has confirmed TB. Despite the owner and BAS providing AH with contacts in October – a trace on this sale had not been followed up.

Dec 6th Owner has agreed to let AH take another 5 animals.

The remaining animals testing negative on both blood tests, will be monitired by AHO at 2, 4 and 6 monthly intervals.
The 4 alpaca which gave samples not capable of screen, will be retested.

Losses to date: 30, with 5 booked to go.
To be continued.

We failed ....

All summer, several contributers to this site have been trying valiantly to collate the figures for the cost to the taxpayer, of testing and removal of bTB positives to the skin test and other assorted toys. While numbers of animals slaughtered are available on the Defra website, (and our trend graphs show just where cattle numbers are likely to be by 2014) other associated costs are not so transparent. So after a lonely trawl, a few Parliamentary Questions were lobbed in the general direction of Hilary Benn, Minister of State for (some) Animal's Health - and his henchmen.


The reason for this is simple. After worshipping the moneylenders, UK plc is broke. And in 2006 a short term fixing tape in the form of tabular valuation was introduced to reduce 'farmers' share of the TB largesse. But within three years, sheer numbers of reactors had outstripped any fiscal advantage. So in the absence of any change of policy, and to go with our trend line graph of the numbers of cattle Defra can expect to cope with, we had intended producing a graph illustrating the sheer bloody waste of money, cost of all this prevarication to the long suffering taxpayer, already reeling under the laxative of 'quantitative easing' to protect the financial sector.

And therein lies is a problem. Answers to our pointed questions, repeated when we really did not believe what we were reading, explained - patiently it has to be said - that 'Compensation' included many other expenses other than monies paid to farmers for reactor cattle. Aye?? That was a surprise - and it takes a lot to surprise us. Such cynicism comes with years of practise, but we digress..

The less-than-transparent figure for 'Compensation' also includes species other than cattle - and there have been a few of those with numbers climbing: "Payments for non-bovine species are included in the total compensation figure for England." Then the writer explained that they were:

" ... unable to pull out an exact figure as our records are not kept in that way. Prior to 2006/07 minimal compensation was paid for other species. Over 2006/07 and 2007/08 a more substantial amount of money was paid out (though under £1million) for camelids."

So the llama and alpaca casualties of 2007, were funded at 'less than £1million? That's like a supermarket offering goods at £99.99 and saying they were 'under £100'. And as the numbers were quite modest, they were expensive lawnmowers then?

As 'other species' are included in the total sum, a straight simple division into the amount paid as 'compensation' by the number of cattle reactors, would not be in any way correct. But it gets worse.

Although veterinary testing costs are collated separately (and in the last couple of years have outstripped 'compensation') we had not realised that the 'accounting' system which Defra operate also bundles all costs of removing the reactor from the farm, getting it through the abattoir and its eventual disposal into that one misleading total.

The minister of State was asked for the costs of:

(a) compensation paid directly to farmers for removal of animals, (b) veterinary tuberculin testing, (c) haulage for removal of animals, (d) abattoir and official veterinary surgeon services in respect of slaughter, (e) on-farm slaughter, (f) disposal and incineration and (g) valuation fees was in respect of the implementation of statutory testing and slaughter under bovine tuberculosis regulations of (i) cattle classed as bovine tuberculosis reactors, inconclusives or dangerous contact animals and (ii) all other mammals (A) between 1986 and 1996 and (B) since 1997. [293860]

Jim Fitzpatrick answered and confirmed an answer which we had already gleaned: that the figure euphemistically labelled 'Compensation' and which is generally accepted as being lobbbed into cattle farmer's pockets, included haulage, valuers fees, disposal of parts not wanted in the food chain - but was net of 'salvage'. Further questions elicited the following reply as to the cost of slaughter v. sales of meat:

Jim Fitzpatrick: No such estimate has been made. For most cattle compulsorily slaughtered on TB control grounds, DEFRA has received a net payment from abattoirs rather than incurred a cost. Meat Hygiene Service officials inspect carcasses of such cattle when slaughtered in licensed abattoirs, a small proportion of TB affected cattle are condemned as unfit for human consumption e.g. if TB lesions are identified in more than one part of the carcase. In such cases DEFRA does makes a payment to the abattoir to cover its disposal costs. It is not possible to provide details of slaughter costs in the form requested: typically an abattoir will receive batches of cattle being slaughtered on disease control grounds rather than single animals—if one (or more) of these animals is condemned, the cost to DEFRA will be offset by the total salvage value received from those passed as fit for human consumption.

So there we have it. A less than transparent method of calculating costs, the general public (and farmers themselves) assuming, quite wrongly, that the published figures for 'Compensation' relate to farmers, when in fact they include many other costs as well. And from abattoirs, no separate credit / debit balances, merely a net figure which was £4.3m last year, for the difference between what they charge Defra for putting cattle through the slaughter line, and the monies obtained for the carcasses. We would say Defra's cost control is as lacking as any effort to stem the tide of infection from a name they dare not speak..

A very rough guide to TB costs, is on the Defra website.
And to really confuse, figures for 'cattle slaughtered' are on a calandar basis (January - December), while associated costs relate to a 'financial year' (March - April)

You really couldn't make it up.

A TB test on 'Countryfile'

See a reasonable overview of the frustration and waste of the non-policy which passes for bTB eradication in this country, on last weekend's episide of the BBC's COUNTRYFILE. Some beautiful in calf holstein heifers, loaded up for slaughter on a nearby dairy farm, with the added comment that over 200 black and white bull calves had been destroyed at birth over this two year herd restriction.

Then a snapshot of a six month 'short interval' herd test on Adam Henson's various rare breed beef stock, revealed four reactors within various groups of cattle roaming 1600 acres. A smart in calf Gloucester cow, and three youngsters including a very scarce White Park calf - a breed which is getting dangerously low in numbers.

If we are being pedantic, it would have been more honest of the BBC to allow Adam the airtime to explain that such a six month SI test follows a period of herd restriction due to a previous bTB breakdown. Thus his euphoria in the early summer, when the programme showed his clear TB test (and thus his ability to trade his stock with pride) was the expected emotional response, when for some little time 'Adam's farm' had been under continuous TB restriction, 60 testing and slaughter. And the further wasting of taxpayers' money..

In the interests of balance, we confidently expect a clip of Oddie / Kidner et al kissing small badgers in a follow up film. And a lot of hot air about vaccinating badgers infected with tuberculosis in hotspot areas such as this, with BCG. Which can be expected to create more jobs, buy more time, solve the TB problem overnight - at least in the eyes of a naive and misinformed public.

A parallel?

We have mentioned PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) technology many times and will continue to do so. But reading again correspondence from Dr. Roger Breeze, formerly of the US Plum Island facility and a developer of PCR, rang more than a few bells.

The jobs dependent on keeping this stunning technology firmly in its box, are described by Dr. Breeze in this mail of 2007 when he was pioneering RT-PCR as a fast diagnostic tool for controlling FMD:

"FMD diagnostic technology of the late 20th century depended upon tests that involved live virus or reagents to perform the tests that were derived from live virus and thus were confined to biological safety level 3 (BSL 3) diagnostic laboratories for biological safety reasons to prevent accidental escape of live virus contaminating the reagents (no one bothered to safety test the reagents to show there was no live virus contaminant so they could be moved out of biological containment). These tests could have been moved out of BSL3 labs like Pirbright or Plum Island but there was no incentive: APHIS were the only ones who would use them in the US, they had them in BSL3 at Plum and did not want to move them out to the mainland."

There is a parallel here with the control Defra exercise over the reagent DNA assay from m.bovis which is also a Grade 3 (BSL3) pathogen. Dr. Breeze explains how PCR development was stymied by this self interest group, dedicated to blocking progress:

"The world of diagnostics was a small and traditional club in which people talked only to each other in a circle of mutual assurance and mutual congratulation. There was certainly an element of job protection in this internationally in that these were labs that governments could not easily privatize - nor could governments transfer the test reagents to private companies outside the physical limits of the BSL 3 labs. Reviews of one country's capability were performed by club members from other countries. The idea that these labs might all use the same tests and reagents prepared for the group was unthinkable.

We have heard from top officials in Defra that PCR technology 'will never be used in bTB diagnostics'. And one may be entitled to ask, why not? In whose interest is it to keep this disease circulating, its casualties increasing and becoming more varied by the day?
Dr. Breeze explains how PCR broke up 'this cosy arrangement':

Development and testing of PCR tests would not have been possible without people knowledgeable of FMD etc and with access to viruses in BSL 3 - there is clearly a continuing vital need for BSL 3 national facilities and skilled foreign animal disease scientists, it's just that the diagnostic role of central government labs has changed from test performance to quality control and quality assurance of a distributed system of laboratories that can respond very quickly.

Many FMD viruses representative of all 7 serotypes were genetically sequenced by Dan Rock's team at Plum Island and the sequence information was transmitted electronically to Tetracore in Maryland. Rock and Tetracore worked together to compare the complete sequences of many different viruses simultaneously to find regions of the sequence that were identical between all the different viruses - these common regions would be targets for PCR tests. Tetracore have some proprietary software that eases this comparison. Having identified likely targets, Tetracore made reagents to these targets and Rock tested these with real viruses at Plum Island. From this, the ARS Tetracore FMD PCR test was developed, and this did not require any materials that had ever been in contact with live viruses.."

Thus with a degree of co-operation between the people who held live assay, the PCR manufacturers enabled a PCR assay to be developed which did not depend on live components and as such was not subject to 'scientists' defending territory or playing politics.

The key factor was that electronic information was sent to Tetracore from Plum Island - this information did not require an APHIS permit. The reagents were made without BSL 3 containment off Plum Island and sent back for testing. Certainly, had it been necessary to send any piece of the virus or any reagent derived from virus to Tetracore, APHIS would have denied a permit to do this and this generation of tests would not be available today. But the computer technology of sequence and transmission over the Internet overcame the longstanding APHIS barrier ."

We have said many times and will continue to say, that this technology has more than a small place in bTB diagnostics. Whether that is to speed up positive diagnosis in cattle lesions after slaughter (as the US were doing 8 years ago), supporting positive identification of bait marked infected badger setts, or refining the blunt instruments of less than specific current diagnostic tests, ahead of slaughter.

For many of the cattle, farmed deer, alpacas and other animals now suffering continuous testing and slaughter, the wildlife reservoir now awash with infection and its inevitable spill over victims, that day cannot come a moment too soon.

'Our' terrier, becomes official.

In June we received a sorry tale of a little Patterdale terrier, who was found doing what terriers do and mauling an almost-dead and decidedly manky badger. This resulted in wounds to his nose and his eventual death from 'bovine' Tb. ( Please note: the Patterdale in the pic, is for illustration only, and is not the terrier in question. Patterdales are described as 'feisty and fearless' and used for 'hunting vermin'.)

Our terrier's story and that of two other dogs recently positively diagnosed with bTB, is now told by VLA staff and veterinary surgeons attending the animals, and is published in this week's Veterinary Record.

We would like to report on three recent cases of tuberculosis (TB) in dogs caused by Mycobacterium bovis, following bites from wildlife.
The most recent case concerned a healthy seven-year-old pet/working, male entire Patterdale terrier that went rabbit hunting in March 2009 in an area of Worcestershire recognised as a hot spot of bovine TB. The dog went missing and was found chewing the neck of a very thin, moribund badger. The terrier had incurred multiple bite wounds on and around its muzzle during the fight with the badger. The badger carcase was not examined. At the time the private veterinary surgeon alerted the dog's owners to the risk of TB, especially because there was a young child in the household. Antibiotics were prescribed to treat the bite wounds on the terrier's muzzle. After several weeks the dog became listless, weak and started showing respiratory signs and weight loss despite a good appetite. These clinical signs became progressively worse, and on advice from the vet the dog was euthanased in early June. Postmortem examination showed multiple granulomatous lesions in the lungs, pleura, liver, kidneys and lymph nodes.

The paper describes how cultures from affected organs were positive for SBO263 (VLA type 17) which is the predominant molecular type in the area where the terrier lived, and where the badger was found.

The second case is that of a Jack Russell terrier, who lived in inner city Glasgow and had a close encounter with a squirrel. This little chap was luckier than the Patterdale, and after treatment, has appeared to recover. The spoligotype isolated in 2008 after a biopsy on a non healing lesion, was Type SBO140 or VLA 9. Scottish VLA staff comment thus, on the strain type and their findings:

This was unexpected because the dog lived in Glasgow, an inner-city area with a very low historical incidence of bovine TB and had no reported contact with any livestock. The dog had reportedly not travelled to an area with endemic bovine TB infection. The skin lesion eventually healed and the dog returned to apparent good health

. The third case detailed in Vet. Record occurred in 2007 in Wales, where a three-year-old terrier was suspected of being bitten by a fox or badger while hunting.

He developed nodular, calcified, hugely enlarged submandibular lymph nodes. The bite wounds did not heal despite treatment. The dog was euthanased and M bovis spoligotype SB0140 (VLA type 9b) was isolated from one of the lymph nodes that showed granulomatous lesions with acid-fast bacteria.

The authors of the paper indicate that "in all three cases the local Animal Health office and local public health authorities were notified and health and safety advice was given to the dogs' owners". Although in the case of the Patterdale, we understand that this was sketchy and slow, especially as there was a child involved who had had close contact with the dog.

The authors also comment that in all three of these documented cases, there was no known contact with cattle or other livestock. And they mention increasing numbers of cats, dogs, South American camelids and goats as spill-over hosts of 'bovine' TB.

They conclude with an observation about TB in domestic pets in general, and cats in particular :

In cats, many cases of confirmed M bovis infection involve lesions in the skin or superficial lymph nodes, suggesting a cutaneous route of infection. As with these three canine cases, some of the owners of M bovis-infected cats have reported that infection followed a bite by native wildlife.

And finally, a plea to their fellow veterinarians, who may be unaware of the extent of environmental' 'bovine' TB pollution to which any mammal is suceptible:

We would like to raise awareness among small animal practitioners to include M bovis infection in the differential diagnosis of bite wounds that are unresponsive to antimicrobial treatment, develop nodular lesions and associated lymphadenopathy and/or cases of general undiagnosed malaise where there is a history of bite wounds. Undiagnosed TB in pets poses a particular zoonotic risk due to the often close contact between these animals and their owners and family.

We understand that Defra have approved this article ahead of publication. It is to be hoped that the implications set out in it, are clear to them as well.

The authors of the paper are : G.M van der Burgh,(VLA Luddington, Warwicks.,) T Crawshaw,(VLA Starcross, Devon.) A.P Foster,(VLA Shrewsbury. ) D.J.B. Denny,(B.VET.MED. MRCVS, Worcester.) and A.Shock, (VLA Lasswade,International Research Centre, Midlothian, )

Alpacas - TB inter herd spread.

It was only a matter of time before 'bovine' TB, now entrenched in a well protected but exploding population of badgers, spilled into non-bovine species. And if our Minister for (some) Animals' Health does not turn a hair at the slaughter of thousands of cattle annually, he may just have a fight on his hands with owners of some extremely highly valued alpacas, which when they do contract TB, appear to be more than capable of spreading it between themselves.

We have returned to this subject several times since the first alert in November 2007, after a west country llama farm was decimated by disease. The case was later described in the Veterinary Record, from which we quoted in this posting. Today we received data from another alpaca stud, with a similar story to that of the Devon breeder whose females returned from stud in Sussex, carrying a Shropshire strain of TB, from which they subsequently died.

A Gloucestershire breeder has sent us the following snapshot of his experiences. His story started in early September, after visiting shows with 3 young stud males during the summer. No other disease problems were found throughout intense veterinary investigation; but within a week, three of these animals were having breathing difficulties and had measurable weight loss. Wide spectrum antibiotics failed to give results. By mid September the first casualty was euthanased and his post mortem revealed lesions on lungs and liver. Two weeks later, a second alpaca died with similar post mortem results and the third was euthanased, again with the same pm results.

The owner takes up the story:

My spoligotype has been confirmed as type 10. My Defra veterinary officer has confirmed that there have been no type 10 outbreaks near to me, which confirms their and Animal Health's initial suspicions that my herd had contracted this disease at a show. All of the three initial cases were in my junior male show team.

But as has become apparent with other cases of alpacas with bTB, inter-herd spread, often before owners have a clue what is going on, had already begun:

We lost a 40 month adult female recently (she had been in the paddock alongside the junior males for some months. As is the way with these things, she is also a show winning alpaca). I currently have three others in isolation. Two other junior males and the 12 week old cria of the dead female.

The veterinary attention these animals have been offered (banned in the case of cattle) extends to specific anti-tuberculosis drugs, used in the treatment of humans:

One of the boys appears to have responded well to Isoniazid (anti-tuberculin drug) and is back to normal weight and breathing normally. Balthazar, a multi show winning grey male, is the most recent to go into isolation and is now on Isoniazid. The drug isn't cheap but, since I was offered £8,000 for him I'm not giving up - apart from the value, I had hoped to keep him as a member of my stud team. Oriel, the cria, seems okay at the moment but, as his mother died of bTB there's a reasonable chance he could get it.

Alpaca owners have lobbed a string of correspondence in the direction of Defra's window-box over their problems with camelids. And the frustration of owners of animals infected with this devastating disease when they are met with little advice, no support and condescending pre-programmed platitudes, only increases their anger.

Like the Devon animals, (who contracted Shropshire strain 35 TB from a visiting female while in Sussex), this alpaca owner has delved into the source of his outbreak. As he points out, no alpaca has presented to VLA at this time, exhibiting Type 10 bTB. This is unlike the Devon case, where although the Shropshire female died at stud, another animal from the Shropshire farm did subsequently come within Defra's radar. He explains:

Some alpaca studs have dozens of these visiting females - so you can see the potential for spreading bTB and other diseases/parasites to the four corners of the country. As far as I have been able to find out, there is no other alpaca stud/farm with spoligotype 10 known to Defra. This makes one think that there has to be someone out there that has had animals die but, has not had any post-mortemed. Given the attitude of some of the larger commercial breeders to the bTB issue and to those of us that are making a "fuss", they probably don't want to find out as it would be too damaging to their businesses. However, if left to fester, none of them (whether currently infected herds or not) will have a business left within a couple of years.

Quite. TB in camelids is a killer, and although the intradermal skin test is regarded as the primary test for camelids, even on the recommended 'severe' interpretation, it is not doing the job. Figures of less than 20% accuracy have been bandied about and a member of the BAS board has told members that only 6 alpacas have tested positive using it. This although members of the society themselves can account for in excess of 100 animals dead from TB in the last few months.

The blood test has been flagged up as a possible ancillary ante mortem test, but veterinary practitioners experienced in the care and treatment of these animals say that interpretation of the test is not solid enough. This alpaca owner has been told that

" the only way I can be sure that my herd is free of bTB is to use the blood test, but I should be prepared to lose 4 or 5 healthy animals for every one that is genuinely infected."

He concludes: "For obvious reasons, this cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution - especially as the Government will only pay £750 per alpaca (if they pay at all)".

This is a very sobering tale, running parallel to the experiences of many other camelid breeders across the country, and beyond. If Defra continue to bury their heads in the sand, this country runs a very real risk of establishing a second, unchecked reservoir of disease - if it hasn't done so already.

Accurate testing for any disease is vital. And if the skin test is failing camelids, and blood tests are failing them as well, why not dredge up Defra's most unfavourite toy, now widely used in the diagnostics of many other diseases in most countries - except TB in the UK of course; PCR? Just a thought....

Our grateful thanks to the owners of these beautiful animals for sharing their story - so far.....

Protocol for Camelids - or not... ?

As we have pointed out, Defra's policy of dealing with bTB in non-bovine species is non-statutory. But with the urgency of a dormouse on vallium, Defra offer a few explanatory guidelines, which for alpaca owners and veterinary staff involved with these creatures, may have avoided some confusion.

Defra have no 'right of entry' into camelid premises so unless bTB has been confirmed, are admitted by invitation only. Movement restrictions may then be served, but protocol appears to vary depending on which civil service 'ROD', (Regional Operations Director) is reading which Defra bible and from which area. Some RODs are more equal than others, handing out instructions to highly trained veterinary staff in a fairly arbitary manner, and not necessarily agreeing with 'ROD' in the next patch. Why would they? They have territories jobs to defend. An example of this mish-mash of non-policy, is the use of the blood test on alpacas. While some RODs apparently allow just visibly unwell animals to be tested, others insist on whole herd screening. This test will never be 'validated' and its correct sensitivety / specificity established if it is directed at animals likely to be positive for bTB on ante mortem observations. Conversely, to expect alpaca owners, who regard their animals as pets, to slaughter all positives immediately is optimistic. Isolation and monitoring, combined with other antemortem screens may give a more solid picture of disease status.

Nobody wants animals with rampant tuberculosis left to fester, (except the badger groups) However the slaughter of three alpaca last week, which had been in isolation for four months found just one positive for TB on post mortem. For the other two extremely healthy animals, their cause of death could have been logged as 'gunshot wound to the head'.

Brief Defra guidelines for 'non-bovine species', have been available since early summer - at least. However they will not help the two alpaca in the photo.

Both are now dead.



Defra documents are written in civil service-ese which is neither easy to navigate, understand or interpret. Here is a taste:

10.2 As with other non-bovine species, there is at present little legislation underpinning the control of TB incidents in camelids in Great Britain, apart from the general power in the TB Orders to isolate and restrict movements of any affected and in-contact animals. There is no requirement to identify camelids or record their movements. DVMs or Local Authorities have no legal powers to enforce tuberculin testing of camelids and slaughter any reactors. Similarly, there are no provisions to compensate owners for the loss of such animals. Therefore, any testing of camelids for TB has to be voluntary, but if the owner does agree to test at the Department’s expense (see below), then this needs to be linked to a voluntary prior agreement to release for slaughter any animals identified as reactors.

Losing animals to TB is bad enough without this cat's cradle of jargon to plough through. Plain English would be good. The links for the two documents are buried contained within the AHO 'Operators Manual', and can be accessed here for Defra's Disease Reporting Procedures in non-bovine species, and the here for tuberculin testing of camelids. We note that the latter advises a 'severe interpretation' of reaction >2mm rather than the standard >4mm used for cattle, until disease is confirmed. And as with much protocol developed 'on the hoof', we understand that this too is not widely adhered to.
Or perhaps the vets doing the tests haven't read the manual either.

Update - 'A way forward'

In April, we introduced a film made by wildlife photographer, Chris Chapman with the overview that a form of 'management' of what has now become an endemically infected wildlife population, was a possible way forward out of the impasse that has made the UK the worst area in the world, for bTB.

This week the film was launched, and in the next few weeks it will be seen by vets and other interested parties across the country.

An introduction by Richard Gard, an agricultural journalist with an interest in animal diseases, described how after seeing a short introductory piece, all major television channels had turned down the film. Too hot to handle? The footage of emaciated badgers which had died in dire straights was not what people would have expected from the ever rattling tins of the Wildlife and Badger groups. But that is what their ultimate protection of this species has delivered. So while the carnage of FMD were brought nightly to our screens by most TV channels, the equally destructive salami sliced effects of bTB on our cattle herds and those who tend them, are ignored.

With a strap line is 'Healthy Badgers - Healthy Cattle', the fact sheet opens:

"Wildlife assessments of groups of farms with adjacent land are an important step in the control of cattle TB to operate alongside existing procedures. The project is established to offer wildlife assessments to veterinary practices and their clients for the winter of 2009/2010. No funding for assessments is currently available."

We note that last snippet.

The political slant heaped on this pernicious zoonosis is such that successive layers of Defra (formally MAFF) civil servants and their political puppet masters have sung from a different hymn sheet when dealing with the problem at the farm level as opposed to the perceived problem tossed around in the Palace of Westminister. Thus we have in place a government totally divorced from what is really happening on the farms. And the folk tending Defra's corporate window box, haven't a clue what to do. Other than kill more cattle.

The result is that cattle farms are testing and killing cattle, and then 60 days later - killing more cattle. How extraordinarily and expensively short sighted? In warfare this is known as 'cognitive dissonance', a plan of action which although destructively wrong, may work in the end because all the cattle are dead. (Or all the badgers?) But the fallout from Defra's carnage is incalculable, both on the ecology as a whole and on other species, equally susceptible to TB, as we are seeing here and here.

Mr. Chapman's film projects stoic but grim sadness from affected farmers as their animals are piled into Defra's maw, but many salient facts as well. From Dr. John Gallagher, the well made point that very small lesions in badgers will produce millions of bacteria, (with just 70 needed to produce TB in a cow - ed. [PQs]) and that from this, "it is inevitable that there will be cross contamination". Dr. Gallagher also pointed out that the disease is monitored and acted on in cattle, but ignored in wildlife.

Devon veterinary practitioner Andrew Cobner, reported a 50 percent increase in herd breakdowns in the area covered by his practice over the last few years, with continuous cattle testing and culling failing to clear problems. And several times the difference in the behaviour of excluded and extremely sick badgers, which were shown in Mr. Chapman's film, was highlighted.

And it is this 'management' of their own social groups by the badgers themselves, that is at the core of the message offered by the group promoting the film and the possible direction TB control could take, which is explained thus:

"At this time wildlife assessments are not accepted as an important part of TB control. We are convinced that a combination of wildlife assessment, veterinary involvement and cattle management can reduce the numbers of cattle being slaughtered and the number of farms under TB restrictions."

Richard Gard explained his understanding of the word 'science', which he said "involved the observation of natural phenomenon and the need to work within it". The process is ongoing he said, and once proved, the result becomes 'science'.
The core of this possible way forward uses the observed behaviour of badgers themselves, as its core. Mr. Gard described TB as the 'hidden disease of the countryside'.

He explained how farmers, their vets and maps of the farms, all formed bits of a disease 'assessment' jigsaw. Input of where cattle had contracted disease, fields, buildings or areas which were giving problems, were then examined by trained wildlife trackers and the results mapped. These maps gave a green light to setts and territories used by badgers which clear cattle tests showed were healthy and conversely, the often single hole satellite setts, used as temporary lairage by badgers excluded by the main group and which could be linked to major breakdowns, often on several farms, were marked 'red'.

In recent papers, AHO risk assessment sheets from newly infected farms, showed an overwhelming majority - up to 90 percent - of breakdowns were attributable to wildlife, and in particular to badgers. This part of the jigsaw is then ignored. It was noted that both the BVA and BCVA had mentioned 'assessment' of all available information, in relation to their client's TB breakdowns, and also 'green and red' setts, within their policy documents.

The present non-policy offered by Defra is a shambles, but anything replacing it has to tick several boxes: the main one being the word 'targeted'. This assessment of several farms within an area, using the information offered by tested cattle sentinels, and interpreted by wildlife trackers appears to us to answer that selection process.

If the badgers don't want a skanky, sick individual within their group - why would any cattle farmer?

Healthy Badgers - Healthy Cattle Project ;

1. Initial discussions between veterinary surgeon(s) and farmers take place and an assessment area of ten square miles (6-10 farms with adjacent land) is indicated to the project. An initial meeting with the project team is arranged and local practicalities discussed. Maps showing field boundaries of each farm are to be made available. an area wildlife assessment is booked and paid for (£300 per farm)

2. The wildlife assessment is carried out over several days.

3. The farmers, vets and project team meet to review findings and the TB situation [ of cattle} in the area. Actions to improve bio-security of the herds will be discussed.

Richard Gard, Andrew Cobner, Bryan Hill.

Contact : 01647 24434 or email : rgard01@talkbusiness.net .

Spokes.... and wheels.

The Welsh Assembly's decision to operate a badger culling pilot trial parallel to their enhanced cattle testing programme, may be challenged by the Badger Trust. In a not unexpected hissy fit, the Trust are reported to be attempting to put a judicial spoke in the wheel of the Welsh TB eradication policy.

Badger Trust chairman David Williams said the decision would be challenged on the basis that it is not ‘underpinned by robust scientific evidence.’

We assume that he refers to the ISG's 'robust' scientific evidence rather than anything prior to 1997, or after 2007?

The charity said badgers cannot be killed unless, under the Animal Health Act, it is to ‘eliminate or substantially reduce the spread of disease’ and was ‘both necessary and the most appropriate way but without causing undue suffering’.

True. And the present unchallenged, and possibly unlawful moratorium on this part of the Protection of Badgers Act, has done nothing for the health and welfare of badgers which the Trust pretend to support, but let that pass.

Farmers Guardian has the story.

Referring to the Independent Scientific Group’s 2007 report on badger culling, the Badger Trust claimed any benefits would be ‘at best very marginal’, while the cost would be ‘substantial’. And of course in that sweeping statement, they have deliberately missed the crucial evidence given by the diminutive professor to the EFRA committee on many occasions, when he said (quite forcefully) that culling badgers "In the way in which it was done in the RBCT badger dispersal exercise", was not sustainable. And he (Bourne) stressed the importance of this, with further questioning extracting the painful implication, that a different method, on a more flexible time frame and more tightly targeted could have achieved a substantially different result.

Even the WLU operatives and managers, overseeing the diminutive professor's (political) instructions piled in with their own experiences of this 'robust' type of science.

And the Badger Trust seems to have blindsided the follow up
on the trial, completed last year by some members of the original ISG, which showed even with protocol as badly skewed as this, a drop of 60 percent in cattle TB across all the proactive cull zones, with a corresponding drop of 30 percent in the 'edge' zones was eventually achieved. But that was after Bourne published his report and so is politically and conveniently pigeon holed. Out of sight.

TB and alpacas - advice update.

After a concerted effort, the owners of TB affected alpacas, if not some of their breeders, have achieved not a little success in raising awareness of the susceptibility of these delightful animals to TB.

The British Alpaca Society (BAS) has produced a TB question and answer file on its website, which highlights some problems with alpacas and TB.



As we pointed out in this posting, having made TB notifiable in 'all mammalian species' in early 2006, Defra failed to provide its AHOs with the tools to finish the tracing, restriction and testing part of TB control. The result is a mish mash of voluntary compliance with regulations which are limited in statute to 'bovine species and farmed deer'.

The British Alpaca Society (BAS) has warned its members ignoring bovine TB (bTB) could have dire consequences for the species. The society has set up a TB Action Group and is also raising awareness of the issue on its website and in its membership magazine.

Farmers Guardian has more.